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ABSTRACT
Haotao Wu, Ph.D. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, September 2010.
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Supervisor: Dr. Murray E. Fulton
This study explores a number of the issues around the provision of micro-loans by credit
unions and the agencies with which they work. One of the issues is how information asymmetry
in the provision of microcredit and the resulting rationing of credit to low collateral entrepreneurs
are addressed by the bundling of microcredit with the provision of non-financial services (e.g.,
mentoring). The other issue of interest is the advantages and disadvantages of investor-owned
firms (IOFs) – e.g., chartered banks – versus credit unions in providing microcredit.
Two models of the credit market with both adverse selection and moral hazard are set up to
analyze credit rationing of low collateral entrepreneurs and the potential role of non-financial
services as a selection instrument in mitigating information asymmetry. The first model investi-
gates the situation where entrepreneurs cannot be distinguished by wealth and the second model
looks at the situation where entrepreneurs cannot be distinguished by entrepreneurial skill.
A model of a monopoly credit union is developed to examine whether credit unions have
advantages over IOFs in providing microcredit. By offering a community investment saving
deposit program, the credit union has access to loan funds for microcredit at below-market rates
of interest. The model takes into account both pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives of savers
for participating in the saving program.
A key result is that with information asymmetry, a perfectly competitive credit market will
not produce the first-best efficient level of investment when collateralizable wealth is unavailable.
Micro-entrepreneurs with insufficient collateral face credit rationing. Rationing arises because,
in a perfectly competitive credit market, the collateral constraint limits lenders’ ability to design a
set of incentive-compatible contracts. In response, lenders randomize the credit delivered under
the contract designed for the low collateral entrepreneurs to deter other entrepreneurs from
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choosing it. The smaller is the collateralizable wealth of the low collateral entrepreneurs, the
greater is the credit rationing that occurs.
This study provides a new explanation for the provision of non-financial services such as
mentoring along with microcredit. Non-financial services have traditionally been seen as a way
of providing training to borrowers and increasing the likelihood of them repaying their loans. The
research in this thesis demonstrates that non-financial services can play a role in having borrowers
select the types of loans they wish to obtain. The resulting separation means that the resources
designated for micro-entrepreneurs will not be used by other entrepreneurs. The bundling of
micro-loans with the provision of non-financial services imposes extra costs on entrepreneurs
that obtain a micro-loan in comparison to a traditional loan. Assuming heterogeneity in the
entrepreneurs’ costs of obtaining a micro-loan, it is argued that entrepreneurs who are the target
clients of microcredit programs incur the lowest cost of obtaining a micro-loan, while other
entrepreneurs incur a relatively higher cost of obtaining a micro-loan. If this outcome occurs,
then the higher cost discourages the latter from obtaining micro-loans. Thus, the use of non-
financial services, along with the interest rate and collateral, in the loan contract results in a
perfect separation and a more efficient level of investment.
The analysis also suggests that credit unions, in comparison with IOFs, have advantages in
providing microcredit to micro-entrepreneurs. Credit unions’ advantage stems from their focus
on the welfare of their members rather than on the profits earned. The result suggests that credit
unions are likely to be more capable of successfully operating a microcredit program than are
IOFs. All else equal, credit unions are able to obtain greater support from their saver members,
and thus have more loan funds available for delivering microcredit.
The result also suggests that the member orientation of a credit union can create a deadweight
loss – the stronger the credit union prefers one member group over the other group, the greater
is the deadweight loss – and thus have an impact on both the total benefits for members and the
distribution of the benefits between micro-loan borrower members and saver members. Despite
this, the presence of a credit union leads to a better outcome in terms of both the level of
investment that is financed and the benefits to borrowers and savers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The availability of capital is critical for the development, growth and survival of a business
(Blanchflower and Oswald [1998]). In developed countries, such as Canada, sophisticated and
flexible financial markets have been developed to facilitate the creation and growth of businesses.
While it is reasonable to expect that these markets provide ample and diversified sources of
capital to large firms, the picture is quite different for small businesses, and especially for micro-
businesses.1
Lack of capital is one of the barriers for entrepreneurs in initiating or expanding their busi-
nesses. For example, in the British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey, half of the respondents
claimed that insufficient capital was the reason why they did not operate their own businesses,
although they had considered operating their own businesses very seriously (Blanchflower and
Oswald [1998].2 Since financial institutions are an important source of finance, credit rationing
by these organizations, if present, can have important implications for entrepreneurs, and micro-
entrepreneurs in particular, since most of this latter group have limited sources of finance.
1The primary sources of finance for small businesses are personal savings, bank loans and borrowing from
friends/families (Knight [1985] and Bates [1997]). Large firms have more diversified sources of financing, for
example, debt finance and equity finance.
2BSA surveyed 5,947 randomly chosen employees. 451 respondents (16.8%) expressed that they had considered
operating their own businesses seriously. In 1983, 1984 and 1986, BSA asked this group of respondents why they
did not become self-employed. On average, 51.3% claimed that lack of capital was the reason.
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Recent empirical work provides mixed evidence on credit rationing (see Parker [2004] for a
review). Perez [1998] suggests that there is widespread credit rationing, while Berger and Udell
[1992] conclude that credit rationing “if it exists, may be relatively small and economically
insignificant” (Berger and Udell [1992] , p. 1071). However, even if credit rationing is empirically
unimportant, the perception of it may discourage some potential entrepreneurs from approaching
financial institutions for loans (Levenson and Willard [2000] and Cowling [1998]). In addition,
as will be discussed below, lack of access to credit from financial institutions (e.g., banks) would
seem to be particularly important when borrowers have limited collateral to offer, which is
typically the case with at least some micro-entrepreneurs.
Information asymmetry may be one of the reasons why micro-entrepreneurs are not able to
obtain commercial loans. In the credit market, borrowers often have better information about
their own creditworthiness and willingness to repay the loans than lenders. This asymmetry is
especially the case for micro-enterprises, since banks often have poor knowledge of and little
experience with these businesses, and, importantly, micro-enterprises are ill-equipped to provide
the formally recorded information.3 Banks’ profits are affected not only by the interest rate that
they charge but also the quality of the risk portfolios. To positively affect the quality of the risk
portfolios, banks may restrict credit. Thus, credit rationing may arise in perfectly competitive
credit markets (for example, see Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]; Stiglitz and Weiss [1992]; Cater
[1986]).
To address information asymmetry, banks have developed and employed sophisticated loan
arrangements such as collateral and credit scores to protect themselves from default risk. How-
ever, as a number of researchers have demonstrated, the use of these additional instruments may
not eliminate credit rationing (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss [1992]; Jaffee and Stiglitz [1990]; Coco
[1999]). Moreover, the use of collateral and credit scores by banks makes access to loans difficult
for micro-entrepreneurs. Micro-entrepreneurs are typically those who are in a disadvantaged or
marginalized position in their communities. They may not have the collateral required to obtain
a loan and/or they may not have the business experience (perhaps because of an inability to
3Banks determine whether to approve loans or not according to their judgement on the creditworthiness of the
applicants. This judgement is based on track record, projections of future cash flows and collateral. Consequently,
banks are in a better position to provide loans to bigger enterprises than to micro-enterprises.
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obtain a loan) to have a credit rating. Evidence of this difficulty is shown from a survey of 30
Canadian and 86 U.S. entrepreneurial, small business counselling and financing organizations
(CEDSEDI [1990] cited by Russell [2001]). The Corporation for Enterprise Development points
out that “institutional lenders are frequently unwilling to make loans to welfare recipients, the
unemployed, minorities and residents of poor communities” (CEDSEDI [1990] cited by Russell
[2001], p. 29).
The financing gap of micro-entrepreneurs can be bridged in a number of ways. Microcredit
represents one such attempt. Microcredit is the delivery of small amounts of unsecured credit
to those who otherwise have no access to capital to undertake income-generating activities. It is
based on the idea that, with a small amount of credit, the entrepreneur can start up a business,
repay the loan with the income generated from the business and gradually become self-reliant.
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the pioneer of microcredit, has achieved significant success.
By the end of 2008, it had lent out US$7.6 billion to poor individuals. In 2006, Grameen Bank and
its founder, Muhammad Yunus, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The success of Grameen
Bank has inspired similar projects in more than 40 countries. Microcredit is by far the most
successful attempt to improve the access of credit for the underserved micro-entrepreneurs. It is
“the latest solution to the age-old challenge of finding a way to combine the banks’ resources
with the local informational and cost advantages of neighbours and moneylender” (Armendariz
de Aghion and Morduch [2005], p. 8).
In developing countries and economies in transition, micro-loans are very small, ranging
from a few dollars to up to several thousand dollars, depending on the country and the local
financial market (Von Pischke [2002]). To lend to the “unbankable”, a number of innovations
have been made to enable the microcredit providers to address information asymmetry and
to improve the repayment performance. The most significant innovation is the introduction of
group lending with joint liability. The loans are delivered to a group of individuals who are often
self-selected. If one member fails to repay the loan, all group members would be sanctioned by
being denied future credit, unless the loan is repaid. By means of this arrangement, microcredit
lenders can make use of local information and transfer at least part of the lender’s responsibilities
onto borrowers, including screening potential borrowers (Stiglitz [1990] and Ghatak [1999]) and
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enforcing repayment (Besley and Coate [1995]). Group lending “ is a way to achieve efficient
outcomes even when the lender remains ignorant or unable to effectively enforce contracts”
(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch [2005], p. 115).
More recently, microcredit programs have started to operate in developed countries such as
Canada. Like their counterparts in the developing world, the core activity of Canadian microcredit
programs is to provide unsecured small loans to those who are in a marginalized or disadvantaged
position.
In Canada, the primary microcredit providers are non-profit organizations and credit unions.
The microcredit programs operated by urban credit unions in Western Canada are the focus of
this thesis. Based on the interviews with the staff at three credit unions, namely, Affinity Credit
Union in Saskatoon (formerly FirstSask Credit Union), Assiniboine Credit Union in Winnipeg
and Vancity Credit Union in Vancouver, the staff of seven agencies that work with the credit
unions and nine micro-loan borrowers, the major characteristics of micro-loans delivered by the
credit unions are summarized as follows.
1. Loans are delivered to individual entrepreneurs. Although a few credit unions adopt the
group lending mechanism, they seldom hold group members responsible for each other’s
loans.
2. The loans are unsecured and the contract terms (e.g., interest rate, size and term) are
comparable to commercial loans delivered to small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
3. Individuals ineligible for conventional credit are eligible for micro-loans. The loans are
not designed exclusively for a specific group of individuals (e.g., low-income or women
entrepreneurs) like those offered by non-profit organizations.
4. Flexible criteria are employed to screen the applications with a focus on the viability of
the business plans and personal characters of the applicants.
5. The provision of loans is often bundled with non-financial services, e.g., mentoring, train-
ing and after care. Different approaches have been used to provide non-financial services.
Some credit unions provide these services themselves (e.g., Affinity Credit Union); some
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send the entrepreneurs to local community development organizations (e.g., Assiniboine
Credit Union); and some combine the above two approaches (e.g., Vancity Credit Union).
6. Some credit unions operate a special deposit program to finance micro-loans (e.g., Assini-
boine Credit Union and Vancity Credit Union). The interest rate on such saving deposits is
below the market rate. Members voluntarily make contributions by participating in these
deposit programs.
1.2 Research Objectives
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore a number of the issues around the provision of
micro-loans by credit unions and the agencies with which they work. One of these issues is
information asymmetry which is critical in capital markets, especially in the provision of credit
to micro-entrepreneurs. A number of credit unions have found ways to provide microcredit
to Canadian micro-entrepreneurs. In doing so, they appear to have at least partially addressed
information asymmetry. The approach used by credit unions relies not on group lending, as is the
case in the developing world, but instead on the bundling of credit with non-financial services,
e.g., mentoring and technical assistance.
A significant portion of the research in this dissertation focuses on the informational problems
that would cause credit to be rationed to micro-entrepreneurs. More specifically, the thesis
develops two models – one that considers a situation where entrepreneurs cannot be distinguished
by wealth and another that considers a situation where entrepreneurs cannot be differentiated by
entrepreneurial skill. In both models, rationing of credit to entrepreneurs who have insufficient
collateral may occur in equilibrium. It is shown that linking the provision of microcredit to the
provision of non-financial services can result in a relaxation of credit rationing, thus providing
benefits to micro-entrepreneurs who have insufficient collateral.
The modelling work outlined above is carried out under the assumption of perfect competition
in the capital market. With perfect competition, any and all firms would be prepared to offer
microcredit programs of the type outlined above. Yet this is not the pattern that is observed. While
credit unions and non-profit organizations are major players in the microcredit market, chartered
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banks are not active at all in this market. As well, credit markets are generally oligopolistic in
nature, with a few large chartered banks dominating the industry.
To examine the advantages and disadvantages of investor-owned firms (IOFs) – e.g., chartered
banks – versus credit unions in providing microcredit, a model of a monopoly credit union is
developed. This model explicitly considers the different roles played by borrowers and savers and
the potential conflict that exists between them.4 To raise loan funds for micro-loans, the credit
union offers a special deposit program that pays a below-market rate of interest. Given this, the
potential conflict between borrowers and savers is particularly critical.5 Meanwhile, members’
non-pecuniary concerns (i.e., positive spillovers created by the provision of microcredit and the
consumption of warm glow) are taken into account, because they are one of the primary reasons
for saver members to make contributions to the credit union’s microcredit program through
participating in the special deposit program. The conclusion from the model is that a credit
union that weighs equally the interests of borrowers and savers provides better contract terms to
both borrowers and savers than does an IOF. One of the conclusions to draw from the model is
that credit unions may thus have an advantage in the provision of microcredit over IOFs.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the concepts of microcredit
and the social economy with a focus on a specific organization – credit unions. Chapter 3 reviews
the literature on credit rationing, explores the mechanisms commonly adopted by microcredit
programs to deal with informational problems, such as group lending and dynamic incentives,
and summarizes the literature on the impact of member orientation on credit unions’ pricing
policies. Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to two credit rationing models. The first model examines
credit rationing in the environment where lenders cannot distinguish borrowers according to their
wealth. The second model examines credit rationing in the environment where lenders cannot
4Borrowers prefer lower loan interest rates and savers prefer higher deposit interest rates, while other factors
remain constant. Making one group better off is thus at the cost of another group.
5A credit union has the objective of maximizing the welfare of its membership. As a result, the potential conflict
between different member groups is an important factor that needs to be taken into account by the credit union
when it makes pricing policies. Unlike the credit union, an IOF tries to maximize its profits. Thus, in its pricing
decisions, the potential conflict between borrowers and savers are not important.
6
Chapter 1. Introduction
distinguish borrowers according to their quality. In each model, the potential role of non-financial
services in relaxing credit rationing is examined. Chapter 6 presents a model for credit union
decision-making. This study concludes in Chapter 7 with a summary of the key findings, and an
outline of the limitations and a discussion of the areas of further study.
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Chapter 2
A Brief Review of Microcredit and Credit Unions
2.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is the engine for economic growth. As Drayton notes, “from the fall of Rome
(ca. 476) to the eighteenth century, there was virtually no increase in per capita wealth generation
in the West. With the advent of entrepreneurship, however, per capita wealth generation and
income in the West grew exponentially by 20 percent in the 1700s, 200 percent in the 1800s, and
740 percent in the 1900s” (cited by Dubreuil and Mirada [2008], p. 2). In this sense, communities
with greater “entrepreneurial strength” are more likely to be in a better position to deal with
social and economic challenges. Experience indicates that the economies that provide the most
support for entrepreneurship have experienced the highest growth rates (Farmer [1977] and
Parker [2004]).
Today, entrepreneurship plays an important role in the Canadian economy. By 2003, there
were 2.41 million self-employed Canadians, accounting for 16% of the total workforce (Tal
[2003]). The self-employment sector’s contribution to GDP is significant, although very small
when compared with the other sectors. For example, unincorporated self-employment – account-
ing for just over 60% of all self-employed enterprises – generated about 9.4% of total GDP or
$93.2 billion in 2005 (Rispoli [2009]).
The majority (around 80%) of self-employment initiatives are micro-enterprises (Tal [2006]).
According to Self Employment Development Initiatives, the leading Canadian authority on self-
employment programs, micro-enterprises are defined as being small businesses that are operated
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and managed by the owners with less than three employees, and that usually require less than
$25,000 to start-up; many of them are home-based businesses.1
Only a portion of micro-entrepreneurs succeed. Micro-entrepreneurs are typically those
who are at the margins of the mainstream economy. They are in a disadvantaged position in
their communities mainly because they have a lower level of education, resources or support.
Therefore, although micro-businesses have significant potential for helping their owners build
wealth and become self-reliant (Soloman [1992]), not surprisingly, only a portion of micro-
entrepreneurs can achieve enough success to contribute to the social and economic development
of their communities. Most newly established micro-businesses only survive for a very short
period of time.2 To realize the full potential of entrepreneurship as an engine for growth, a
favourable environment which enables micro-businesses to grow and prosper would be an asset.
2.2 Access to Credit – A Barrier for Micro-entrepreneurs to Becoming
Self-employed
Potential micro-entrepreneurs face barriers to becoming self-employed. Lack of access to capital
is one of the important barriers since access to capital at appropriate terms in a timely manner is
important for a business to start-up, survive and expand.
Lack of access to capital has been identified as one of the most important reasons why the en-
trepreneurs who considered self-employed seriously did not start their businesses (Blanchflower
and Oswald [1998]; Blanchflower, Oswald, and Stutzer [2001]). In a survey in Metro Toronto,
around 30% of entrepreneurs indicated that access to capital was difficult (Russell [2001]).
Unlike large enterprises who have diversified sources for capital, micro-enterprises rely
heavily on financial institutions for capital to start-up or to grow; however, access to credit is
difficult for them. In recent years, micro-entrepreneurs’ access to credit has not been improved
(Wilson and Bailey [2004]), despite the growth of their activities. In order to increase the market
share in small businesses (including micro-enterprises), banks have lowered their interest rates
1There is no single definition for micro-enterprises. For instance, Statistics Canada defines a micro-enterprise as
a business with less than four employees.
2For example, Tal [2006] reports that in a typical year, around 150,000 small businesses (including the self-
employed) start operation and 130,000 or so close.
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and the size of their loans, but have significantly increased the security requirement for loans.3
Between 2001 and 2004, the average security required is $1.52 for each dollar borrowed (CFIB
[2003]). This has made conventional loans more difficult to access for micro-enterprises.
In a survey of 30 Canadian and 86 U.S. entrepreneurial, small business counselling and
financing organizations, the Corporation for Enterprise Development points out that “access to
capital was a key problem for the poor trying to start a business... institutional lenders are fre-
quently unwilling to make loans to welfare recipients, the unemployed, minorities and residents
of poor communities” (CEDSEDI [1990] cited by Russell [2001], p. 29). Goldenberg [2006]
reports that the self-employed rely heavily on personal credit cards and personal savings for fi-
nance; only 34% use commercial financing, while 49% of small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
use commercial financing.4
Although there is anecdotal and theoretical evidence (which will be discussed later) that
suggests that a certain class of entrepreneurs may have relatively difficult access to credit, the
empirical work provides mixed evidence. Berger and Udell [1992] conclude that credit rationing
“if it exists, may be relatively small and economically insignificant” (Berger and Udell [1992] , p.
1071). Similar result is reported by Levenson and Willard [2000]. They estimate that only 2.14%
of small businesses fail to obtain the loans they desired. However, some studies suggest that the
size of firm could be a dimension according to which banks deny credit, which in turn leads to
credit rationing. Levenson and Willard [2000] report the probability of credit denial and the size
of firm are negatively related. According to Thompson Lightstone, smaller firms face challenges
with terms of credit and access to bank loans, in comparison with bigger firms (cited by EMC
[2002]). Levenson and Willard [2000] and Cowling [1998] provide empirical evidence that the
perception of credit rationing may discourage some potential entrepreneurs from approaching
mainstream financial institutions for loans, even if credit rationing is unimportant.
Information asymmetry may be one reason why micro-entrepreneurs are underserved by
mainstream financial institutions, e.g., banks. Banks are exposed to default risk. As a result,
3According to Industry Canada, small businesses have less than 100 employees (if it is a goods-producing
business) or less than 50 employees (if it is a service-based business).
4Statistic Canada defines an SME as any business establishment with 0 to 499 employees and less than $50
million in gross revenues.
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their profits are affected by not only the interest rates they charge but also the quality of their
loan portfolios – i.e., the creditworthiness of borrowers. However, credit markets are notorious
for information asymmetry – i.e., borrowers often have better information about their own cred-
itworthiness and willingness to repay the loans than do banks. The interest rate, thus, becomes an
instrument for controlling the quality of the loan portfolio, rather than an instrument for clearing
the market. Therefore, it is possible that banks restrict credit even if the market does not clear
(Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]).
To address information asymmetry, banks have developed and employed security arrange-
ments such as collateral and credit ratings. Bester [1985] demonstrates that the use of the collateral
together with the interest rate may achieve perfect separation without rationing. However, such
results are not robust. They depend on the assumptions made. As the assumptions are modified,
the results may change dramatically. As Hillier and Ibrahimo [1993] conclude, “the agency costs
associated with asymmetric information may arise in various ways, and that the implications for
theory and policy may differ from model to model. It is, therefore, important to choose between
the different models before attempting to draw firm conclusions from the literature. Making this
choice will require further theoretical as well as empirical work” (Hillier and Ibrahimo [1993],
p. 300).
Information asymmetry and micro-entrepreneurs’ position in the community together make
access to credit difficult for micro-businesses. Information asymmetry is more prominent when
lending to micro-businesses, because banks have little knowledge and a poor understanding of
micro-entrepreneurs – most of whom are in the informal sector, and micro-entrepreneurs are
ill-equipped to provide the formally recorded information. The result is that, in the absence of
conventional information supporting creditworthiness, banks tend to perceive micro-businesses
as bad risks rather than try to identify the good risk. As an OECD report points out, “ limited
market power, the lack of management skills, high share of intangible assets, the absence of
adequate accounting track records and insufficient assets, all tend to increase the risk profile
of SMEs” (cited by Goldenberg [2006], p. 28). This argument applies to micro-businesses as
well. It means that more collateral or better credit ratings are likely to be a necessity for micro-
entrepreneurs to obtain a loan. Therefore, access to credit is difficult for them.
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2.3 Bridging the Financing Gap of Micro-entrepreneurs – Microcredit
The microcredit movement represents one approach used to address the financing gap of micro-
entrepreneurs. Around the world, microcredit programs have emerged and proliferated since the
1970s.5 Unlike the provision of subsidized credit channelled by development banks, microcredit
focuses on the creation of local businesses. Experiments in Asia have indicated that the poor
can help themselves establish a business, generate income, build wealth and become self-reliant
with a small amount of credit. The president of the World Bank claims that microcredit has
“brought the vibrancy of the market economy to the poorest villages and people of the world...
(and) allowed millions of individuals to work their way out of poverty with dignity” (cited by
Williams [2004], p. 146). Microcredit is by far the most successful attempt to improve the access
of credit for micro-entrepreneurs, and in particular those with low incomes. It is “the latest
solution to the age-old challenge of finding a way to combine the banks’ resources with the local
informational and cost advantages of neighbours and moneylenders” (Armendariz de Aghion
and Morduch [2005], p. 8).
Microcredit has a great potential in individual development and economic growth (Bevilacqia
[1998]). Inspired by the pioneers in developing countries and attempting to fill the financing gap,
a number of Canadian microcredit programs have emerged since the end of the 1980s.
2.3.1 Nature of Microcredit
Microcredit is the provision of unsecured small loans to micro-entrepreneurs who need credit
to invest in a small business but have limited or no access to traditional credit. The core activity
of microcredit programs is to supply micro-loans. Micro-loans are different from conventional
loan products in at least three aspects:
1. They target marginalized individuals in the community. All microcredit programs have
the objective of delivering credit to individuals in a disadvantaged or marginalized social
and economic position in the communities in which the programs operate. In developed
countries, the people who choose micro-loans are typically the working poor, those who
5There are more than 2,500 microcredit programs worldwide serving nearly 70 million low-income individuals;
each program serves 25,000 low-income individuals on average (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch [2005]).
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become unemployed as a result of economic restructuring, those who cannot meet their
ends and those who cannot integrate into the mainstream for other reasons (Bhatt, Tang,
and Painter [2001]).
2. They focus on income-generating activities. Micro-loans are intended to generate income
for borrowers. The creation and development of local businesses is the goal and the pro-
vision of credit is the means for achieving this goal.
3. They provide small amounts of unsecured loans. Microcredit programs deliver small loans.
There is usually an upper limit on the size of such loans which varies across programs.
Meanwhile, micro-loans are in essence ‘unsecured’ loans as they require little or no tradi-
tional collateral. As a result, those who otherwise have no access to credit due to a lack of
collateral can obtain the credit and undertake investments, and the financing gap is bridged
or at least reduced.
2.3.2 Impact of Microcredit Programs
Most literature on the impact of microcredit concentrates on programs in developing countries
(Morduch [1998], Hulme and Mosley [1996] and Shaw [2004]). Studies on microcredit programs
in developed countries have shown that microcredit has produced positive social and economic
impacts. Microcredit programs can improve individual and family stability (Mount Auburn As-
sociates [1994]), and increase education, self-confidence and economic options (Servon [1999]).
Wehrell, Campbell, Cunnigham, Mathie, and Lee [2002] report similar findings based on a study
of four microcredit programs in Atlantic Canada: 73% of respondents indicated that they had
higher self-confidence; the 263 micro-entrepreneurs surveyed created a net gain of 173 full time
jobs and 65 part time jobs in addition to the self-employment they created for themselves; and
61% expressed the view that self-employment is why they were able to remain in their com-
munities (Wehrell et al. [2002]). These results indicate that at the community level microcredit
programs can generate positive impact on the local economy – e.g., to combat depopulation
resulting from the decline in employment in the community, to diversify local economies and to
reduce the dependence on social welfare.
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However, the impact of microcredit programs in developed countries is more limited (Schreiner
and Morduch [2002]). Microcredit programs in these countries have difficulties in achieving the
impact that their counterparts in developing countries have achieved. Even if they can impact indi-
viduals as do the programs in developing countries, their overall impact is limited. Schreiner and
Morduch [2002] argue that there are two important factors that have an impact on the performance
of microcredit programs in the United States. One is the structure of the industrial economy,
which is more complicated and has more barriers for micro-entrepreneurs in comparison with in
developing countries.6 Another factor is the small number of micro-entrepreneurs. Schreiner and
Morduch [2002] cite three pieces of empirical evidence – Vroman [1997], Dallinger [1989] and
Schreiner [1999b]. The first two “suggest that microfinance may help about 1 in 100 displaced
workers become self-employed who otherwise would not have” and the last one suggests that
“the ratio for people on public assistance may be closer to 1 in 1,000” (Schreiner and Morduch
[2002], p. 54).
2.3.3 Microcredit in Canada
Canada is a developed country with a well-established financial system. The cause of credit
rationing of micro-entrepreneurs is the result of “the excesses of market forces rather than
their under-development. New technology has led to the ability of financial service providers
to segment their markets precisely and effectively in the context of rampant competition, so
forcing them to ensure that returns in any market segment are being maximized and cross-
subsidy between different parts of their business is being kept to a minimum” (Johnson [1998],
p. 802). According to Johnson, microcredit programs seek to “re-invent” the financial system in
a way that focuses on “social, economic and environmental costs and benefits” (Johnson [1998],
p. 802).7
The context in which Canadian microcredit programs operate is similar to that in other
developed countries but quite different than that in developing countries. First, the market size of
6For instance, unlike their counterparts in the developing world, micro-enterprises in developed countries compete
with large firms (e.g., large retailers and service providers) or against imported goods, and they also face regulatory
constraints.
7In developing countries where credit rationing is the result of an under-developed financial system, a lack of
infrastructure and a poor legal system, microcredit programs focus on sustainability and outreach (Johnson [1998]).
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microcredit is very small. Entrepreneurs’ push toward being self-reliant is weakened by things
such as abundant wage jobs, the social welfare net and regulatory barriers (Schreiner [2003]).
The experience of Calmeadow – the microcredit pioneer in Canada – indicates that it is difficult
to achieve the scale required to be self-sustainable (Frankiewicz [2001]).
Second, human capital is crucial for an entrepreneur’s success. Canadian micro-entrepreneurs
must be decathletes who excel in many tasks such as providing services or goods, paying taxes,
and complying with regulations (Schreiner [2003]). However, micro-entrepreneurs, especially
those with low incomes, often lack human capital (Bates and Servon [1998]). Thus, in addition
to financial capital, microcredit programs often provide non-financial services – e.g., training,
mentoring and technical assistance – to ensure the success of micro-entrepreneurs.
Third, group lending with joint liability, an innovation adopted by many microcredit programs
in the developing world, tends to not work in Canada due to the lack of strong social capital,
the prevailing individualism and the availability of alternative financing channels (for instance,
credit cards) (Schreiner [2003]).
Fourth, microcredit service is more expensive in Canada than in the developing world where
there are economies of scale in microcredit provision, overhead is lower and it is easier to obtain
financial support from national and international donors (Schreiner [2003]).
2.3.4 Complementary Non-financial Services
Non-financial services have been one of the important components of many microcredit pro-
grams in developed countries. The objective of non-financial services is not only to provide
business skills, but to help the entrepreneur develop a new and viable business (Balkin [1992]).
Non-financial services include business training, classes, workshops, business mentoring and
counselling, technical assistance, and after care services.
Financial capital and human capital are complements. With adequate human capital, the
entrepreneurs are more likely to operate their businesses successfully. Based on four Canadian
microcredit programs, Wehrell et al. [2002] report that 73% of respondents who had received
technical assistance and business loans reported that they had increased business planning skills;
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61% of respondents said they had increased budgeting and financial management skills; and
73% of respondents expressed enhancement of self-confidence.
However, given the wide range of problems that micro-entrepreneurs may face, it is difficult
to develop a set of non-financial services that can teach the entrepreneurs a wide array of skills
that fits the needs of different businesses (Schreiner [2003]). Schreiner [1999a] suggests that the
main impact of general training may be to warn the potential entrepreneurs of the risks that they
may face. Entrepreneurs may be discouraged rather than be encouraged if such services are too
generic (see, for example Bhatt et al. [2001] and Bhatt and Tang [2002]).
Non-financial services can play important roles beyond the transferring of knowledge and
skills. For example, the development of a business plan can help the lender track the effort made
by an entrepreneur (Denis [1987]). The training attendance, progress made through developing
a business idea into a business plan, and completion of the training are all signals of the en-
trepreneurs’ commitments to their businesses. The addition of upfront non-financial services not
only helps the entrepreneurs build capacity, but also helps the program screen the entrepreneurs
(Carr and Tong [2002]). However, the screening role may create tension between the services
that try to make the entrepreneurs feel good about their business ideas and those that focus on
imparting knowledge and assessing the viability of the business plans (Bhatt, Plainter, and Tang
[2002]).
To conclude, microcredit is different from traditional credit. It is the delivery of small and un-
secured loans to micro-entrepreneurs for their income-generating activities. As will be elaborated
in the next chapter, many innovations have been made to address information asymmetry so that
microcredit programs transfer the “unbankable” into “bankable”. All over the world, the opera-
tion of microcredit programs varies significantly across programs and contexts. Microcredit is by
far the most successful attempt to bridge the financing gap experienced by micro-entrepreneurs
(Schreiner and Morduch [2002]).
Microcredit creates positive spillovers in a number of ways, e.g., empowering women, re-
ducing depopulation and improving nutrition and education. However, operating a microcredit
program means taking on more risks and more costs. Banks, although they have the expertise
and infrastructures to deliver micro-loans, often have no real interest in it.
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In Canada, the primary providers of microcredit are non-profit organizations and credit
unions. Both of them are part of the social economy. The next section explores the concept
of the social economy. Since the focus of this study is the urban credit unions in Western
Canada, the characteristics of credit unions will be described in detail, followed by a description
of the microcredit programs delivered by three credit unions, namely, Vancity Credit Union,
Assiniboine Credit Union and Affinity Credit Union (formerly FirstSask Credit Union).
2.4 Canada’s Social Economy
Recognizing the importance of supporting micro-businesses, a number of Canadian organiza-
tions in the social economy have established and developed microcredit programs to bridge the
financing gap of micro-entrepreneurs. In 2003, there were nearly 200 microcredit programs oper-
ating in Canada (Chaput [2003]). These programs can generally be classified into two categories:
the programs operated by non-profit community development organizations and the programs
operated by credit unions.8
Over the past two decades, the social economy has become a topic of interest. People call upon
the social economy for an increasing role in the provision of products and social services in the
public interest. The social economy, sometimes referred to as ‘the third sector’, ‘the voluntary
sector’ or ‘the non-profit sector’, describes the activities and the organizations that mobilize
economic resources for the satisfaction of people and that belong to neither the for-profit sector
nor the government (Moulaert and Ailenei [2005]). The social economy is a grass-root response
to the failures of the market and the public sector in providing essential services to people and
the community in need.
The social economy consists of a variety of organizations, including non-profit organizations,
co-operatives, charity organizations and social economy enterprises. They are involved in a
variety of activities, such as education, health and day care, and they have a particular focus on
8The Government of Canada provides financial assistance to micro-entrepreneurs as well. The supports are pro-
vided through a number of government institutions and organizations. For example, regional economic development
agencies of the Canadian government – e.g., the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA), and Western Eco-
nomic Diversification Canada (WD) – support micro-entrepreneurs with access to capital. These agencies also offer
a variety of financial assistance programs in collaboration with other government departments or the private sector.
Some of the programs offered include: the Community Futures; Business Development Program; and the WD Loan
Investment Fund program.
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the disadvantaged individuals. These activities are the means to achieve the social objectives of
the social economy organizations and community economic development organizations (Quarter,
Mook, and Armstrong [2009]).
2.4.1 Defining the Social Economy
There are differing definitions for the social economy (Bouchard, Ferraton, and Michaud [2006,
2008] and McMurtry [2010]). However, there is a general agreement on its key features based
on the types of organizations in this sector (Government of Canada [2004]).
Quarter et al. [2009] defines the social economy as “a bridging concept for organizations
that have social objectives central to their mission and their practice, and either have explicit
economic objectives or generate some economic value through the services they provide and
purchase that they undertake” (Quarter et al. [2009] , p. 4). This definition focuses on two core
concepts: social mission and economic value. The social economy thus refers to a large array
of organizations with a social mission. Some are market-based and overlap with those in the
private sector, and some are civil society organizations and overlap with those in the public
sector. The organizations that fall in the social economy share some common characteristics: (1)
social objectives that are central to the organization’s mission from its establishment; (2) social
ownership, which means that the organization generally does not belong to a particular individual
and thus the surplus revenues generated are used for an improvement in the services it provides (if
there is a loss, then its services would be reduced); (3) volunteer and social participation directed
to enhance the services the organization provides; and (4) civic engagement which provides “a
space through which people can engage with each other in a constructive manner” (Quarter et al.
[2009], p. 24).
Social economy organizations are neither private nor public. They operate within the tradi-
tional market-based system, but their primary objective is the improvement of the social well-
being of members of a community through economic activities, rather than the maximization of
profits. Bouchard et al. [2006, 2008] identify four criteria to further clarify this concept:
1. The organization must engage in an economic activity producing either a service or a
product;
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2. Distribution of surplus among the members is limited or even prohibited;
3. The organization is a voluntary association of members; and
4. A democratic governance process is employed, that is, the decision-making is based on
the use of the services or goods rather than capital investment.
A broader definition is given by McMurtry [2010], who refers to the social economy as
“economic activity neither controlled directly by the state nor by the profit logic of the market;
activity that prioritizes the social well-being of communities and marginalized individuals over
partisan political directives or individual gain” (McMurtry [2010], p. 31).
The central aspect of these definitions is that social economy organizations are established
for social objectives; commercial interests, if there are any, serve to achieve the social objectives.
People participate in the social economy because they want to make a difference in their own
lives or their communities and because there is a belief that the existing market-based options
are insufficient to meet their needs or the needs of their communities. The development of the
social economy occurs because there is a desire to find new ways to meet the unmet needs
caused by market or government failures and address important social and economic issues.
As McMurty argues, people who want to make the changes, as social economy actors, “must
begin to conceptualize themselves not as individual agents, but rather as constituting a part of a
movement...” (McMurtry [2010], p. 30)
The emergence of the social economy can be linked to information asymmetry. As Peter Lloyd
indicates, social economy organizations “represent a form of economically rational response to
certain kinds of market failure; an important instrument to respond to conditions where imperfect
and asymmetric information exists between buyers and suppliers, workers and managers; an
efficient way to cope with high transaction costs in those activities where this is an issue, and
above all, they have real competitive weight under circumstances where trust is a key component
of the provider-client inter-relationship” (cited by Morrissey and Mclvor [2008], p. 11).
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2.4.2 Credit Unions as a Part of the Social Economy
“A credit union is not an ordinary financial concern, seeking to enrich its members
at the expense of the general public. Neither is it a loan company, seeking to make
a profit at the expense of the unfortunate... The Credit Union is nothing of the kind;
it is an expression, in the field of economics, of a high social ideal” (Alphonse
Desjardins cited by Coyle and Wehrell [2006], p. 4).
Co-operatives (including credit unions) are organizations that are owned and democratically
governed by members. The owners of a co-operative are also the users of the products or ser-
vices provided by the co-operative. These organizations are part of the social economy, and
typically balance economic and social objectives.9 Co-operatives serve the common needs of
their members within a community – for example, they can fill a market gap, or correct market
imbalance or empower people.10 The democratic structure helps the co-operative to give priority
to its members rather than return on capital. The Rochdale principles set out in the middle of the
19th century have formed the foundation for the development of co-operatives and help ensure
that co-operatives serve the social and economic objectives of their members.11
Credit unions are co-operatives that provide financial services for members. Their economic
and social philosophy is very different from that of the banks owned by investors. The philosophy
of credit unions emphasizes ‘the supremacy of people over money’ (Hannafin and McKillop
[2006], p. 2). Credit unions exist to maximize the economic and social benefits of the membership
(Ferguson and McKillop [1997]).
Credit unions are one of the most pervasive forms of social economy organizations in Canada.
According to Credit Union Central of Canada, across the country, credit unions (including caisse
populaire) have nearly 11 million members, accounting for around one third of the population; in
9There is a debate about whether all or only some co-operatives are part of the social economy. For example, in his
‘new social economy’, William Ninacs only includes non-profit co-operatives in housing, daycare and health-care
in the social economy, and excludes co-operatives that are active in competitive markets (Ninacs [2002]).
10Many Canadian credit unions were formed for this reason – to provide credit to low-income individuals and
farmers who otherwise had no access to it. Currently, credit unions are the sole financial service provider in more
than 900 Canadian communities (Ketilson and Brown [2009]).
11The principles are: (1) voluntary and open membership; (2) democratic member control; (3) member economic
participation; (4) autonomy and independence; (5) education, training and information; (6) co-operation among
co-operatives; and (7) concern for the community.
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2009 there were approximately 1,000 credit unions (including caissee populaire) with aggregate
assets of more than $226 billion (CUCC [2010]).
Organizational Characteristics of Credit Unions
Credit unions have a number of distinguishing organizational characteristics. These characteris-
tics not only qualify credit unions as a social economy organization, but also make them a good
candidate for operating a microcredit program.
1. Credit unions are owned by their membership. The membership is voluntary and open to
all persons who want to use the services and accept the member’s responsibilities without
discrimination. By purchasing a share, an individual becomes a member of the credit union,
and thus has access to the financial services provided by the credit union. Members are
not only the users of the financial services provided by credit unions, but also the suppliers
of the inputs (loan funds) (Taylor [1971]). Credit unions, therefore, are both producer
co-operatives and consumer co-operatives.
This characteristic is important because it provides credit unions with an incentive to
operate a socially-oriented program. Such programs usually produce social benefits (an
externality) but little economic benefits. Members – who live or work in communities –
are able to capture at least some of the benefits. At least a portion of members – especially
those who care about their community – are willing to see that their money is reinvested in
their community in a socially-responsible way. Since they are owned by the membership,
credit unions need to serve the needs identified by the membership. Therefore, credit
unions may have the incentive to carry out microcredit programs.
2. Credit unions are operated on a non-profit basis. The surplus is used to strengthen the
organization and to improve the services. Dividends – if paid – are based on the use of the
services, not on the amount of shares that a member holds. The distribution of surplus is
ultimately determined by the membership.
3. Credit unions employ a democratic governance structure. Members control credit unions
through a board of directors. At general meetings, members elect the directors from the
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membership based on the democratic principle of one-member, one-vote. The directors
– typically community leaders – are responsible for supervising the performance of the
management and determining the general direction and policies of the credit union. The di-
rectors should be responsive to members, otherwise they may be replaced by new directors
elected by members.
This structure enables credit unions to decentralize power, to be responsive to the needs
of the membership and to be innovative in designing and delivering new services to better
serve the membership (Jones [2001]).12
Strengths of Credit Unions
Like all co-operatives, one of the reasons for the formation of credit unions is to address market
failures (Walter [2006]). In credit markets, a common source of market failure is informational
asymmetry.
Historically in Canada, the lack of credit provision in rural areas and among the working poor
was a major factor in the formation of credit unions in Quebec (e.g., the caisses populaire) and in
Western Canada (CICA [1984]). The credit union idea was brought to Canada in the late 1890s.
During that time, the economy was at the early stages of economic development and “co-operative
effort was often the only way for mutual survival” (CICA [1984] p. 5). Banks concentrated
exclusively on the more well-to-do segment and ignored the financial needs of farmers and
the working poor. As a result, there was a lack of provision of financial services. Inspired by
the spirit of co-operation and self-help, committed individuals came together and formed their
own credit unions, which provided them with the credit they needed for the purchase of inputs
and equipment. Since then, credit unions have grown rapidly in size and members. Despite
these changes, credit unions are the only financial services provider in nearly 900 communities
(Ketilson and Brown [2009]).
12This democratic arrangement has disadvantages as well. A credit union’s activity may not necessarily reflect its
members’ interest if members are inactive. Moreover, the democratic governance makes decision-making process
expensive and difficult (Staatz [1987]), and sometimes results in inefficient outcomes. This aspect will be discussed
in the next chapter.
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In their early years, credit unions were formed around a common bond – either occupational,
organizational or residential. With a common bond, “credit union members were differentiated
from unknown borrowers because of in-depth information among the group of members about
the character and economic prospects of one another” (Walter [2006], p. 1-2). This restriction
on the membership gave credit unions a comparative advantage in screening and monitoring the
borrowers (Walter [2006]). Fischer [1998] highlights the importance of the common bonds by
pointing out that the success of credit unions often depends on the strength of the bond.
In addition, credit unions often lent money on the basis of character – the manager and
members of a credit union often had much better information on the creditworthiness of a
borrower than a commercial lender.
However, as credit unions grow and expand, their informational advantages are not as strong
as before due to a number of factors. For example, the common bond of the membership is
no longer required in Canada; the introduction of new technologies, such as credit ratings, has
improved the availability of borrower information. As well, and particularly in urban areas, the
people requiring loans are very diverse – often from different cultures and speaking different
languages. These changes have weakened credit unions’ advantages to some extent.
Despite this, credit unions, especially rural credit unions, still have informational advantages
over banks due to their deep roots in the community. In fact, this could be the case for large
urban credit unions. During the interviews, the staff of credit unions indicated that they tried to
take advantage of their connections with the communities to deliver micro-loans. For example,
they may rely on an individual who knows the community very well for information to assess a
loan application, or rely on a local organization for such information.13
Weakness of Credit Unions
While credit unions have their strengths, they have weakness as well.
Heterogeneity of the membership is inherent in credit unions. The greater this heterogeneity,
the more difficult it is to design the services that allow all members to benefit. This issue is more
important for credit unions because there are two broad groups of members – i.e., borrowers and
13Source: Personal Interviews.
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savers – whose interests are very different from each other. This issue and its implications will
be elaborated in detail in the next chapter.
Credit unions also suffer from the agency problems between the managers of credit unions
and the board of directors, and between members and the board of directors, the free rider
problem and member individualism (see Fulton [2005] for a review).
Despite some weakness, credit unions are important for a socially-oriented microcredit pro-
gram. However, it is not sufficient for them to get involved in such programs. They need good
reasons to justify their involvement.
Reasons for Participation
Credit unions have a number of reasons for engaging in microcredit programs.
1. Members have a concern for their community. The well-being of individual members is
linked to the economic and social conditions of their community. For instance, people tend
to feel insecure in communities experiencing high levels of unemployment, poverty and
social breakdown. Therefore, members would like to see their credit unions demonstrate a
concern for and a commitment to the community through implementing a socially oriented
program, such as a microcredit program. Empirically, this concern for community appears
to be a differentiating feature of credit unions. As an example, a survey in Alberta shows
that credit unions’ involvement with the local community is one of the major reasons for
patronizing credit unions (Dakurah, Goddard, and Osuteye [2005]).
2. Microcredit lending represents a new niche for credit unions. Historically, credit unions
have focused on consumer lending and mortgage lending, and they have been very success-
ful in doing this. However, with deregulation and the entry of foreign banks, and combined
with the fundamental changes in values among Canadians, these two markets are no longer
as profitable and secure as they once were (Delbrouck [1994]). Clearly, credit unions need
new niches. Microcredit lending represents such an opportunity. In fact, micro-enterprise
is one of the fast growing sectors of the economy. It has potential for growth.
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Of course, it is difficult for credit unions to make profits from lending micro-loans to micro-
businesses. But as micro-entrepreneurs build their businesses, they may need more loans
and other services from which credit unions can make profits. Therefore, even though credit
unions cannot make money on micro-entrepreneurs today, they can expect to make money
on them from the conventional services tomorrow, particularly if micro-entrepreneurs
remain loyal to their credit unions.14
3. Microcredit lending offers an opportunity for credit unions to differentiate themselves
from other financial institutions. With deregulation and growing competition, credit unions
become less distinguishable from their competitors. To compete for members and build
loyalty, credit unions need to build a strong public image that makes them different from
the competitors. Microcredit lending provides such an opportunity. The active involvement
in microcredit lending and other community-based initiatives can clearly demonstrate a
difference to members and the public, and keep members with their credit unions.
4. The fate of a credit union is closely linked to the health of the community. In the case
where a community experiences continuous decline, it is difficult for the credit union to
operate and survive (Fairbairn, Ketilson, and Krebs [1997]). This is because the decline
in members’ wealth translates into reduced demand for services, and importantly, it is
difficult for credit unions, as a locally-owned and locally-controlled organization, to leave
the local community easily when the economy is in decline. This is particular the case for
small credit unions.
5. Large credit unions, with a geographically diversified membership, are being created in
Canada as a result of a number of recent mergers. Large credit unions may find it easier
than their smaller counterparts to close a branch that serves a small community, since doing
so only affects a small fraction of their membership base. However, due to their history,
values, philosophy and governance, such decisions may still be difficult for large credit
14During the interview, a credit union loan officer indicated that the micro-loan borrowers remain loyal and
continue to transact with the credit union after graduation because the credit union was the only financial institution
that was willing to lend money to them.
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unions to make. Indeed, as noted from discussions with people that watch the credit union
sector closely, some of the large credit unions have retained a concern for community,
even as they have grown larger. In other cases, however, the credit unions have paid little
attention to this aspect.
2.4.3 Three Examples
A number of Canadian credit unions operate microcredit programs. To understand the current
status and characteristics of the microcredit programs operated by credit unions, the staff of three
urban credit unions in Western Canada (Vancity Credit Union in Vancouver, Assiniboine Credit
Union in Winnipeg and Affinity Credit Union (formerly FirstSask Credit Union) in Saskatoon),
the staff of seven agencies that work with these three credit unions, and nine micro-loan borrowers
were interviewed.
The seven agencies include governments (Western Economic Diversification Canada (WD)
and Manitoba Business Start Program in Winnipeg) and community development organizations
(SEED Winnipeg, YMCA-YWCA of Winnipeg, Jubilee Fund in Winnipeg, Women’s Enterprise
Centre (WEC) in Winnipeg and MOSAIC in Vancouver). These agencies either provide financial
support (e.g., loan guarantee) or deliver non-financial services that are complementary to credit
unions’ micro-loan services.
The borrowers that were interviewed are located in Vancouver and Saskatoon. They include
new immigrants, unemployed single moms and low-income individuals. Most of them operate a
small home-based business, for instance, hair-cutting. Most of the borrowers interviewed report
positive benefits from their investments.
The interviews were semi-structured and were designed to understand why credit unions
implement their microcredit programs and how they work with their micro-loan borrowers. A
copy of the interview questions is found in Appendix A.
The remainder of this section first briefly introduces the three microcredit programs operated
by the respective credit unions and then summarizes their common features. The material in this
section is drawn largely from the interviews.
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Vancity Credit Union
Vancity was founded in 1946. It is Canada’s largest credit union with $14.1 billion in assets,
more than 390,000 members and 59 branches throughout Greater Vancouver, the Fraser Valley,
Victoria and Squamish. Vancity’s operation is guided by a commitment to help people and
communities thrive and prosper through the provision of financial services. Each year, Vancity
invests 10% of its profits in the community. In 1989, the Vancity Community Foundation was
created to deliver Community Development Lending Programs.
In 1997, Vancity took over a peer loan portfolio from Calmeadow.15 Since then, Vancity
has delivered two types of microcredit programs – i.e., a peer lending program and individual
lending programs.
1. Peer Lending Program
Vancity’s peer lending program targets entrepreneurs who have not established a sound
credit history. The first loan level is $1,000 or $2,000 for the graduates of a self-employment
program, and the maximum loan level is $5,000. The interest rate is prime rate plus three
percentage points. The repayment terms range from 3 months to 24 months (Vancity
[2005]).
The loans are extended to a group of people, usually three to six, who come together for the
purpose of a loan. The group members assess and approve each other’s loan application.
Approval is based on the confidence that each member has in the other’s commitments,
resources and ability to repay. After approval, group members must meet once a month to
review the progress in their businesses and loan repayment.16
By 2004, Vancity’s peer lending program had lent out approximately $1.1 million to
301 entrepreneurs with 680 loans (Strandberg [2004]). Currently, Vancity’s peer lending
portfolio is worth around $150,000 with approximately 100 borrowers.17
2. Individual Loan Programs
15Calmeadow ceased operations in 2001.
16Vancity’s peer members provide ‘moral collateral’ since they are not required to repay the other group members’
loans.
17Source: personal interviews.
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Vancity has developed several individual loan programs, including the Self Reliance Loans
Program. These programs provide lines of credit or personal loans of up to $35,000 based
on the borrower’s character or credit history. The loan term is 5 years at maximum. The
interest rate is prime rate plus a risk premium of 4 percentage points. To be eligible,
borrowers must enrol in or have graduated from a self-employment program or a similar
pre-entrepreneurial program.
Vancity also designed a micro-loan program for Canadians with disabilities. The Advice
and Business Loans for Entrepreneurs with Disability (ABLED) program is a joint initia-
tive between Vancity and Western Economic Diversification Canada (WD). This program
provides entrepreneurs with disabilities with loans of up to $75,000.
To date, more than $13 million have been lent out to over 800 entrepreneurs (Hart and
Touesnard [2008]).
In 1993, Vancity launched a socially-responsible investment fund ‘Shared Growth’– a Com-
munity Investment Deposit Program. Since the inception of microcredit programs, a portion of
funds deposited under this program have been directed to micro-loans.18
Shared Growth deposits are one to five year term deposits. The minimum investment is $500
and the maximum investment is $150,000. These deposits provide Vancity with funds at below-
market rates of interest. The difference reduces the debt burden on micro-loan borrowers. By the
end of June 2004, approximately $4 million had been deposited by members under this program
(Strandberg [2004]).
Assiniboine Credit Union (ACU)
ACU is headquartered in Winnipeg. The credit union was established in 1943. In 2009, its
assets amounted to $2.62 billion (ACU [2009]). It has a mandate to make a profit while making
a difference in the community it serves. It is involved in various socially-oriented programs.
Microcredit program is one such program.
ACU has implemented a microcredit program since 1993 when ACU’s board of directors
wanted to make the organization more responsible to the community and took an interest in
18The rest of the funds is used to finance other socially responsible projects, such as affordable housing.
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community economic development. However, at that time, ACU was small, and given the im-
portance of the non-financial services that it was unable to provide, ACU was unable to operate a
micro-loan program alone. Therefore, ACU, together with other organizations in the community,
helped create SEED Winnipeg – a community development organization targeting low-income
individuals. ACU was responsible for administrating a loan portfolio and SEED Winnipeg was
responsible for providing additional non-financial services for borrowers. At that point of time,
loans were small, typically ranging from $1,000 to $10,000.19
Today, in addition to special community loan funds (SEED Winnipeg and Jubilee Fund),
ACU administers a micro-loan program from WD.20 With these supports, ACU is now able to
lend out larger loans, up to $35,000. The interest rate is prime rate plus a risk premium ranging
from 3 to 6 percentage points (mostly plus 3 percentage points).21 The maximum loan term is
five years. Loan applications are processed on a case by case basis with a focus on personal
character. ACU does require some physical collateral as an indication of one’s commitment to
the investment.
In 2009, ACU lent out $1.5 million to 55 organizations, and its outstanding micro-loans
amounted to $3.4 million (ACU [2009]). Cumulatively, ACU has helped more than 400 en-
trepreneurs to develop their own businesses.22
ACU mainly relies on local business development organizations and agencies, such as
YMCA-YWCA and SEED Winnipeg, to provide non-financial services to micro-loan borrowers.
ACU offers Social Responsible Investment (SRI) mutual funds, Jubilee Investment Certifi-
cates, and ACU Guaranteed Investment Certificates. In 2008, members invested an additional
$7.9 million in SRI products, bringing total SRI assets managed by ACU to $35.3 million at year
end (ACU [2009]).
Jubilee Investment Certificates, which take the form of three to five year term deposits, are
administered by ACU. The interest rate is 2 percent below the regular rate of interest (GIC
19Sources: personal interviews.
20Jubilee Fund provides loan guarantee and ACU provides credit. The projects must meet the investment criteria
of the Jubilee Fund.
21For the interest rate of loans financed by SEED Winnipeg, the interest rate is prime rate plus 2 percentage points.
22Sources: personal interviews.
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interest rate).23 The funds are used to secure and leverage loans. Jubilee Investment Certificates
are an innovation in providing a socially responsible investment product to the general public.
Affinity Credit Union
In 1999, Saskatoon Credit Union, which later merged into FirstSask Credit Union and then
merged into Affinity Credit Union, entered into a partnership with WD to create a micro-loan
program. A $1.5 million micro-loan program was created to provide access to credit for eligible
entrepreneurs with good business ideas but no access to traditional credit. Borrowers can apply
for loans up to $35,000. The loan term is a maximum of five years.24
Affinity provides non-financial services to help micro-loan borrowers build skills and finan-
cial knowledge. Micro-loan borrowers are required to meet with Affinity’s staff once a month.
In its first five years, the program lent out more than $1.3 million in 75 loans. These loans
created around 160 new jobs in Saskatoon area.25
Common Features
The above microcredit programs share some common features.
1. Social benefits rather than profits motivate the credit unions. As a loan officer described,
“what we have determined as a company is that it is the market that is not being served.
We would not necessarily like our micro lending portfolio itself to give us a same rate
of return, or even in some cases a rate of return comparable with our other components
of our business operation. (...) So our company made the decision that here is the market
that is underserved in the traditional way. (...) We want to serve that market. We do not
necessarily want to make it profitable. (...) We recognize and we accept the fact that many
of the small or micro-loans [are] not bringing financial return[s] on our balance sheets or
the bottom line, but it serves the need of our community that is not being met presently,
and it fulfills our mandate as having a very strong values statement in terms of how we
23Sources: personal interviews.
24Source: personal interview.
25Source: personal interview
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reinvest in our community, and the types of services we are providing to the underserved
in our communities.” 26
2. Loans are delivered to individual entrepreneurs. It should be noted that the peer lending
mechanism employed by Vancity is significantly different from the peer lending programs
that prevail in developing countries since group members in the Vancity program are not
responsible for each other’s repayment.
3. Loan terms (e.g., interest rate, size and term), with the exception of Vancity’s peer lending
loans, are similar to commercial loans delivered to SMEs. However, due to the lower
collateral requirement, micro-loans may seem more attractive than commercial loans for
SMEs.
4. The programs are not designed for low-income individuals exclusively. Individuals who
are not on a low income but have difficulties in accessing credit can apply for micro-loans
as long as they are eligible.
5. Non-financial services (e.g., mentoring and technical assistance) have formed an important
part of the microcredit programs administered by the three credit unions. Such services are
either provided by the credit unions directly or by community development organizations
operating in the communities. In many cases, entrepreneurs are required to enrol in a self-
employment program. Such a program may take from several days to several weeks, or even
a year, to complete; while such non-financial services produce benefits to entrepreneurs,
they do impose extra costs on entrepreneurs as well.
2.5 Summary
Lack of capital is frequently a barrier for micro-entrepreneurs to becoming self-employed. They
are underserved by mainstream financial institutions. Information asymmetry in the credit mar-
ket, combined with the micro-entrepreneurs’ disadvantaged social and economic positions in
communities, are the main reason for this under-provision.
26Source: Interviews.
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Microcredit is an approach to bridge the financing gaps experienced by micro-entrepreneurs.
Micro-loans are essentially unsecured small loans. Microcredit programs impact individuals
directly and create positive spillover as well. However, compared with traditional credit, mi-
crocredit is riskier and more expensive. Mainstream financial institutions have little interest in
microcredit and are not directly involved in it.
Credit unions are important microcredit providers in Canada. Their commitment to the
socially-oriented microcredit programs and their strengths in correcting market failures stem
from their co-operative nature.
The next chapter first presents a review of the literature on credit rationing and informa-
tion asymmetry in the credit market. The loan-delivering mechanisms of microcredit is then
introduced since many innovations have been developed to address information asymmetry and
thus reduce rationing. The chapter is concluded with a review of the literature on credit union
decision-making with a focus on the issue of member heterogeneity and member orientation.
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Chapter 3
A Literature Review: Credit Rationing, Collateral,
Innovations in Microcredit and Credit Union Decision-Making
The credit market is subject to serious information problems between the borrowers and financial
institutions. To solve these problems, financial institutions set loan contract terms such as the
interest rate and the collateral requirement to reveal borrower information. Rationing may arise
when these techniques are ineffective.
Given that the problem of asymmetric information tends to be more serious in small enter-
prises – and micro-enterprises in particular – and these organizations tend to be less capable of
signalling their creditworthiness to the lender (for example, by providing collateral as required),
obtaining credit financing may be very difficult for these businesses.
Lack of capital is an important barrier for people who want to be self-employed. In a survey
in the period from 1983 to 1986 in the United Kingdom, about half of the respondents claimed
that they had considered self-employment seriously but gave up the idea due to a lack of capital
(Blanchflower and Oswald [1998]). A consulting report Russell [2001] provided similar anecdo-
tal evidence. Based on a survey in Canada in 1981, Bernhardt [1994] reported that the probability
of an individual choosing self-employment increases with the amount of wealth possessed by
the individual and the family.
This chapter presents a review of the current literature related to credit rationing, microcredit
and credit unions’ pricing policies. It is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents a review
of the current literature on credit rationing, with a focus on the role of collateral. Collateral is
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an important component of loan contracts and often serves as a barrier to credit for the poor.
Section 3.2 presents a brief review of the literature on loan delivery mechanisms of microlenders,
including the famous mechanism of group lending with joint liability that has been adopted by
microcredit programs to bridge the financing gap. This mechanism allows lenders to solve the
information problems in a cost-saving way through group dynamics (peer monitoring, peer
selection and peer sanctions), and to transform the ‘unbankable’ poor to ‘bankable’. Section 3.3
provides a review of the studies on the credit union’s pricing policies, with a focus on the impact
of member orientation on the credit union. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1 Credit Rationing and Information Asymmetry
Credit rationing refers to the denial of credit at the going price (Bhattacharya and Thakor [1993]).
That is, banks offer credit at a price where there is an excess demand. Some borrowers are denied
credit even though: (1) they are willing to pay a higher interest rate or pledge more collateral;
and (2) they are observationally indistinguishable from the borrowers who do receive a loan.
Rationing can also occur when borrowers receive a smaller loan than the amount for which they
applied. In this study, the focus is the first type of rationing.
3.1.1 Information Asymmetry and Credit Rationing
Financial institutions are exposed to repayment risk or default risk. In the credit market, the
borrowers receive the loans or credit at one point of time, and do not need to honour their
obligations until some time later. This raises the problem of repayment risk: are the borrowers
able and willing to pay back the loans when they are due?
The profits of financial institutions are affected not only by the interest rate that they charge
the borrowers, but also the repayment risk of the loans that they have made. The repayment
risk depends crucially on the borrowers’ ability and willingness to repay the loans, an ability
that is private information to the borrowers and unobservable to the lenders. The lenders can
only screen potential borrowers on the basis of observable characteristics. They also may not
be able to monitor the borrowers’ investment activities, especially when the monitoring cost
is sufficiently high. As a result, the credit market is characterized by information asymmetry
between the lenders and the borrowers. This feature prevents the conventional price mechanism
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from clearing the market: the interest rate does not always adjust to clear the market and credit
rationing emerges as a result.
After the work of Akerlof [1970] and Arrow [1963, 1968], the idea that information asymme-
try may affect the market outcome has been widely recognized and applied to the credit market.
Akerlof and Arrow focused on different problems associated with information asymmetry. Ak-
erlof considered the problem of adverse selection. The sellers – knowing the quality of their
products – offer products of different qualities to the buyers who cannot detect the difference in
quality. The buyers offer a price to the sellers based on their perceptions of the average quality of
the products. This price is likely to discourage sellers who sell good quality products that have
a reservation price that exceeds the price offered. The outcome is that the good quality products
are driven away by the bad quality products.
Arrow considered the problem of moral hazard. The principal enters into a contract with
the agent. The principal can neither stipulate what actions the agent should take because of the
incompleteness of the contract, nor monitor the agent’s actions. The principal and the agent have
different preferences, but are both affected by the agent’s actions. To discourage the agent from
taking undesired actions, the principal designs a contract to ensure that the agent’s interest is
aligned with the principal’s. “The key point is that the behaviour of the agent, which the principal
wishes to control, is a function of the terms of the contract between them” (Hillier and Ibrahimo
[1993], p. 275).
Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] applied the idea of adverse selection and moral hazard to the credit
market. Stiglitz and Weiss explained that an increase in the interest rate may affect the quality
or the riskiness of the pool of loans by either: (1) discouraging good risk borrowers (adverse
selection); or (2) causing the borrowers to undertake undesired actions (moral hazard). The
problem of adverse selection arises where some borrowers are inherently bad risk and some
are inherently good risk. While the borrowers know their types, the lenders do not have this
information. Under these conditions, the interest rate plays a role as a screening device: those
who are willing to pay a higher interest rate are bad risk – they are willing to borrow at a higher
rate because they know their probability of repaying the loan is low.
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The problem of moral hazard arises if the lenders have no control over the borrowers’
investment choices. With an increase in the interest rate, the borrowers’ return from the investment
decreases. As a result, it becomes more profitable to undertake the riskier investments (one that
has a higher return if successful).
With adverse selection or moral hazard, the increase in the interest rate has an adverse
impact on the riskiness of the risk pool. The lenders’ profits are affected by both the interest
rate charged and the riskiness of the loan portfolio. Consequently, the lenders’ profits increase
slowly compared to the increase in the interest rate, and beyond a point, may actually fall. If
the optimal rate at which the lenders’ profits are maximized is lower than the rate at which the
market cleares, rationing may occur because the lenders have no motivation to charge a higher
rate to clear the market.
Ghatak [1999] focused on adverse selection and found a similar pattern. In Clemenz [1986],
the borrowers have different costs of default. Honest borrowers have high costs of default. Given
the high default costs, honest borrowers are on the margin of borrowing. The result is that an
increase in the interest rate forces them to withdraw first. The adverse selection effect emerges.
The rationing result in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] may occur.1
Parker [2001] argued that the difference in the borrowers’ ability to carry out their investments
may give rise to credit rationing. The reason is that the most able entrepreneurs are more likely
to find a satisfying paid job, hence a higher interest rate discourages this type of borrower
from borrowing. Thus, the high interest rate results in a decrease in the average ability and the
probability of success of the borrower pool, and therefore may negatively affect the lenders’
expected profits.2
1Barham, Boucher, and Carter [1996] extended the results of Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] and suggested that
imperfect information may give rise to quantity-rationing outcomes – the second type of rationing. In the model,
they allowed the size of the loans to change with the interest rate. The size of the loans supplied depends on the
interest rate and the riskiness of the loan portfolio. With imperfect information, the lenders offer a single interest rate
that reflects the average risk. In equilibrium, compared to the situation with perfect information, bad risk borrowers
borrow more, while good risk borrowers borrow less. In the case where the demand for loans are different across
borrowers, those who need loans of small sizes may be completely rationed. Barham et al. [1996] thus provided
one explanation why small borrowers are often denied.
2Schreft and Villamil [1992] demonstrated that with market power, a profit-maximizing lender can price dis-
criminate by setting “an inverse relationship” between the loan size and the interest rate – through this schedule,
the lender can reveal the endowment of the borrowers. In the model, all borrowers except the largest borrowers are
credit rationed: smaller borrowers are more rationed.
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Watson [1984] took another approach. In his model, the borrowers respond to an increase in
the interest rate by reducing their effort. So a higher interest rate increases the cost of monitoring
for the lenders. Therefore, it is possible that in equilibrium the borrowers who are denied credit
cannot ‘bid loans away’ from those who receive loans by offering a higher interest rate. This is
because doing so would result in a fall in the profits of the lenders.
A feature of these models is that the interest rate cannot work efficiently because it not only
directly affects the lenders’ expected profits, but also indirectly affects the riskiness of the risk
pool. Therefore, the interest rate is used as an instrument for impacting the riskiness of the risk
pool, rather than as an instrument for clearing the market.
It should be noted that the rationing result is model sensitive. If the assumptions are modified,
the possibility of rationing can be ruled out. For example, de Meza and Webb [1987] is a
well-known model in which credit rationing may not arise in an environment of asymmetric
information. These authors have shown that when the projects have the same expected returns,
but differ in the success probabilities, the interest rate may have a positive selection effect: as
the interest rate increases, the borrowers with riskier projects withdraw from the market. The
lenders benefit from the higher repayment rate as a result of the increase in the interest rate and
the improvement in the risk of the risk pool. If there is excess demand for loans, the lenders
would always want to charge a higher interest rate to clear the market. In this situation, rationing
would not occur. Moreover, sub-optimal projects are financed and the equilibrium investments
exceed the socially optimal level.
However, these credit rationing models neglect the use of other contract terms, such as
collateral (Bester [1985]), equity (Myers and Majluf [1984]) and loan size (Milde and Riley
[1988]). The next section examines the literature on the role of collateral in solving information
asymmetry.
3.1.2 Collateral as a Selection Device
Collateral is considered to be an indispensable element of loan contracts by banks. Boot, Thakor,
and Udell [1991] demonstrated that, to reduce the repayment risk of the pool of loans, the lenders
have an incentive to increase the collateral requirements on both good risk borrowers and bad
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risk borrowers in an environment in which the borrowers exhibit adverse selection and moral
hazard.
In addition to providing protection to the lenders against defaults, collateral has a mitigating
effect on information asymmetry. Therefore, it is expected to play a role in reducing credit ra-
tioning. A number of theoretical efforts have been made to investigate collateral as an instrument
to mitigate information problems. The studies can be divided into two categories depending on
the problems addressed (Leland and Pyle [1977]).
The studies in the first category consider collateral as a screening device, dealing with the
problem of adverse selection. Compared to bad risk borrowers, good risk borrowers are willing to
provide more collateral because their chances of actually losing the collateral are lower. Given this
difference, collateral has a signalling role to play: the borrowers can signal their creditworthiness
to the lenders by providing more collateral (see Chan and Kanatas [1985], Bester [1985] and
Besanko and Thakor [1987]). In equilibrium, good risk borrowers provide more collateral than
bad risk borrowers.
The second category of studies regards collateral as an incentive device that can deal with
the problem of moral hazard. The interest rate on the collateralized loan (secured loan) is lower
than the uncollateralized loan (unsecured loan). This reduction reduces the marginal return to
effort for the borrowers. As a consequence, the collateralized loan contract results in a smaller
reduction in the return to the borrowers because “it smoothes the borrower’s repayment cost over
successful and unsuccessful states” (Boot and Thakor [1994], p. 903). The conclusion of these
studies are in contrast with the conclusions in the first strand: bad risk borrowers provide more
collateral than good risk borrowers.
These studies assume that the borrowers of different types have different preferences or atti-
tudes toward collateral. This difference, thus, suggests that collateral can play a role in mitigating
information asymmetry and consequently reducing credit rationing.
However, the effectiveness of this separation mechanism may be very limited. First, in
practice, the borrowers may be different in many dimensions. In this case, the interest rate
and collateral requirement may be insufficient to achieve a perfect separation, and the rationing
result is persistent (see Jaffee and Stiglitz [1990]). An example is Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] where
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the borrowers differ in both the risk of their investments and the level of initial wealth – being
rich also means being less risk-averse. As a result, both the best risk borrowers and the worst risk
borrowers will provide collateral. Based on the framework in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], Coco
[1999] focused on the effect of moral hazard, and demonstrated that rationing may still occur
if the borrowers differ in their risk preferences. In these studies, collateral cannot effectively
separate the borrowers according to their types because the borrowers are different in more than
one dimension. As a result, credit rationing may still arise and more devices are necessary to
solve the problem. Cater [1986] analyzed credit rationing in the agricultural sector, where small
farms are rationed out of the market. Small farms are considered to be less productive and riskier
than big farms. This “farm size statistical discrimination” combined with the problem of adverse
selection and moral hazard make access to credit difficult for small farms: they are rationed out
of the credit market. Barham et al. [1996] provided similar results.
Second, the borrowers may have insufficient wealth to pledge as collateral. In this situa-
tion, the pooling equilibrium with rationing emerges again (Bester [1987], Besanko and Thakor
[1987], and Chan and Thakor [1987]). According to Chan and Thakor [1987], in the competitive
credit market where the lenders compete for the borrowers with each other, rationing does not
occur unless the borrowers have insufficient wealth.
Third, competition in the credit market may lead to persistent rationing. With imperfect
competition among the lenders, the lenders may maximize profits by offering a single pooling
contract. This outcome is examined by Besanko and Thakor [1987]. Chan and Thakor [1987]
found that in the market where the level of competition for the borrowers is low and the level of
competition for savers is high (that is, the interest rate on deposits is endogenously determined),
a rationing equilibrium may emerge.
Fourth, as Mattesini [1990] demonstrated, the usefulness of collateral as a screening tool
crucially depends on the composition of the borrowers. Because the use of collateral is costly to
the lenders, only when the proportion of bad risk borrowers is sufficiently high, it is optimal for
the lenders to incur the costs of using collateral and to offer a set of separating contracts since
the cost is compensated by the benefits of screening; otherwise, it is optimal to offer a single
contract and rationing still may occur.
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Finally, the nature of the game between the borrowers and the lenders may determine whether
a separating or a pooling equilibrium arises (Hellwig [1987]).
To conclude, credit rationing may arise in a number of different ways and in different lending
environments. Collateral has the potential to solve information asymmetry problems in some
cases. However, such a security requirement may result in the rationing of the borrowers who
have insufficient collateral.
3.2 A Remedy against Credit Rationing – Microcredit
As illustrated in the above theoretical work, the lenders prefer to reject some borrowers and
require collateral because of the adverse selection effect and the incentive effect (moral hazard)
of information asymmetry. A possible solution to credit rationing is to explore local information
about the borrowers. One approach is through a social evaluation in which the loan officer and
the people who hold specific information get together through social networks and make loan
decisions. Ferrary [2003] provided an example where the lenders resort to financial counsellors
who have a good understanding and rich knowledge of the community to provide information
necessary to make a risk evaluation.
Many microcredit providers take another approach. They rely on innovative program ar-
rangements to deal with the information problems.
3.2.1 Group Lending with Joint Liability
Group lending with joint liability is an arrangement whereby individuals without collateral get
together and form groups for the purpose of obtaining a loan from a lender. Under this mechanism,
individual borrowers receive loans, but sanctions (in the form of being cut off from future loans)
are imposed on the group if any individual borrower in the group defaults on the loan. Instead
of lending directly to individual borrowers, microcredit providers lend to the groups formed by
self-selected borrowers.
Group lending prevails in many developing countries. The success of some programs, such
as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Morduch [1999]) and Banco Sol in Bolivia (Gonzalez-Vega,
Schreiner, Meyer, Rodriguez-Meza, and Navajas [1997]) is attributable to the implementation
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of this mechanism. For example, the Grameen Bank has lent $1 billion to more than two million
borrowers and maintains a repayment rate of around 97% (Wydick [2001]).
This mechanism enables the lenders to make use of local information to which they otherwise
have no access, and consequently it has the potential for improving the repayment rate, especially
in an environment where the borrowers have strong social ties or social connections with each
other. Group lending with joint liability has been considered as “one of the most innovative
and promising means of making credit available to those without access to the formal financial
market” (Wydick [2001], p. 463), and has rapidly drawn the attention of researchers.
Under group lending, the borrowers self-select with respect to their risks through peer se-
lection (Ghatak [1999] and Van Tassel [1999]). The imposition of joint liability on the groups
provides the borrowers with the incentive to choose group members with care. As each borrower
prefers to choose good risk borrowers, and good risk borrowers prefer to stay with good risk
borrowers, assortative matching can be achieved in equilibrium. Good risk borrowers end up
with good risk borrowers because they do not want to cross-subsidize bad risk borrowers who
are more likely to default on the loans and thus increase the burden on their fellow members.
Group homogeneity is the result of peer selection and is linked to a higher level of repayment
rate (Ghatak [1999]).
Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier [2000] applied this mechanism to developed countries
where the borrowers are not informed about each other’s types. They argue that due to a “collateral
effect” – “cross subsidization amongst borrowers acts as a collateral behind a loan” (Armendariz
de Aghion and Gollier [2000], p. 633), the lender can reduce the interest rate under group lending.
This collateral effect can offset the joint liability effect: when the defaulting partner is a bad risk
borrower, a good risk borrower suffers less than a bad risk borrower. With no local information,
group lending makes “repayment rates be random for both types of borrowers, but it does so in
a way that reduces the extent to which risky borrowers can take advantage of being pooled with
safe borrowers in the same – unsegregated – credit market whilst at the same time saving on
auditing costs” (p. 639).
Group lending provides the borrowers with an incentive to monitor each other’s investment
actions, because each member’s payoff is affected by fellow members’ actions. Therefore, the
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problem of moral hazard can be mitigated (Stiglitz [1990] and Laffont and Rey [2003]). Stiglitz
argued that by transferring default risk from the lenders to the borrower groups, the lenders can
offer a joint liability loan to improve the welfare of the borrowers. Madajewicz [2004] went
further. He demonstrated that group monitoring is more efficient than the monitoring conducted
by the lenders – to achieve the same result, the borrowers incur lower costs of monitoring than
the lender.
However, it should be noted that group lending is subject to the free rider problem. Under
group lending, each member is responsible for the repayment of the group. It means that the
borrower member has to share his returns with the peers. Consequently, the borrower tends to
make less effort in the investment. Thus, compared to individual lending, the borrower members
may be less motivated in generating their returns (Che [2002]). Moreover, the free rider problem
is more likely to arise in large groups – each prefers that her peer members monitor and “incur
the ill will that would result from reporting offenders who have misused the funds lent to them”
(Stiglitz [1990], p. 361). Another problem is that members may collude and default on their
loans.
If group members have close social connections with each other, the social cost of defaulting
may be very high. In this case, social sanctions by peer members against the strategic defaulter
serves as an efficient mechanism for enforcing repayment (see Besley and Coate [1995] and
Diagne [1998]).
Group lending is capable of reducing transaction costs for the lenders (Bhatt and Tang
[1998]). It enables the lenders to deal with groups, and thus save costs of transacting with several
individuals. In many cases, it is slightly more expensive to administer a group of several loans
than to administer a single loan (Schaefer-Kehnert [1982]). More importantly, group lending
allows the lender to not only make use of local information and relations – through the dynamic
of the groups, but also transfer some risk and costs (such as screening, monitoring and enforcing
repayment) to the borrowers. As a result, the lender enjoys both low transaction costs and low
default risk.
Despite the strengths of group lending, this arrangement has significant disadvantages that
make joint liability loan contract less attractive: (1) under joint liability, the lenders pass on some
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costs and risks to the borrowers; (2) given the diversified demand of the borrowers for loans,
it is difficult to design a ‘tailored’ contract to make each borrower in the group satisfied; and
(3) some borrowers simply do not like joint liability contracts as they do not want to be held
responsible for the consequence of other people’s actions. So the application of joint liability
contracts is quite limited and mainly confined to the delivery of micro-loans.
Group lending often comes along with other innovative arrangements that enhance the bor-
rowers’ willingness to repay, such as dynamic incentives and regular repayment requirements.
3.2.2 Dynamic Incentives
Dynamic incentives are an important mechanism for assuring high repayment rates. The key
element is the threat of the denial of future access to loans. The cost of defaulting is to be cut off
from future loans. To forward-looking borrowers whose need for credit is on-going, the access
to future loans is very important, or in other words, their cost of defaulting is very high. The high
defaulting cost deters the borrowers from defaulting strategically. As Armendariz de Aghion and
Morduch [2005] put it, “even without recourse to peer monitoring, collateral, or social sanctions,
microlenders can give incentives to the borrowers by threatening to exclude defaulting borrowers
from future access to loans. In this way, microlenders have a weapon that was unavailable to
failed state-run banks of the past” (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch [2005], p. 123). A clear
disadvantage of this mechanism is that it is not useful if the borrowers do not need to borrow
again.
Another element is the so-called progressive lending. Under this arrangement, the borrowers
start with a small loan. Then, upon their repayment performance, the loan sizes are gradually
increased. As Ghosh and Ray [1997] stated, progressive lending has “the unique advantage of
testing the borrowers with small loans, allowing the lenders to develop relationships in time and
so sort out potential defaulters before the loan scale is expanded” (Ghosh and Ray [1997], p.
493).
3.2.3 Frequent Repayment Installments
Microlenders usually require that the loans be repaid in small installments, starting very soon
after the disbursement. The installments may be weekly or monthly, varying across the programs.
45
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
This arrangement helps the lenders to select the good risk borrowers (Armendariz de Aghion and
Morduch [2005]; Jain and Mansuri [2003]), and serves as an early warning system. Since the
repayment starts very soon, the borrowers should have other sources of income to repay the early
installments. For example, the borrowers may have to borrow from an informal lender. Thus, the
requirement of frequent repayment installments means the lenders in effect lend “partly against
that stream of outside income, not just the proceeds from the project” (Armendariz de Aghion
and Morduch [2005], p.131). In this way, the lenders can indirectly ‘coopt’ the informal lenders
who have good information of the borrowers.
3.2.4 Other Incentive Mechanisms
Microlenders have developed other complementary incentive mechanisms to reduce credit ra-
tioning on the poor populations (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch [2005]). One example is
that they accept collateral in non-traditional forms. This collateral may be not valuable to the
lenders but represent a valuable asset to the borrowers. Thus, the provision of non-traditional
collateral makes a borrower who is considered as “unbankable” due to the lack of traditional
collateral become ‘bankable’, and plays a signalling role.
Making repayments public (Rahman [1999]) and cross-reporting (Rai and Sjostrom [2004])
can be used to improve repayment rates through peer pressure and social sanction. Women seem
to be more reliable than men in repaying their loans (Hossain [1988]). The evidence suggests
that targeting women may be a viable strategy.
3.3 Member Orientation of Credit Unions
Co-operative theory has shown that the creation of a co-operative can help members achieve a
more efficient outcome compared to the outcome under an IOF who has some market power.
Credit unions are financial co-operatives owned by members. After purchasing a share,
individuals become the members of the credit union. The credit union mobilizes savings from
members and lends loans out of the pools of saving deposits to members. Since their own money
is being lent out, members have a keen interest in seeing the loans repaid in a timely manner. This
kind of internally generated funds (hot money) tend to result in a sense of ownership and respect
for loan contract enforcement (e.g., Bennett, Goldberg, and Hunte [1996]), a strong incentive
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for monitoring each other (e.g., Stiglitz [1990]; Laffont and Rey [2003]; Banerjee, Besley, and
Guinnane [1994]; Guinnane [2001]; Huppi and Feder [1990]) and enforcing loan contracts (e.g.,
Besley and Coate [1995]; Guinnane [2001]), and thus achieve an efficient outcome compared to
the outcome under chartered banks (e.g., Hansmann [1990]; Besley, Coate, and Loury [1993]).
Credit unions are not-for profit. After retaining a proportion of surplus for operation or future
development, credit unions return the remainder to the membership – the owners – according
to their patronage. Therefore, credit unions have no profit motive of their own. Their ultimate
objective is to improve the well-being of the members by delivering services to meet the members’
needs and to help them generate income and accumulate wealth (Smith [1984]). Navratil [1981]
provided empirical evidence of this different objective. He examined U.S. credit unions and
concluded that credit unions are loyal to their historical goal of providing members with low
cost consumer credit even if some potential revenues are sacrificed.
Members control their credit union through electing a board of directors and holding them
accountable. At general meetings, members elect their directors from the membership. Each
member has one vote, regardless of the number of shares that he/she holds. The major respon-
sibilities of directors are to determine the general direction and policies and to supervise the
performance of the management. They should be responsive, otherwise, they may be removed
by members.
Like any organization, the behaviour of credit unions depends on certain elements of their
internal structure. For instance, as in any firm whose managers are not also its owners, there
may be a divergence of interest between the managers and the members of the credit union.
Such divergence may cause conflicts and the diversion of the credit union from the objective
of maximizing the welfare of the membership. Two factors further complicate this problem: (1)
members are the users; and (2) directors are democratically elected by the members from the
membership. Thus, “it is difficult for an individual to exert pressure on management, except
through the democratic process, which (...) suffers from severe free-rider problems. In the co-
operative, then, management may be more entrenched than they would be in a public corporation”
(Hart and Moore [1998], p. 45). This manager-member relation has been considered crucial for
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credit unions by some economists and has been examined under different frameworks (see
Fischer and Mahfoudhi [2003] for a brief review).
Another problem that is particularly important in credit unions is that the power distribution
may lead to the maximization of the welfare of a section of the membership, rather than the
total membership. In each credit union, there are two broad types of members: borrowers and
savers. The supply of loan funds is provided by savers. The simultaneous presence of savers
and borrowers may cause conflicts between them. Borrower members and saver members have
different economic reasons for joining the credit union. All else constant, borrowers prefer a
lower interest rate on loans, low transaction costs and lax discipline; while savers prefer a higher
interest rate on saving deposits and strict disciplines to strengthen the viability of the credit
union. Once inefficiencies have been removed from the organization, it is impossible for the
credit union to make the two groups better off at the same time – for example, to reduce the
loan interest rate and increase the deposit rate simultaneously. The improvement in the welfare
of one group is a cost to the other group.
Member heterogeneity makes price setting and cost allocation difficult. These decisions
“directly affect the stockholders’ willingness to patronize and contribute financially to the orga-
nization” (Staatz [1987], p. 38). However, with heterogeneous members, it is difficult to make all
members benefit simultaneously. Meanwhile, managers’ ability to cut prices and cross-subsidize
may be very limited because it could be difficult to convince members who use a particular prod-
uct or service to finance the subsidies for the provision of the product or service that they seldom
use.
There is some empirical evidence on the member orientation of credit unions. The first
quantitative evidence was provided by Flannery [1974] who reported that among 589 U.S. credit
unions over 50% were subject to member bias (cited by Ferguson and McKillop [1997]). Patin
and McNeil [1991a] analyzed a sample of 9660 U.S. credit unions in 1984. Taking into account
the regulatory changes that had occurred, they concluded that 2.7% of the sample were extremely
borrower orientated; 12.9% were weakly borrower oriented; 45.1% were neutral; 29.7% were
weakly saver oriented; and 9.6% were strongly saver dominated.
48
Chapter 3. A Literature Review
A considerable portion of theoretical efforts have been devoted to exploring how credit unions
distribute surplus among different member groups and the possible impacts of regulatory and
supervisory requirements.
Taylor [1971] noted that conflicts between members are inherent in credit unions because
they cannot make each group better off at the same time. Based on the assumption that credit
unions minimize costs, he described credit union behaviour in the most basic form. He showed
that in a saver-dominated credit union, the objective is to maximize average net returns. The entry
of new borrowers can enhance the credit union’s ability to pay dividends. Therefore, the dominant
saver groups consider such an entry as being complementary to their own interests. However,
the entry of new savers may reduce dividend payment for all members. Thus, existing borrower
members have an incentive to restrict the entry of new savers. In a credit union dominated by
borrowers, savers represent the lowest cost source of loan funds. Therefore, it is in the interest
of the dominant borrower group’s interest to allow all savers in the potential membership to
access the deposit services offered by the credit union. However, the entry of new borrowers is
restricted because of the negative impact on the loan interest rates. Finally, existing members in
a neutral credit union are less likely to restrict the membership, especially if there are economies
of scale. The work of Patin and McNeil [1991b] provided some empirical evidence in favour of
Taylor’s arguments.
Almost all the subsequent theoretical works recognize that saver-borrower relation or member-
group orientation may affect the operation of credit unions. Based on previous work, Smith,
Cargill, and Meyer [1981] provided a general objective function of the credit union. Their con-
tribution is the introduction of explicit weights which are defined as the behavioural preferences
of the credit union toward different member groups. The objective function of the credit union
is the maximization of the sum of weighted benefits for the membership. The benefits for bor-
rowers are defined as the decrease in the interest rate on loans if borrowing from the credit union
rather than the next best alternative lender; and the benefits for savers are defined similarly as the
increase in the interest rate on deposits if making deposits at the credit union rather than the next
best financial institution (Walker and Chandler [1977]). The authors demonstrated that com-
pared with a neutral credit union, all else equal, the borrower-dominated credit union charges a
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lower interest rate on loan services, and the saver-dominated credit union offers a higher interest
rates on saving deposits. In an regulatory environment where there are interest rate ceilings, the
saver-dominated credit union may retain an excessive amount of earnings as reserve to bind the
deposit rate ceilings. This is because by doing so the credit union can better ensure the future
dividends.
Smith [1984] extended the above model into multi-periods. He took into account the in-
tertemporal nature of deposit and saving transactions. Smith [1984] examined the comparative
static properties and highlighted the factors that affect the optimal interest rates. These factors
include operating costs and regulatory constraints. He showed that when the preference or orien-
tation of the credit union is evident, the preferred group absorbs disturbances. For example, if the
borrowers are the preferred group, the credit union will adjust the loan interest rate to respond
to the changes in the operating environment, while the deposit interest rate remains constant.
This result occurs because the borrower-oriented credit union attempts to make as much profit
as possible from savers to subsidize the borrowers, and any adjustment in the deposit interest
rate will negatively affect the profit from savers, and thus negatively affect the borrowers.
Emmons and Schmidt [2001] considered credit unions who have as their goal the maximiza-
tion of consumer surplus. They solely focused on the deposit interest rate and found that, in a
one-member, one-vote governance structure, a saver-dominated credit union will set the interest
rate on saving deposits at the minimum that is required for the credit union to collect sufficient
savings to finance loans to borrowers. As the number of borrowers increases, the deposit interest
rate is raised so that savers can extract more surplus from borrowers.
Canning, Jefferson, and Spencer [2003] investigated the optimal pricing policy in an environ-
ment where credit unions return surplus in the form of a subsidy to interest rates with rationing.
The introduction of interest rate subsidy without rationing is inefficient because it creates a profit
motive and distorts members’ decisions. For example, a subsidy on the loan interest rate attracts
more borrowers, and leads to a deadweight loss. The optimal policy is “ to set the volume of
loans and deposits equal to those that would prevail at the market rate, adjusted for any business
costs and risk, and to distribute earnings to [dominant] members through interest rate subsidies,
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which are rationed as not to affect the levels of lending and borrowing” (Canning et al. [2003],
p. 259).
While not focused on credit unions, the work of Hart and Moore [1996] provided important
insights. They focused on IOFs and co-operative organizations and argued that both of them may
lead to inefficiency. Based on the median voter theorem, they pointed out that a small change
in the membership preference has no impact on an IOF but can have dramatic impact on the
outcome in a co-operative.
Based on Hart and Moore [1996], Emmons and Mueller [1997] focused on credit unions’
governance structure. They considered the credit union in an environment where its preference
shifts from one group to the other group as a result of the change in the composition of the
membership. The democratic governance mechanism allows the credit union to shift its policy as
the member preference shifts. The authors found that in the credit union, as the preference (median
member) shifts from borrowers to savers, the credit union adjusts its policy from “underpricing
credit toward the provision of competitively priced credit and deposit services” (Emmons and
Mueller [1997], p. 1) to keep the equilibrium between saver and borrower members. They
concluded that “the threat of withdrawal of borrowing members served as a powerful disciplining
device” (Emmons and Mueller [1997], p. 27).
Emmons and Schmidt [2000] extended the model further to study the pricing and dividend
policies in open credit unions. These credit unions transact with both members and non-members
on a non-discriminatory basis but return the surplus to members only. Thus the conflict between
profit-maximization (in members’ interest) and output-maximization (in non-members’ interest)
complicates the problem of member-group orientation. The optimal pricing policy is now affected
by both the preference and the volume of transactions with non-members, since the credit union
has to keep a balance between borrowers and savers, as well as between members and non-
members.
The above studies focus on the governance structure of credit unions as both a producer co-
operative (from the perspective of borrowers) and a consumer co-operative (from the perspective
of savers) and investigate how credit unions internalize the conflicts between different groups,
produce and price financial services.
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These models are based on the assumption that people pursue their own ‘material self-interest’
only – i.e., they perceive the services provided by credit unions and those provided by the banks to
be homogeneous. Price becomes the only factor that affects the decisions of the members. Non-
economic motives have been ignored. Peterson [1980] raised this point in his critique, “credit
union behaviour can’t simply be classed as saver-oriented, borrower-oriented or managerial.
Our credit union frequently makes “uneconomic” decisions in order to be ‘fair’ or ‘altruistic’
(‘help the little guy’ – by making very small loans, providing share-draft services with no service
charge, or charging below market rates on used-car loans). However, such behaviour may help
our credit union attract or retain deposits when interest rates are high. Many savers appear to be
willing to sacrifice some yield to support an institution that is equitable and charitable” (Peterson
[1980], p. 551).
Non-economic incentives may have important implications. For example, Bundt, Chisea, and
Keating [1989] argued that member orientation of associational credit unions may be affected by
‘fraternalistic altruism’, thus reducing the labour costs through voluntarism. In a more sophisti-
cated way, Amess and Howcroft [2001] explained the behavioural patterns of the membership.
According to them, people join credit unions for two reasons: (1) they cannot obtain the services
elsewhere; and (2) they are socially minded and “believe in the ethos of credit unions and the
spirit in which they operate” (Amess and Howcroft [2001], p. 61). These studies help explain
why credit unions may make ‘uneconomic’ decisions, for example, implementing a socially
oriented project which cannot generate more profits or the returns that are comparable to that
from other services.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has presented a review of the literature on credit rationing, the role of collateral in
mitigating information asymmetry and reducing rationing, the innovative loan delivery mecha-
nisms adopted by microcredit providers and credit unions’ price determination.
The current literature explores credit rationing as a result of information asymmetry. Financial
institutions need good quality borrower information to carry out risk evaluations and make loan
decisions, but they often cannot obtain this information. In a response, they either impose a
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restriction on the loans (credit rationing) or require a positive amount of collateral to solve
the information problems they face. However, these arrangements limit access to credit for
some borrowers. It should be noted that the results in the literature are not robust. When an
assumption is changed, significant changes may occur to the results. Despite this, many studies
have demonstrated that access to credit is difficult to those who have insufficient collateral.
The innovative arrangements derived by microcredit providers – including group lending
with joint liability and dynamic incentives – offer an alternative to deal with information prob-
lems and reduce the rationing of the poor. Some of these innovations (dynamic incentives and
frequent repayment installments) have been used by Canadian microcredit programs. However,
as mentioned in Chapter 1, the peer lending mechanism – the most significant innovation – tends
to not work well in Canada.
Finally, the review of the literature on the credit union’s pricing policies indicates that member
orientation is an important factor that affects the credit union’s decisions, in addition to the
degree of market competition and the cost of the services. However, in the current literature,
non-economic motives have been largely ignored, while evidence suggests that members care
about not only their economic interest but also non-economic interest.
In the next chapter, a theoretic model will be developed to illustrate the wealth impacts on
the credit market, and the role of mentoring and technical assistance as a substitute for collateral.
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Chapter 4
Credit Rationing and Non-Financial Services
as a Selection Device, Model I
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 presented a review of the current literature on credit rationing. The literature explores
credit rationing as a consequence of information asymmetry in the credit market. Under asym-
metric information, the interest rate charged by the lender affects the quality of the loan portfolio
and the lender’s profits. One of the consequences may be credit rationing (defined as the denial of
credit at any price (Bhattacharya and Thakor [1993])). The profit-maximizing lender chooses not
to raise the interest rate to the market clearing level because of the negative effects on the quality
of the loan portfolio and profits (Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]). When more contracting variables
are introduced, such as collateral, rationing may still arise in equilibrium. For example, some
studies have explored the impact of wealth on credit rationing (Besanko and Thakor [1987],
Stiglitz and Weiss [1992] and Cater [1986]).
Credit rationing is more serious for micro-entrepreneurs, especially those with low incomes,
since the lenders often have very limited information on and a poor understanding of these
entrepreneurs’ businesses, and because these entrepreneurs have limited resources. Microcredit
programs are aimed at bridging the financing gap of credit-constrained micro-entrepreneurs.
However, micro-loans appear to be similar to commercial loans delivered to SMEs. For example,
many microcredit programs extend loans to individual entrepreneurs. The interest rates charged
on micro-loans are around prime rate plus two or three percentage points, which are close to
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the interest rates on commercial loans to SMEs. The upper limit on the size of micro-loans is
$35,000, very close to the average size of commercial loans to SMEs. Micro-loans, however,
usually have lower collateral requirements than commercial loans.
Given these characteristics, the following questions arise. What is the difference between
commercial loans and micro-loans? What mechanisms are used to ensure that only the low-
income micro-entrepreneurs obtain micro-loans?
A key distinguishing feature of microcredit programs is that the supply of credit services
is packaged with the supply of non-financial services, e.g., mentoring and technical assistance.
These non-financial services form an important part of microcredit programs. However, such ser-
vices are not provided to the entrepreneurs who borrow commercial loans. The standard interpre-
tation of mentoring and technical assistance is that they contribute to the survival and success of
micro-entrepreneurs (Sievers and Vandenberg [2007]). However, although they provide benefits
to micro-entrepreneurs, these activities increase the entrepreneurs’ costs of obtaining a micro-
loan. The entrepreneurs have to spend time and effort on participating in these activities. The
consequences are loss of working hours and extra expenses (e.g., transportation). It is likely that
there is a differential between the entrepreneurs – i.e., non-financial services make micro-loans
more costly for entrepreneurs with sufficient resources (i.e., wealthier entrepreneurs) than those
with insufficient resources (i.e., low-income entrepreneurs).1 Therefore, only low-income micro-
entrepreneurs find it optimal to choose micro-loans, and other entrepreneurs choose conventional
loans. Thus, bundling the provision of credit with non-financial services results in a self-selection
process which enables microcredit programs to target low-income micro-entrepreneurs.
In this chapter, a model is developed based on Stiglitz and Weiss [1992] to demonstrate that
information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and lenders may lead to rationing on the low-
income entrepreneurs who are collateral-constrained. This model has three key assumptions:
• The loans are always partially secured in the sense that the net value of collateral is less
than the principal plus interest, and hence the lender is exposed to default risk.
1Of course, the costs associated with non-financial services may be costly to some low-income entrepreneurs as
well (for example, a single mom who has to look after her kids while running a business, or a micro-entrepreneur who
has two part-time jobs), and thus discourage them from borrowing. However, to most low-income entrepreneurs, it
is still attractive to borrow micro-loans.
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• The lender can neither distinguish between individuals nor monitor individuals’ behaviour.
• Wealthier entrepreneurs are less risk-averse than low-wealth entrepreneurs.
Given these assumptions, the role of non-financial services as a selection tool is examined.
To do this, non-financial services are treated as an extra contract variable – one that is assumed
to have no effect on the entrepreneur’s entrepreneurial skills – and the focus is put on the
impact of these services on the entrepreneur’s costs of obtaining a loan. With the presence of a
cost differential between the entrepreneurs, the self-selection of entrepreneurs will occur: only
credit-constrained entrepreneurs choose micro-loans. Therefore, non-financial services can be
used as a way of providing micro-credit only to credit-constrained entrepreneurs.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents the basic model. Section 4.3
analyzes the equilibrium in the credit market as well as the extent of rationing. Section 4.4 exam-
ines the potential role of non-financial services in inducing self-selection of the entrepreneurs.
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 The Basic Model
In this model, there are two types of agents in the market: lenders and entrepreneurs. Lenders
are banks or other financial institutions. Entrepreneurs wish to make risky investments but lack
the necessary capital, and thus turn to lenders for external finance. The timing of the game is as
follows.
At time 0, lenders announce their loan contract sets. Entrepreneurs compare the announced
loan contracts, choose the one with the most attractive terms, and make a loan application. Upon
receipt of the application, lenders make loan decisions. If an application is approved, the loan is
disbursed and the investment is undertaken; otherwise, the game ends.
At time 1, entrepreneurs obtain the returns from the investments. If the investments are
successful, the loans are repaid according to the terms stipulated in the contracts; otherwise, the
loans are defaulted. The game ends. In this game, there is no strategic default.
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4.2.1 Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur has the opportunity to invest a fixed amount (normalized at unity) in one
project at most. Let e be the entrepreneur’s initial wealth. For simplicity, it is assumed that initial
wealth cannot be used to invest in the project, and yields zero return: after one period, initial
wealth is still e. Therefore, to make the investment, the entrepreneur has to borrow from a lender.
The entrepreneur can choose between two possible techniques – good and bad – to undertake
the investment. If the project is successful, it yields a return of Ij , where the subscript j = g or
b represents the good or bad technique, respectively, and Ig < Ib. If the project is unsuccessful,
it has a return of zero. The probability of success of the project is pj . The project with the good
technique is more likely to succeed – i.e, pg > pb. Furthermore, it is assumed that the expected
return from the project with the good technique is higher than that from the project with the bad
technique – i.e., pgIg > pbIb. This assumption implies that it is not efficient to finance a project
with the bad technique.
A loan contractE consists of two elements: the repayment requirementR (R = 1+r, where
r is the interest rate on the loan) and the amount of collateral C. The probability of obtaining
a loan is given by γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1), where γ indicates the fraction of the entrepreneurs who can
obtain the loans at the specified contract.
At the end of time 1, given technique j, the entrepreneur’s wealth is Y 1j = e + Ij − R
if the project is successful, or Y 0j = e − C = Y 0 if it is unsuccessful. It is assumed that all
entrepreneurs have the same utility function U (U increases in wealth at a decreasing rate – that
is U ′(Y ) > 0 and U ′′(Y ) < 0). It is assumed there is decreasing absolute risk aversion – that
is dA/dY < 0, where A is the absolute risk aversion (A = −U ′′(Y )/U ′(Y )).2 Thus, as will be
shown later, the entrepreneur with more initial wealth is less risk-averse and tends to invest with
2This assumption has been made in Stiglitz and Weiss [1992] and Coco [1999], and has been proved to be critical
to the rationing outcome in the credit market.
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the bad technique, compared with the one with less initial wealth. At the end of period 1, the
entrepreneur’s expected utility from making a loan application under contact E is
EUj(E, γ) =
{
γ[pjU(e+ Ij −R) + (1− pj)U(e− C)] + (1− γ)U(e) if C < R,
γ[pjU(e+ Ij −R) + (1− pj)U(e−R)] + (1− γ)U(e) if C ≥ R.
If the loan is fully secured (C ≥ R), the entrepreneur always pays off the loan. In this
situation, the entrepreneur’s utility decreases with R and is independent of C. As a result, the
indifference curve is vertical in R− C space.
However, a full collateral requirement (C ≥ R) results in limited credit provision, especially
to low wealth entrepreneurs. As a result, the focus is put on the situation where only partial
collateral is required (C < R). When the loan is partially secured (C < R), the indifference
curve in R− C space is downward sloping,
−dC
dR
|U =
pjU
′(e+ Ij −R)
(1− pj)U ′(e− C) > 0, (4.1)
since the entrepreneur requires a reduction in the collateral requirement C to compensate for an
increase in the repayment requirement R. The indifference curve is also concave in R and C as
shown in panel a of Figure 4.1.3 Notice that γ does not affect the shape of the indifference curve.
In panel a of Figure 4.1, curves U¯g and U¯b are the indifference curves associated with the
good technique and the bad technique, respectively, given γ. The two curves are drawn on the
assumption that, with the given technique, the entrepreneur is indifferent between the contracts
on curve U¯g and U¯b. Curve U¯g is steeper than curve U¯b at any point (R,C). This is because, with
the good technique, the entrepreneur is more likely to succeed and repay the loan, and thus is
less likely to lose the collateral. Therefore, when he/she invests with the good technique, the
3The slope of the indifference curve decreases in R, since
d2C
dR2
|U¯ = −
pj
1− pj
U ′(e+ Ij −R)
U ′(e− C)
[
−U
′′(e+ Ij −R)
U ′(e+ Ij −R) +
U ′′(e− C)
U ′(e− C)
dC
dR
]
< 0.
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a. With no choice of techniques. b. With choice of techniques
R
U b
Ug
SL
R
C CR = C R = C
U¯
good technique
is used
bad technique
is used
1OO
Figure 4.1: Entrepreneur’s indifference curves and switch line.
entrepreneur is willing to accept a larger increase in the collateral requirement C in exchange
for a given reduction in the repayment requirement R than when he/she uses the bad technique:
−dC
dR
|g
U
=
pgU
′(e+ Ig −R)
(1− pg)U ′(e− C) >
pbU
′(e+ Ib −R)
(1− pb)U ′(e− C) = −
dC
dR
|b
U
. (4.2)
It is assumed that the entrepreneur is rational, and that he/she chooses the contract and the
technique that gives him/her the highest level of expected utility. The locus of the contracts at
which the entrepreneur is indifferent between the two techniques is called the switch line and is
graphed as an upward sloped curve SL inR−C space in panel b of Figure 4.1. This switch line
is upward sloping, since
dC
dR
|Ug=Ub =
pbU
′(e+ Ib −R)− pgU ′(e+ Ig −R)
(pb − pg)U ′(e− C) > 0. (4.3)
Assumption 4.1. When full collateral is required, i.e., R = C, the entrepreneur prefers the
good technique; when zero collateral is required, i.e., C = 0, the entrepreneur prefers the bad
technique since defaulting is costless.
This assumption guarantees that, for the same γ, the entrepreneur’s indifference curves
associated with different techniques (curves U¯g and U¯b) cross and cross only once in the area
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where R > C (see panel a in Figure 4.1). The switch line SL is thus an upward sloping curve
in this area (see panel b in Figure 4.1), and it is truncated by line R = 1 since R ≥ 1.
For R and C combinations that lie above the switch line SL, the entrepreneur chooses the
good technique. Thus, a relatively low repayment requirement R and a relatively high collateral
requirement C will give rise to the choice of the good technique. Below SL, R is high and
C is low, and thus the bad technique is chosen. Therefore, by specifying R and C, the lender
can indirectly control the entrepreneur’s choice of techniques. Notice that γ does not affect the
switch line.
The indifference curves are not concave if the entrepreneur can choose the technique. As
shown in panel b in Figure 4.1, the indifference curve is depicted by curve U – the upper envelop
of the indifference curves associated with the good technique and the bad technique, respectively.
The following additional assumptions about the entrepreneur’s behaviour are made:
• If the entrepreneur is indifferent between the two techniques, he/she chooses the good
technique; and
• If the entrepreneur is indifferent between two contracts, he/she chooses the one that is
designed for his/her type.
Assume that there are two types of entrepreneurs – wealthy entrepreneurs (r) (hereafter called
rich entrepreneurs) and low wealth entrepreneurs (p) (hereafter called poor entrepreneurs). To
simplify the illustration, the rich entrepreneur hereafter is referred to as a male and the poor
entrepreneur is referred to as a female. The rich entrepreneur has more initial wealth than the
poor entrepreneur – i.e., er > ep. Let βi denote the proportion of type i entrepreneurs in the
market, where i = r, p and
∑
i βi = 1.
The assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that a difference in initial wealth
results in a difference in the indifference curves: the poor entrepreneur’s indifference curve at any
point inR−C space is flatter than that of the rich entrepreneur, given that the same technique is
employed. This result occurs because the rich entrepreneur is less risk-averse. He thus requires
a smaller reduction in the repayment requirement R to compensate for a certain increase in the
collateral requirement C than does a poor entrepreneur:
∂ dC
dR
∂e
= − pj
1− pj
U ′(e+ Ij −R)
U ′(e− C)
[
U ′′(e+ Ij −R)
U ′(e+ Ij −R) −
U ′′(e− C)
U ′(e− C)
]
< 0. (4.4)
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The assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion also implies that initial wealth has an
impact on the entrepreneur’s choice of techniques. The bad technique is more attractive to a rich
entrepreneur than it is to a poor individual given the same contract. This can be seen from the
switch lines: the rich entrepreneur’s switch line lies above the poor entrepreneur’s switch line.
This is because when the poor entrepreneur is indifferent between the two techniques, the rich
entrepreneur must prefer the bad technique, and thus an increase in the collateral requirement is
necessary to make him indifferent between the two techniques. A switch from the good to the
bad technique can be considered as “a mean utility preserving change” and it would cause “a
reduction in one’s expected utility for a more risk averse individual” (Stiglitz and Weiss [1992],
p. 170). The switch linesSLr andSLp are depicted in Figure 4.2. Because the rich entrepreneur’s
switch line (curve SLr) is steeper than the poor entrepreneur’s (SLp), the two curves never cross.
R
SLr
SLp
O
C R = C
I
II
III
1
Figure 4.2: Entrepreneurs’ switch lines SLr and SLp.
In Figure 4.2, three areas can be identified. Any contract that falls in area I results in all
entrepreneurs investing with the good technique. In area II , the rich entrepreneur invests with
the bad technique and the poor entrepreneur invests with the good technique. In area III ,
all entrepreneurs invest with the bad technique. Moreover, at any point in area I and III , the
indifference curve of the rich entrepreneur is steeper than that of the poor entrepreneur. However,
at any point in area II , the indifference curve of the rich entrepreneur may be either steeper or
flatter than that of the poor entrepreneur.
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Assumption 4.2. At any contract E(R, C) in area II, ∆EUpg < ∆EUrb, where ∆EUpg =
pgU(ep + Ig − R) + (1 − pg)U(ep − C) − U(ep) and ∆EUrb = pbU(er + Ib − R) + (1 −
pb)U(er − C)− U(er).
According to Assumption 4.2, at any contract in area II , the expected utility gain of the
rich entrepreneur is greater than that of the poor entrepreneur. This assumption means that if a
poor entrepreneur finds a contract between the switch line SLr and SLp desirable, so does a rich
entrepreneur.
4.2.2 Lenders
The credit market is competitive. Homogenous lenders finance loans by funds from depositors.
Each lender faces a perfectly elastic supply schedule of loan funds at an exogenous market-
determined rate rf . Lenders are assumed to be risk neutral, since they hold sufficiently large
and diversified loan portfolios to achieve risk-pooling. The lender’s expected return from a loan
extended to an entrepreneur who uses technique j is:
pij = pjR + (1− pj)C −Rf (4.5)
where Rf = 1 + rf .
The iso-profit curve is a linear downward sloping curve in R− C space:
−dC
dR
|pij =
pj
1− pj > 0 (4.6)
The slope of the curve indicates the riskiness of the technique used. Specifically, when the
entrepreneur uses the good technique, the lender’s iso-profit curve is steeper than when the
entrepreneur uses the bad technique, since
−dC
dR
|pig =
pg
1− pg >
pb
1− pb = −
dC
dR
|pib (4.7)
Moreover, as only partial collateral is required (R < C), the lender is exposed to default
risk, since the entrepreneur repays the loan only if his/her investment is successful. Therefore,
the lender’s expected return is affected by the entrepreneur’s choice of techniques. This is shown
in Figure 4.3. The iso-profit curve when lending to a rich entrepreneur is depicted by segments
AB and CD. Along segment AB, the rich entrepreneur uses the good technique, and along
segment CD he uses the bad technique. The iso-profit curve is not continuous because of the
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entrepreneur’s change of technique when the R and C combination falls on the switch line.
Segments AB′ and C ′D are similarly defined for the poor entrepreneur.
U¯r
A
B
B′
C
C ′
D
C
R
R = C
O 1
SLr
SLp
Figure 4.3: Lender’s iso-profit curves
Notice that at any point the entrepreneur’s indifference curve is flatter than the lender’s iso-
profit curve given the same technique j because the entrepreneur is risk-averse and the lender is
risk neutral:4
−dC
dR
|U ij < −
dC
dR
|p¯ij
Thus, when the loan is partially secured (R > C), the entrepreneur’s indifference curve and the
lender’s iso-profit curve cannot be tangent to each other. This is depicted in Figure 4.3, where
the indifference curve of the rich entrepreneur (curve U¯r) is shown. The same argument applies
to the poor entrepreneur.
Assumption 4.3. EUi(E(Rf , Rf ), 1) > U(ei) for i = r, p.
This assumption implies that all the contracts on the lender’s zero profit curve above the
type i entrepreneur’s switch line – either rationing or non-rationing – are desired by the type i
entrepreneur.
4The entrepreneur invests in only one investment, and thus cannot diversify his/her investment risks. The lender,
however, manages a large loan portfolio, and thus is able to absorb losses on any one investment. As a result, the
lender tends to be less risk-averse than the entrepreneur.
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4.3 The Equilibrium
The credit market contains a large number of individually insignificant lenders and entrepreneurs,
and is assumed to be competitive. Lenders are Bertrand competitors. It is assumed that they do
not want to finance the projects with the bad technique.5 To simplify the analysis, it is assumed
that the entrepreneur can only apply to one lender during the period.
The analysis concentrates exclusively on Nash equilibria. Because in the long-run, no lender
can operate while earning negative profits, the focus is on Nash equilibria that produce non-
negative profits. The analysis is first undertaken under the assumption of perfect information.
This assumption is then relaxed.
4.3.1 Perfect Information
With perfect information, the lender can distinguish the entrepreneurs, and an optimal contract
can be developed for each entrepreneur type. In equilibrium, the contracts must satisfy the
participation constraints of the entrepreneurs:
EUi(Ei, γi) ≥ U(ei). (4.8)
The contracts must also encourage the use of the good technique:
EUig(Ei, γi) ≥ EUib(Ei, γi). (4.9)
In addition, because of the competition among lenders, each lender must make zero profit on
the contract offered to each entrepreneur type (if positive profits could be earned, then lenders
would have an incentive to modify their contract terms to earn more profits):
pii = 0. (4.10)
The equilibrium contract thus maximizes the entrepreneur’s utility subject to constraints
(4.8), (4.9) and (4.10). According to Assumption 4.3, all the contracts on the lender’s zero profit
curve and above the type i entrepreneur’s switch line satisfy the type i entrepreneur’s participation
5This assumption implies a slight deviation from risk-neutral behaviour. Profit-maximizing is the primary objec-
tive of the lender. However, the lender is also concerned about default risk to which the lender is exposed. Therefore,
among the possible contracts that produce the same level of profits, the lender prefers the one that is associated with
the lowest level of default risk. So the lender does not want to finance the investments with the bad technique.
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constraint (4.8). Since the optimal contract must be on the lender’s zero profit curve (constraint
(4.10)), constraint (4.8) is redundant and can be dropped. As the entrepreneur is better off when
moving down along the lender’s zero profit curve given the same technique, constraint (4.9) must
be binding in equilibrium. Therefore, the optimal contract for the type i entrepreneur must be at
the point where the lender’s zero profit curve above the type i entrepreneur’s switch line crosses
his/her switch line.
Proposition 4.1. With a perfectly elastic supply of loanable funds, the Nash equilibrium under
perfect information is given by:
E∗r = E
∗
r (R
∗
r , C
∗
r ), E
∗
p = E
∗
p(R
∗
p, C
∗
p) and γ
∗
r = γ
∗
p = 1,
where E∗r (E
∗
p) is the contract under which the lender’s zero-profit curve above the rich (poor)
entrepreneur’s switch line crosses the rich (poor) entrepreneur’s switch line (see Figure 4.4).
R∗r R∗p
C∗p
C∗r
O
C
Π = 0
R = C
SLr
SLp
E∗p
E∗r
Rf R1
Figure 4.4: Equilibrium under perfect information
This result is straightforward. If contractE∗r (E
∗
p) is offered to the rich (poor) entrepreneur, no
new contract can be offered profitably. No lender would deviate from these contracts unilaterally.
Furthermore, no lender restricts credit since denying credit is unprofitable if sufficient collateral
is available. However, rationing may arise if and only if an entrepreneur is unable to provide
sufficient collateral – i.e., ei < C∗i .
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Finally, according to Proposition 4.1, the rich entrepreneur posts more collateral than the poor
entrepreneur – i.e.,C∗r > C
∗
p . To compensate, the rich entrepreneur is charged a lower repayment
requirement – i.e., R∗r < R
∗
p. This result occurs because the less risk-averse rich entrepreneur is
the riskier borrower in the sense that he is more likely to choose the bad technique. As a result,
a higher collateral requirement is necessary to deter him from using the bad technique.
4.3.2 Imperfect Information
Now consider the situation where the lender can neither observe nor have direct control over
the entrepreneur’s choice of techniques. They know that there are rich entrepreneurs and poor
entrepreneurs. They also know the distribution of each entrepreneur type, but they do not know
whether a specific entrepreneur is rich or poor, since a rich individual can always claim that he
is poor and mimic a poor individual’s behaviour if it is in his best interest to do so.
It is easy to verify that, without rationing, the full information equilibrium contracts are not
incentive-compatible under imperfect information. A rich entrepreneur always finds the contract
designed for the poor more attractive sinceEUr(E∗p , 1) > EUr(E
∗
r , 1) and thus always chooses
it. Therefore, a new equilibrium must be found.
The equilibrium contracts must be incentive-compatible so that no entrepreneur chooses the
contract that is not designed for his/her type.6 It is easy to verify that, to be incentive-compatible,
the rich entrepreneur should be indifferent between the contracts that are offered, and the poor
entrepreneur should not choose the contract designed for the rich type:
EUr(Er, γr) = EUr(Ep, γp) and EUp(Ep, γp) > EUp(Er, γr). (4.11)
Meanwhile, the lender must not lose money:
pii ≥ 0 for i = r, p. (4.12)
Let Eˆi (i = r, p) be the optimal contract designed for the type i entrepreneur under imperfect
information.
6The lender uses the loan contracts to induce the entrepreneur to reveal his/her type truthfully while ensuring that
the entrepreneur uses the good technique. Since the entrepreneur reveals his/her type to the lender, if the application
is denied, even though he/she can apply to the lender for a loan under another contract (if there is any), he/she would
not be able to obtain the loan.
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Proposition 4.2. With imperfect information and a perfectly elastic supply of loan funds, Eˆr =
E∗r and γˆr = 1.
In this model, the rich entrepreneur benefits from the presence of the poor entrepreneur due
to information asymmetry. Since the credit market is competitive, it is impossible to design a
contract that is more favourable than E∗r for the rich type. Therefore, the contract designed for
the rich entrepreneur Eˆr must be identical to E∗r .
Proposition 4.2 states that with an unlimited supply of loan funds, no lender would restrict
credit delivered at contract Eˆr (or E∗r ). The intuition is as follows. Restricting credit at contract
Eˆr makes all entrepreneurs worse off. Therefore, by reducing rationing at contract Eˆr, new
contract(s) can be added for more profits.
Two possible scenarios are depicted in Figure 4.5. Suppose at contract Eˆr, the probability
of obtaining a loan is γ0 < 1. In panel a, a less attractive contract A is designed for the poor
entrepreneur. The probability of obtaining a loan at this contract is γ1. To keep the contracts
incentive-compatible, γ0 < γ1 is necessary. CurvesUr(γ0) andUr(γ1) are the rich entrepreneur’s
indifference curves associated with γ0 and γ1, respectively, and the expected utilities of the rich
entrepreneur on the two curves are the same. Curve Up(γ1) is similarly defined for the poor
entrepreneur. Notice that the poor entrepreneur prefers contract A with γ1 to contract Eˆr with
γ0 although it is not shown in the figure. Suppose that a lender offers a new contract B with γ1.
ContractB is the intersection of the switch lineSLr and the indifference curveUp(γ1). ContractB
with γ1 is thus more attractive to both the rich and the poor entrepreneurs, compared with contract
A with γ1 and contract Eˆr with γ0. Therefore, to deter the rich entrepreneur, this lender can
increase γ0 to restore the incentive compatibility constraint such that only the poor entrepreneur
chooses contract B with γ1. By doing so, this lender can attract all entrepreneurs. Moreover, the
profit from lending to the poor entrepreneur at contractB is higher than that from lending to her at
contractA (recall that the lender’s iso-profit curve is steeper than the entrepreneur’s indifference
curve). Therefore, the lender who offers the new contract and increases γ0 accordingly can make
more profits.
Now consider the second option. In panel b, contractA′ is designed for the poor entrepreneur,
at which the probability of obtaining a loan is γ′1. The incentive compatibility constraint requires
γ0 > γ
′
1. In this situation, a new contract B
′ can be offered profitably. Contract B′ is on the poor
entrepreneur’s indifference curve Up(γ′1) (the dashed curve) and is as rationing as contract A
′,
so the poor entrepreneur is indifferent between them. The rich entrepreneur, however, strictly
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prefers the new contract. However, the incentive compatibility constraint can be restored by
increasing γ0 such that the rich is indifferent between contracts Eˆr and B′ with γ′1, while the
poor entrepreneur strictly prefers contractB′. Since the lender’s zero profit curve is steeper than
the entrepreneur’s indifference curve given the same technique, the lender who offers contract
B′ with γ′1 and reduces rationing at contract Eˆr can make more profits. Therefore, in equilibrium,
no lender rations credit at contract Eˆr – i.e., γˆr = 1.
Notice that the above argument is based on the assumption that the poor entrepreneur’s
indifference curve is steeper than the rich entrepreneur’s in the region between the two switch
lines. The argument also applies to the situation where the poor entrepreneur’s indifference curve
is flatter than the rich entrepreneur’s in this region. To conclude, the lender has no incentive to
ration credit under the contract designed for the rich entrepreneur.
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pi = 0
A′
Eˆr
Ur(γ′1)
Ur(γ0)
R = C
pi = 0
Up(γ′1)
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SLr
SLp
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Ur(γ0) Up(γ1)
Eˆr
γ0 < γ1
γ0 > γ
′
1
a b
SLr
SLp
R R
R = C
C C
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Figure 4.5: Rich entrepreneurs are not credit rationed.
Lemma 4.1. In equilibrium, pii = 0 must hold for i = r, p.
Proof. Proposition 4.2 implies that pir = 0 must hold, since contract Eˆr is on the lender’s zero
profit curve.
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According to the incentive compatibility constraint (4.11) and Proposition 4.2, the optimal
contract that can be designed for the poor entrepreneur must lie in the shadowed area in Figure
4.6. According to Assumption 4.2, for any contract in this area,
dγ
dR
|Upg =
γpgU
′(ep + Ig −R)
∆EUpg
>
γpbU
′(er + Ib −R)
∆EUrb
=
dγ
dR
|Urb > 0 (4.13)
must hold as long as the contract is desired by the poor entrepreneur (i.e., ∆EUpg > 0). It means
that the marginal rate of substitution between R and γ of a poor entrepreneur who chooses the
good technique is greater than that of a rich entrepreneur who uses the bad technique, while C
is held constant.
Thus, in equilibrium the lender’s profit from lending to the poor entrepreneur at the contract
designed for her type must equal zero, because otherwise a new contract can be added to the
market profitably. (Q. E. D.)
The intuition is as follows. At any contract in area II in panel a of Figure 4.6, the marginal
rate of substitution between R and γ of the poor entrepreneur is greater than that of the rich en-
trepreneur when C is held constant. This is because at such a contract: (1) the poor entrepreneur
chooses the good technique and the rich entrepreneur chooses the bad technique; and thus the for-
mer benefits more from a small reduction inR than does the latter; and (2) the poor entrepreneur
suffers less as a result of a slight reduction in γ than does a rich entrepreneur (Assumption 4.2).
As a result, when the collateral requirement is held constant, the poor entrepreneur is willing
to accept a larger reduction in γ for a given reduction in R than the rich entrepreneur. In this
situation, if pip > 0, a new contract can be added profitably. Each lender then has the incentive to
modify the contract designed for the poor type for more profits. Eventually, competition drives
the profit down to zero. This is shown in Figure 4.6.
Consider a sequence of contracts A(RA, CA), B(RB, CA) and C(RC , CA) (in panel a), the
collateral requirements of which are fixed atCA. These contracts are designed such that the poor
entrepreneur strictly prefers contract A(RA, CA) to Eˆr, and the rich entrepreneur is indifferent
between any one of these contracts and contract Eˆr. Note that to make the rich entrepreneur
indifferent, the respective probabilities of obtaining a loan must be ranked as follows: γC <
γB < γA < 1 (see panel b). Suppose that initially the non-rationing contract Eˆr and the rationing
contract A(RA, CA) with γA are offered. Given this situation, a lender has an incentive to add
contract B(RB, CB) with γB for more profits. As shown in panel b, curves Up(CA) and Ur(CA),
respectively, are the indifference curves of the poor entrepreneur and the rich entrepreneur, given
70
Chapter 4. Credit Rationing and Non-Financial Services, Model I
a collateral requirement CA.7 Curve Up(CA) is steeper than Ur(CA). The poor entrepreneur thus
strictly prefers contract B(RB, CA) with γB to contract A(RA, CA) with γA. The lender who
offers the new contract can get all the poor entrepreneurs who are the profitable borrowers,
and thus make more profits. Therefore, all lenders modify their contracts designed for the poor
entrepreneur for more profits until the rationing contract C(RC , CA) with γC is offered, because
beyond this contract, they would lose money. To conclude, each lender makes zero profit from
each entrepreneur type.
Define σij as the marginal rate of substitution between γ and C of a type i entrepreneur who
uses technique j, when the lender’s profit equals zero: σij = dCdγ |U¯i,Π=0 for i = r, p. The term σij
measures the increase in C necessary to make both the entrepreneur and the lender indifferent
given a small increase in γ:
σij = − ∆EUij
γ(1− pg)[ pjpgU ′(ei + Ij −R(C))−
1−pj
1−pgU
′(ei − C)]
> 0, (4.14)
if ∆EUij = pjU(ei+Ij−R(C))+(1−pj)U(ei−C)−U(ei) > 0, whereR(C) = Rf−(1−pg)Cpg .
Notice that according to assumption 4.3, all the contracts along the lender’s zero-profit curve
associated with the good technique are desired by the entrepreneurs, i.e., ∆EUij > 0 must
always hold. It thus means that σij must be positive.
Now consider the equilibrium in the environment of imperfect information. Three possible
situations may arise: (1) σrb < σpg holds at any combination of C,R(C) and γ; (2) σrb > σpg
holds at any combination of C,R(C) and γ; and (3) σrb may be less than or greater than σpg,
depending on the values of C,R(C) and γ.
Case I: σrb < σpg holds at any combination of C,R(C) and γ.
This situation may arise if the difference in wealth between entrepreneurs (er − ep) is small
and the difference between the techniques (pg − pb) is sufficiently large. In this situation, the
indifference curve of the rich entrepreneur between the two switch lines is much flatter than that
7Indifference curves Ur(CA) and Up(CA) are concave in R and γ, because
d2γ
dR2
|Upg =
∆EUpg[
dγ
dR |UpgU ′(ep + Ig −R)− γU ′′(ep + Ig −R)] + pgγ(U ′(ep + Ig −R))2
(∆EUpg)2
> 0;
d2γ
dR2
|Urb =
∆EUrb[
dγ
dR |UrbU ′(er + Ib −R)− γU ′′(er + Ib −R)] + pbγ(U ′(er + Ib −R))2
(∆EUrb)2
> 0.
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Figure 4.6: Profit from lending to the poor equals zero.
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of the poor entrepreneur. Given a downward movement along line E∗rE
∗
p – i.e., the segment of
the lender’s zero profit curve associated with the good technique that is located between the two
switch lines – the rich entrepreneur is much better off than the poor entrepreneur. If this is the
case, although the rich entrepreneur derives a higher level of disutility from a reduction in γ
(recall that ∆EUrb > ∆EUpg), he requires a smaller downward movement along line E∗rE
∗
p to
compensate for a reduction in γ than does a poor entrepreneur. Thus σrb < σpg always holds at
any combination of C,R(C) and γ.
Proposition 4.3. In the environment where there is imperfect information, lenders have a per-
fectly elastic supply of loan funds, the rich entrepreneur has sufficient collateral (i.e., er ≥ C∗r ),
and σrb < σpg always holds at any combination of C,R(C) and γ:
1. if the poor entrepreneur has sufficient collateral (i.e., ep ≥ C∗r ), there exists a unique
pooling equilibrium E∗r where rationing does not occur;
2. if the poor entrepreneur has insufficient collateral (i.e., C∗p ≤ ep < C∗r ), there exists
a unique separating equilibrium with rationing. The contract designed for the poor en-
trepreneur is given by Eˆp = E∗∗p and γˆp = γ
∗∗
p (see Figure 4.7). Specifically,
Rˆp =
Rf − (1− pg)ep
pg
, Cˆp = ep; and γˆp =
∆EUr(E
∗
r , 1)
∆EUr(E∗∗p , 1)
3. if the poor entrepreneur has very limited collateral (i.e., ep < C∗p ), there exists a separating
equilibrium where only the rich entrepreneur borrows at contract Eˆr = E∗r without being
rationed, and the poor entrepreneur leaves the credit market.
As indicated in Proposition 4.3, credit rationing may or may not arise in equilibrium, depend-
ing on the poor entrepreneur’s capacity to pledge collateral. First consider the situation where the
poor entrepreneur has sufficient collateral, i.e., ep ≥ C∗r . Separation is impossible because the
poor entrepreneur has an incentive to increase collateral up to C∗r . Consider contracts A and E
∗
r
on lineE∗pE
∗
r (i.e., curve pig = 0) in Figure 4.7. The probability of obtaining a loan at contractA
is γA so that the rich entrepreneur feels indifferent between these contracts (see panel b). Contract
A with γA and contract E∗r with γ = 1 are on curve Ur|pi=0. This curve depicts the combinations
of loan contracts and the probabilities of obtaining a loan at which the rich entrepreneur’s utility
and the lender’s profit remain constant. Curve Up|pi=0 is the poor entrepreneur’s indifference
curve, while the lender’s profit equals zero. The entrepreneurs are better off with a higher γ and
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Figure 4.7: Derivation of equilibrium under imperfect information: σrb < σpg
a lower C. Curves Ur|pi=0 and Up|pi=0 are upward sloping, and Ur|pi=0 is flatter than Up|pi=0 since
0 < σrb < σpg.8
Suppose that initially the non-rationing contractE∗r is offered. Now suppose that, in addition,
a lender adds contractAwith γA. The rich entrepreneur is indifferent between contractAwith γA
and the non-rationing contractE∗r , and thus chooses the non-rationing contractE
∗
r by assumption.
The poor entrepreneur, however, strictly prefers the non-rationing contract E∗r to the rationing
contract A (see panel b). The lender who offers the new contract thus attracts no entrepreneurs.
Therefore, in equilibrium, no lender has the incentive to deviate from E∗r unilaterally. The
equilibrium is a pooling one without rationing: all entrepreneurs obtain the loans at the same
contract E∗r .
Now consider the situation where the poor entrepreneur has insufficient collateral, i.e.,C∗p ≤
ep < C
∗
r . As shown in Figure 4.7, curvesSLp andUp|pi=0 are truncated by lineC = ep. Due to the
8Curves Ur|pi=0 and Up|pi=0 are concave in γ and C because
−(1− pg)d
2C
dγ2
|U¯ij ,Π=0 =
[
1
γA
∂∆EUij
∂C
+
1
γ
+
1
A
∂A
∂C
dC
dγ
]
dC
dR
> 0
for i = r and j = b; and i = p and j = g, where A = pjpgU
′(ei + Ij − R(C)) − 1−pj1−pgU ′(ei − C). Thus, the
entrepreneurs’ indifference curves on the zero profit hyperplane are concave in C and γ.
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collateral constraint, a pooling equilibrium is impossible. Since σrb < σpg, the poor entrepreneur
would pledge all her wealth as collateral in exchange for a higher probability of obtaining a
loan. Consider the non-rationing contract E∗r and contract E
∗∗
p – the intersection of collateral
constraint line C = ep and line E∗pE
∗
r (see panel a). The probability of obtaining a loan at
E∗∗p equals γ
∗∗
p so that the rich entrepreneur is indifferent between two contracts and chooses
the non-rationing contract E∗r by assumption. The poor entrepreneur strictly prefers contract
E∗r but cannot afford it, and thus chooses the rationing contract E
∗∗
p . When these two contracts
are offered, no contract can be added to the market for more profits. The equilibrium is thus a
separating one with rationing of the poor entrepreneur.
Finally, if ep < C∗p , it is impossible to design a contract for the poor entrepreneur that allows
the lender to break even. As a result, a single contract E∗r is offered. Only the rich entrepreneur
obtains the loan, and the poor entrepreneur leaves the market.
Part 1 of Proposition 4.3 states that with imperfect information, even though the lender can
offer multiple loan contracts, a pair of incentive-compatible contracts does not exist and the
equilibrium is a pooling one, provided that the entrepreneurs can provide sufficient collateral.9
This is because, in this case, the willingness to pledge more collateral in no way signals an
investment with the good technique (recall the assumption that the lender does not want to
finance the investment with the bad technique) or a less risky (more risk-averse) loan applicant.
Coco [1999] also demonstrates that it is impossible to use collateral as a selection tool in a similar
setting where the entrepreneur’s choice of the investments is determined by her attitude toward
risk.
Pooling of the two types, however, implies the possibility of a rationing equilibrium, if the
poor entrepreneur is collateral-constrained (i.e., ep < C∗r ) (parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 4.3 ).
With the collateral constraint on the poor, the equilibrium cannot be a pooling one, because
otherwise the lender can profitably add a new contract. Hence, the equilibrium must be the one
with multiple contracts. The contract designed for the poor has a collateral requirement of ep.
9Taking a different approach, Stiglitz and Weiss [1992] derive the same results in their appendix. They consider
the situation where the entrepreneur strategically selects the loan contracts. The entrepreneur understands that the
lender can make an inference about her characteristics from her choice of loan contract. Among the loan contracts
offered, there is one contract which is designed for the entrepreneurs with the least desirable characteristics, and
the lender restricts the loans granted under this contract. Recognizing this, the individual entrepreneur does not
select this contract, even though it is more favourable. By the same logic, the entrepreneur does not make a loan
application on the contract from which the second least desirable characteristics can be inferred by the lender, and so
on. In equilibrium, the entrepreneurs end up borrowing at the same contract, even though the lender offers multiple
contracts.
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However, the contract designed for the poor is attractive to the rich entrepreneur. If the rich
entrepreneur chooses it, he would invest with the bad technique, since ep < C∗r – the minimum
collateral requirement that enables the lender to at least cover the costs and to solve the incentive
problem of the rich entrepreneur. As a result, the lender’s profit would be negatively affected.
Therefore, the lender restricts the credit granted under the contract designed for the poor to
deter the rich from choosing it. Perfect separation with rationing arises in equilibrium: the rich
entrepreneur obtains credit at the non-rationing contract, and the poor entrepreneur applies for
a loan at the rationing contract, but a proportion of 1 − γˆp (or 1 − γ∗∗p ) the poor entrepreneur
cannot obtain credit. Moreover, if ep < C∗p , the poor entrepreneur is completely rationed.
Corollary 4.1. With imperfect information, if σrb < σpg, the contract designed for the poor
entrepreneur involves more collateral than contract E∗p , i.e., Cˆp = C
∗∗
p ≥ C∗p .
This can be seen in Figure 4.7: contracts E∗r and E
∗∗
p require more collateral than contract
E∗p . This result occurs because, compared with the rich entrepreneur, the poor entrepreneur who
invests with the good technique is more concerned about the probability of receiving the loan
relative to the collateral.
Case II: σrb > σpg holds at any combination of C,R(C) and γ.
This situation may arise if the wealth difference er − ep is sufficiently large and the technique
difference pg − pb is small. Under this situation, the rich entrepreneur’s indifference curve in
R−C space is steeper than the poor entrepreneur’s at any point. Then given a small downward
movement along lineE∗rE
∗
p , the rich entrepreneur benefits less than the poor entrepreneur. Mean-
while, given a reduction in γ, the rich entrepreneur derives a higher level of disutility (recall that
∆EUrb > ∆EUpg). Thus, the rich entrepreneur accepts a larger upward movement along line
E∗rE
∗
p in exchange for a reduction in γ than does a poor entrepreneur. As a result, the condition
σrb > σpg always holds.
Proposition 4.4. With imperfect information, if σrb > σpg holds at any combination of C,R(C)
and γ, there exists a unique separating equilibrium with rationing of the poor entrepreneur:
Eˆr = E
∗
r and γˆr = 1;
Eˆp = E
∗
p and γˆp = γ
∗
p =
∆EUr(E
∗
r , 1)
∆EUr(E∗p , 1)
.
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The condition σrb > σpg implies that for a small increase in γ, a rich entrepreneur is willing
to pledge more collateral than a poor entrepreneur, given that the lender’s profit remains zero.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Derivation of equilibrium under imperfect information, σrb > σpb.
Consider contracts E∗p and A. The respective probabilities of obtaining a loan are set at γ
∗
p
and γA so that the rich entrepreneur is indifferent between any one of these two contracts and the
non-rationing contract E∗r . This is shown in panel b. Contract A with γA and contract E
∗
p with
γ∗p are on curve Ur|pi=0. Note that curve Ur|pi=0 is steeper than Up|pi=0 since σrb > σpg. Suppose
that initially the non-rationing contract E∗r and the rationing contract E
∗
p with γ
∗
p are offered.
The rich entrepreneur is indifferent between them and thus chooses the non-rationing contract
E∗r by assumption; and the poor entrepreneur strictly prefers the rationing contract E
∗
p . In this
situation, no contract can be added profitably. For example, suppose that contract A with γA is
offered. This new contract is unattractive to both the rich and the poor entrepreneurs. Thus, the
lender who offers the new contract cannot increase profits. The result is that no lender unilaterally
deviates from the non-rationing contractE∗r and the rationing contractE
∗
p . In equilibrium, perfect
separation is attainable, with rationing of the poor entrepreneur.
When σrb > σpg, the contract designed for the poor entrepreneur is identical to the one
designed for her type under perfect information. This result arises because the poor entrepreneur
cares more about the loan terms than the probability of obtaining a loan. Therefore, separation
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is possible. A rationing contract with more favourable terms is more attractive to the poor
entrepreneur, while the rich entrepreneur is indifferent between the two contracts and thus chooses
the one that is designed for his type by assumption. Note that in this situation, rationing occurs
even if the poor entrepreneur has sufficient collateral – i.e., ep ≥ C∗r .
Case III: σrb may be less than or greater than σpg, depending on the values of C,R(C) and
γ
Case III implies that there exists a combination of C,R(C) and γ at which σrb = σpg holds.
From the above discussion, an immediate result is given as below.
Proposition 4.5. With imperfect information, if σrb may be less than or greater than σpg, depend-
ing on the values of C,R(C) and γ, the equilibrium may be either a pooling one or a separating
one when there is sufficient collateral. The optimal contract designed for the poor entrepreneur
is either the non-rationing contract E∗r , or the rationing contract E
∗
p with γ
∗
p , or the rationing
contract E∗∗∗p with γ
∗∗∗
p , depending on which contract gives the poor entrepreneur the highest
level of utility. E∗∗∗p and γ
∗∗∗
p solve
σrb = σpg;EUrb(E, γ) = EUrg(E
∗
r , 1); pig(E) = 0.
If however, there is insufficient collateral, i.e., ep < C∗r = Cˆr, the equilibrium is a separating
one with rationing of the poor entrepreneur. The optimal contract designed for the poor is either
E∗p with γ
∗
p , or E
∗∗
p with γ
∗∗
p , or E
∗∗∗
p with γ
∗∗∗
p , depending on which contract gives the poor the
highest level of utility.
Proposition 4.5 states that in Case III the equilibrium can be either a non-rationing pooling
one or a separating one with rationing of the poor entrepreneur. Moreover, the optimal contract
designed for the poor entrepreneur may be either an interior solution (i.e., E∗∗∗p with γ
∗∗∗
p ) or a
corner solution (i.e., either the non-rationing contract E∗r or the rationing contract E
∗
p with γ
∗
p),
depending on the curvature of the indifference curves in γ−C space. This proposition also states
that rationing always arises when there is insufficient collateral.
Clearly, this situation is an interim between Case I and Case II. As the key results remain
unchanged, the discussion hereafter focuses on Case I and Case II.
Now consider the impact of information asymmetry on the welfare.
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Proposition 4.6. Imperfect information has no impact on the rich entrepreneur, but imposes a
negative impact on the poor entrepreneur.
This result is immediate. The rich entrepreneur benefits from the presence of the poor en-
trepreneur when information is imperfect. In the first case – i.e., σrb < σpg always holds at any
combination of C,R(C) and γ – with sufficient wealth (ep ≥ C∗r ), the poor entrepreneur has to
borrow at contract E∗r , rather than at contract E
∗
p . She has to post more collateral than what is
necessary to enable the lender to deal with the problem of moral hazard without worrying about
losing profits – i.e., C∗p . If, however, she has insufficient wealth – i.e., C
∗
p ≤ ep < C∗r – the poor
entrepreneur has to borrow at a rationing contract E∗∗p and thus derives a lower level of utility.
While the welfare of the lender and the rich entrepreneur remain unaffected, the welfare of the
poor entrepreneur are negatively affected by information asymmetry.
Similarly, in the second case – i.e., σrb > σpg always holds at any combination of C,R(C)
and γ – although the poor entrepreneur is able to borrow at contract E∗p , she faces a positive
probability of being denied credit. She is thus worse off as a result of information asymmetry.
Corollary 4.2. The use of collateral is positively correlated with risk.
The acceptance of collateral in a loan contract cannot signal an entrepreneur’s willingness
to take on risk. The rich entrepreneur, who is less risk-averse and thus riskier since he is more
likely to employ the bad technique, chooses the contract with a higher collateral requirement;
and the poor entrepreneur, who is more risk-averse and thus safer, chooses the contract with a
lower collateral requirement. This result is in contrast with most theoretic models that predict a
negative relationship between wealth and the willingness to post collateral (for example, Bester
[1985]). However, the positive correlation derived in this study is consistent with conventional
wisdom and some important empirical studies (e.g., Berger and Udell [1990]; Leeth and Scott
[1989]; Chan and Kanatas [1985]).
If the poor entrepreneur has sufficient wealth (i.e., ep ≥ C∗r ), credit rationing may or may
not arise in equilibrium. If the poor entrepreneur cares about the collateral more than her access
to credit, compared with the rich entrepreneur, credit rationing may arise. If instead, the poor
entrepreneur cares about her access to credit more than the collateral, compared with the rich
entrepreneur, rationing would not occur in equilibrium.
Despite this, the analysis indicates that information asymmetry negatively affects the poor
entrepreneur’s access to credit and welfare. Under imperfect information, the lender has at least
three objectives to accomplish: (1) to deter the entrepreneurs from choosing the bad technique;
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(2) to induce self-selection; and (3) to be competitive and make non-negative profits. The lender
needs more instruments – in addition to R and C – to achieve these objectives. Rationing is
such an instrument. But this instrument is useful if either another imperfection is present – some
entrepreneurs are collateral-constrained (i.e., C∗p ≤ ep < Cˆr) or the poor entrepreneur is more
concerned about collateral than being rationed relative to the rich entrepreneur (i.e., Case II).
In the former situation, the degree of rationing is negatively affected by ep; while in the latter
situation, rationing always occurs, and the degree of rationing is independent of ep provided that
ep ≥ C∗p .
4.4 Non-Financial Services as a Selection Tool
In microcredit lending, the supply of credit is often linked to the supply of non-financial services
(e.g., mentoring and technical assistance). The purpose of this section is to analyze the role of
non-financial services as a selection tool in facilitating microcredit programs to reach the targeted
individuals.10
Define a contract with a component of non-financial services as a mentoring loan contract.
If an entrepreneur borrows under a mentoring loan contract, he/she has to use the non-financial
services designated by the lender.
Although the entrepreneurs who are qualified for commercial loans could benefit from men-
toring activities to some extent, they have more resources and supports, and thus tend to consider
that a micro-loan with a mentoring component is not worthwhile. As will be shown, the mentor-
ing requirement plays a role in inducing self-selection: only the low-income micro-entrepreneurs
choose micro-loans.
In the model that is developed below, the focus of the analysis is on the impact of the mentoring
requirement on the entrepreneurs’ costs of obtaining a loan. For simplicity, it is assumed that
the poor entrepreneur has insufficient collateral – i.e., C∗p ≤ ep < C∗r – since rationing arises in
equilibrium in this situation in each case.
4.4.1 Impact of Mentoring Requirement
Non-financial services produce benefits to entrepreneurs. The benefits include the improvement
in knowledge and skill necessary to undertake the investments, problem-solving capabilities and
self-confidence. Being in a less advantaged situation, the poor entrepreneur tends to benefit more
from non-financial services than does the rich entrepreneur.
10Hereafter, the terms of non-financial services and mentoring and technical assistance are used interchangeably.
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Non-financial services impose extra costs on entrepreneurs as well. The costs mainly take
two forms: (1) the loss of working time as a result of using the lender’s mentoring services – e.g.,
the time spent on producing the information required by the lender; and (2) the psychological
cost of information disclosure if the entrepreneur is reluctant to reveal information. The rich
entrepreneur is assumed to have a higher value for time (or opportunity cost) and a lower
willingness to disclose information, and thus a higher cost of obtaining a mentoring loan.
Given these benefits and costs, the net benefit captured by a poor entrepreneur is greater
than the net benefit captured by a rich entrepreneur. Assume that the net benefit is negative, or
the mentoring requirement imposes a net cost of Bi(Bi ≥ 0) on the type i entrepreneur. Let
bi denote the type i entrepreneur’s marginal cost of obtaining a mentoring loan. It is assumed
that br > bp. Let m be the intensiveness of the mentoring requirement. The net cost Bi is
defined as a function of bi and m: Bi = bim. As the lender’s mentoring activities become more
intensive, the mentoring loan contract becomes more costly to the entrepreneur. It is assumed
that er−brm > ep−bpm for all possiblem. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that bp = 0.
The entrepreneur’s expected utility from borrowing a loan is given as11
EUij(E, m) =
{
pjU(er + Ij − brm−R) + (1− pj)U(er − brm− C) if i = r,
pjU(ep + Ij −R) + (1− pj)U(ep − C) if i = p.
The impacts of the mentoring requirement on the entrepreneurs are illustrated in Figure 4.9.
Curves Ur(0) and Ur(m) are the indifference curves of the rich entrepreneur associated with
mentoring requirements 0 and m, respectively. The rich entrepreneur is indifferent between the
commercial loan contracts on Ur(0) and the mentoring loan contracts on Ur(m) – i.e., the utility
associated with Ur(0) equals the utility associated with Ur(m). The cost Br can be considered
as a reduction in wealth. As a result, curve Ur(m) lies everywhere below curve Ur(0) and it
shifts inward as m increases. Clearly, the rich entrepreneur requires more favourable loan terms
to compensate for being forced to use the mentoring services.
The mentoring requirement also forces the switch line of the rich entrepreneur to shift down to
SLr(m). The greaterm is, the greater is the shift. The poor entrepreneur, however, is not affected
by the mentoring requirement since Bp = bpm = 0. Thus, her indifference curves (not shown
11An alternative treatment is to assume that the mentoring requirement produces positive benefits to entrepreneurs.
Since the poor entrepreneur benefits more than the rich entrepreneur, one can assume that the rich entrepreneur is
not affected by the mentoring requirement, while the poor entrepreneur is positively affected. Such treatment does
not lead to dramatic changes in the key results.
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in the figure) and switch line remain unaffected. Finally, the switch line of the rich entrepreneur
lies everywhere above that of the poor entrepreneur under the mentoring loan contracts, since it
is assumed that er − brm > ep for all possible m.
ep
R
SLp(0)(SLp(m))
SLr(m)
SLr(0)
R = C
C
Ur(0)Ur(m)
Rv
Ev
1O
Figure 4.9: Impact of mentoring on indifference curves and switch lines.
Since the mentoring requirement affects the rich and the poor entrepreneurs differently in
terms of increasing the costs of obtaining a loan, it suggests that the mentoring requirement,
along with the repayment requirement R and the collateral requirement C, can be used as a
selection tool to reduce the impact of information asymmetry on the poor entrepreneur.
Mentoring is costly to the lender as the lender has to assign staff and other resources to
conduct such activities. The profit function is given by:
pij = pjR + (1− pj)C −Rf − cm. (4.15)
where c is the lender’s marginal mentoring cost.
Assumption 4.4. pgRv + (1− pg)ep − Rf − cmv ≥ 0, where contract Ev(Rv, ep) (see Figure
4.9) and mentoring requirement mv solve:
EUpg(Ev, 0) = EUpb(Ev, 0) and EUr(Ev,mv) = EUr(E∗r , 0).
This assumption means that the lender can make non-negative profits at contractEv at which
the poor entrepreneur pledges all her wealth as collateral and feels indifferent between the two
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techniques. The mentoring requirement mv is what is necessary to make the rich entrepreneur
indifferent between the commercial loan contract E∗r and the mentoring loan contract Ev.
The effectiveness of mentoring in inducing separation and reducing credit rationing is affected
by br, c and ep. As will be shown later, Assumption 4.4 excludes the extreme case where br is
low, c is high and ep is very limited such that it is impossible to use mentoring requirement to
deal with information imperfection.
With this background, now consider the equilibrium. With perfect information, no lender has
the incentive to offer mentoring loan contracts. The equilibrium contracts are thus stillE∗r andE
∗
p
for the rich entrepreneur and the poor entrepreneur, respectively. With imperfect information,
the lender can design a pair of incentive-compatible contracts to encourage entrepreneurs to
separate according to their types:
EUr(Er,mr) = EUr(Ep,mp) and EUp(Ep,mp) > EUp(Er,mr). (4.16)
The equilibrium contracts maximize the expected utility of entrepreneurs, subject to the
incentive compatibility constraint (4.16). Meanwhile, these contracts must produce non-negative
profits for the lender:
piij = pjRi + (1− pj)Ci −Rf − cmi ≥ 0 for i = r, p and j = g, b. (4.17)
Note that the profit from lending to the rich entrepreneur must just cover the cost, because
otherwise a new contract can be added profitably. The equilibrium contracts also encourage the
use of the good technique
EUig(Ei,mi) ≥ EUib(Ei,mi) for i = r, p, (4.18)
the contracts must be desired by the entrepreneurs
EUi(Ei,mi) ≥ U(ei) for i = r, p, (4.19)
and the poor entrepreneur can afford the contract designed for her type
Cp ≤ ep. (4.20)
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A check over the variables is used to denote the equilibrium.
Lemma 4.2. In equilibrium, mˇr = 0.
Lemma 4.2 states that the contract designed for the rich entrepreneur must be a commercial
loan contract. This is straightforward. Because the poor entrepreneur is collateral-constrained,
the incentive compatibility constraint (4.16) implies that mr ≤ mp in equilibrium. Suppose
instead mr > mp, then a new contract can be added to the market profitably. This contract is the
same as the one that is designed for the rich type but has a lower mentoring requirement. Thus,
the new contract is more attractive to the rich entrepreneur (recall that the poor entrepreneur is
not affected by the mentoring requirement). It is clear that the lender who offers this new contract
can make more profits from the rich entrepreneur because: (1) the profit from lending to each
rich entrepreneur is increased due to the reduction in the mentoring requirement; and (2) the new
contract attracts all rich entrepreneurs. Therefore, each lender has the incentive to reducemr for
more profits. Thus mr > mp is impossible in equilibrium.
Furthermore, if 0 < mr ≤ mp, a new contract can be added to the market profitably. This is
shown in Figure 4.10. Curve Ur(mk) (k = A,B and C) is the rich entrepreneur’s indifference
curve associated with mentoring requirementmk. The rich entrepreneur is indifferent among the
contracts on the three curves. Notice that to keep the rich entrepreneur indifferent, the following
ranking of mentoring requirement is necessary: mA > mB > mC . The dashed curve Up is the
poor entrepreneur’s indifference curve. Line pi(mk) is the lender’s zero profit curve associated
with mentoring requirementmk. ContractAwith a mentoring requirement ofmA is designed for
the poor entrepreneur, and contract B (on line pi(mB)) with a mentoring requirement of mB is
designed for the rich entrepreneur. Suppose that initially contractAwithmA and contractB with
mB, are offered. The rich entrepreneur is indifferent between the two contracts, and is assumed
to choose contract B with mB by assumption; the poor entrepreneur strictly prefers contract A
with mA. In this situation, a new contract C, which has a mentoring requirement mC , can be
offered profitably. Only the rich entrepreneur chooses this new contract by assumption. Since C
is above the zero profit curve pi(mC), the lender who provides this contract is able to earn more
profits. Therefore, each lender has the incentive to reduce mr for more profits until mr = 0. In
equilibrium the mentoring requirement of the contract designed for the rich entrepreneur thus
must equal zero.
An immediate result of Lemma 4.2 is as follows.
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Figure 4.10: Rich entrepreneurs borrow commercial loans
Proposition 4.7. With imperfect information, the optimal contract designed for the rich en-
trepreneur is defined as: Eˇr = E∗r and mˇr = 0.
This proposition indicates that the best contract that can be designed for the rich entrepreneur
is identical to the one designed for them under perfect information. Given this result, the incentive
compatibility constraint (4.16) is reduced to
EUr(Eˇr, mˇr) = EUr(E
∗
r , 0) = EUr(Ep,mp), (4.21)
since the poor entrepreneur is unable to afford contract E∗r . Thus, the following result can be
derived:
Lemma 4.3. In equilibrium, pˇip = 0.
In equilibrium the lender makes zero profit from lending to the poor entrepreneur due to
competition pressure among lenders. If instead positive profits can be earned from lending to
the poor type, a new contract that is only more favourable to the poor entrepreneur can be added
profitably. This contract has more favourable loan terms (R and C) but a higher level of m.
Define φi as the marginal rate of substitution between R and C of the type i entrepreneur,
when the lender’s profit equals zero (given the good technique): φi = dCdR |U¯i,pig=0 for i = r, p. The
term measures the increase in the collateral necessary to make both the type i entrepreneur and
the lender indifferent given a small reduction in the repayment requirement. The derivation of
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φi can be determined with the aid of Figure 4.11. Curve AD is the indifference curve of the rich
entrepreneur when the lender’s profit equals zero. Notice that along curve AD the mentoring
requirement is not constant. At contract A with mentoring requirement m0, the expected utility
of the rich entrepreneur equals Ur(m0). Curve Ur(m′0) depicts the loci of the contracts at which
the rich entrepreneur’s utility remains at Ur(m0) when the mentoring requirement is reduced
to m′0 (m
′
0 < m0). The reduction in mentoring requirement forces the lender’s iso-profit curve
to shift down from pi(m0) to pi(m′0). At contract D – the intersection of pi(m
′
0) and Ur(m
′
0) –
with mentoring requirement m′0, both the rich entrepreneur and the lender are as well-off as at
contract A with mentoring requirement m0. The slope of curve AD gives φr,
φr = − pj
1− pj
[
(1 + brpg
c
)U ′(er + Ij −R− brm(R,C)) + (1− pj) brc U ′(er − C − brm(R,C))
pj
br
c
U ′(er + Ij −R− brm(R,C)) + (1 + br(1−pj)c )U ′(er − C − brm(R,C))
]
,
(4.22)
where m(R,C) = pgR+(1−pg)C−Rf
c
and j is the technique that the rich entrepreneur chooses.
Notice that curve AD is steeper than the indifference curve Ur(m0). The dashed curve Up is
similarly defined for the poor entrepreneur. Since the poor entrepreneur is not affected by the
mentoring requirement, curve Up is identical to the indifference curve of the poor entrepreneur
that goes through D′. Thus, φp equals the slope of the poor entrepreneur’s indifference curve
φp = − pgU
′(ep + Ig −R)
(1− pg)U ′(ep − C) . (4.23)
Note that φr is affected by br and c. Two extreme cases should be taken into account. First,
when c is low – i.e., the lender is not too sensitive to the mentoring requirement (its iso-profit
curve shifts only a small amount as a result of the change in m) – and br is high – i.e., the
rich entrepreneur is very sensitive to the mentoring requirement (or his cost of obtaining a loan
increases a lot with a small increase inm) – φr could be very low such that φr < φp always holds
at any combination of R,C and m(R,C). When this occurs, it means that among the contracts
at which both the rich entrepreneur and the lender are indifferent, the poor entrepreneur prefers
the one associated with the lowest collateral requirement. As shown in Figure 4.11, the poor
entrepreneur prefers contract A among the contracts on curve AD. Second, if br is low and c
is high – i.e., the lender (the rich entrepreneur) is very (not very) sensitive to the mentoring
requirement – then φr would be high, such that φr > φp always holds at any combination of
R,C and m(R,C). In this situation, the poor entrepreneur prefers the contract with the highest
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collateral requirement among the contracts at which both the rich entrepreneur and the lender
are indifferent.
pi(m′0)
pi(m0)
Ur(m0)
A
Up
D
D′
Ur(m′0)
SLr(m0)
SLr(m′)
SLp
R
R = C
1O
C
Figure 4.11: Derivation of φr and φp
Now consider the equilibrium. The optimal contract designed for the poor entrepreneur is the
one that maximizes the expected utility of the poor entrepreneur, subject to pip = 0, EUp(Ep) >
U(ep), EUpg(Ep) > EUpb(Ep), Cp ≤ ep and incentive compatibility constraint (4.16). Accord-
ing to Kuhn-Tucker theorem, there must exist a unique solution Eˇp and mˇp to this maximization
problem.
Proposition 4.8. With the introduction of mentoring services,
1. if ep ≥ Ccp, then perfect separation without rationing can be attained in the environ-
ment of imperfect information, where Ccp is the collateral requirement at contract E
c
p (the
intersection of curves SLp and E∗rA, see Figure 4.12).
The rich entrepreneur borrows commercial loans at contract Eˇr: Eˇr = E∗r and mˇr = 0
and the poor entrepreneur borrows under a mentoring loan contract Eˇp with mˇp, which
is given by
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(a) if φr < φp always holds at any combination of R,C and m(R,C) where Ccp ≤ C ≤
ep, then the optimal contract designed for the poor entrepreneur Eˇp is contract Eˇ1
as shown in panel b in Figure 4.12. Contract Eˇp and mˇp solve
EUpb(E) = EUpg(E),
pgR + (1− pg)C −Rf − cm = 0,
EUr(E(R,C),m) = EUrg(E
∗
r , 0);
(4.24)
(b) if φr > φp always holds at any combination of R,C and m(R,C) where Ccp ≤ C ≤
ep, then the contract designed for the poor is contract Eˇ2 with mˇ2p in panel c in Figure
4.12, which solve
C = ep,
pgR + (1− pg)ep −Rf − cm = 0
EUr(Ep(R, ep),m) = EUrg(E
∗
r , 0);
(4.25)
(c) ifφr is greater or less thanφp, depending on the values ofR,C andm(R,C), then the
optimal contract designed for the poor entrepreneur is either the mentoring contract
Eˇ1p with mˇ
1
p, or Eˇ
2
p with mˇ
2
p, or Eˇ
3
p with mˇ
3
p (see panel a in Figure 4.12), depending
on which contract gives the poor entrepreneur the highest level of utility. Contract
Eˇ3p and mˇ
3
p solve
φr = φp,
pgR + (1− pg)C −Rf − cm = 0,
EUr(E(R,C),m) = EUrg(E
∗
r , 0);
(4.26)
2. if ep < Ccp, the use of mentoring is ineffective, and the poor entrepreneur has no access to
credit.
Proposition 4.8 indicates that the effectiveness of mentoring services as a selection tool is
limited by the poor entrepreneur’s wealth. This result occurs because if the poor entrepreneur
has very limited wealth – i.e., ep < Ccp – it is impossible to design a feasible mentoring loan
contract that is unattractive to the rich entrepreneur, that encourages the poor entrepreneur to
use the good technique, and that enables the lender to at least break even (see panel d in Figure
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4.12). Curve E∗rA is drawn on the assumptions that: (1) m is adjusted such that the lender’s
profit remains zero; (2) the rich entrepreneur is indifferent between any two contracts along this
curve. Curve BCD is similarly defined as E∗rA for the poor entrepreneur (it is identical to the
poor entrepreneur’s indifference curve and it goes through contract C). It is clear that all the
contracts that can be designed for the poor entrepreneur should lie on curve E∗rA and below line
C = ep. However, such contracts lie below switch line SLp, and thus violates the good technique
constraint and consequently negatively affects the lender’s profit. So if ep < Ccp, no mentoring
loan contract can be designed for the poor entrepreneur.
If ep ≥ Ccp, then mentoring is effective in inducing self-selection. A mentoring loan contract
can be designed for the poor type. Proposition 4.8 describes the optimal contract Eˇp and mentor-
ing requirement mˇp. Eˇp and mˇp can be either an interior solution or a corner solution, depending
on br and c. The various possibilities are shown in Figure 4.12.
First, consider the situation where φr is greater or smaller than φp, depending on the values of
R,C andm(R,C). Under this situation, there exists a unique combination ofR,C andm(R,C)
at which φr = φp holds, or curves E∗rA and BCD are tangent (see contract Eˇ
3
p(Rˇ
3
p, Cˇ
3
p) with
mˇ3p in panel a of Figure 4.12). If curve BCD lies below E
∗
rA as shown in panel a, then there
exists an interior solution which is E3p(Rˇ
3
p, Cˇ
3
p) with mˇ
3
p. In this situation, any contract on E
∗
rA
except Eˇ3p is less favourable than contract Eˇp to the poor entrepreneur. If instead, curve BCD
lies above E∗rA (not shown in the figure), then there exists a corner solution. This solution could
be either contract Eˇ1p(Rˇ
1
p, Cˇ
1
p) (the intersection of curves E
∗
rA and SLp) with mˇ
1
p, or contract
Eˇ2p(Rˇ
2
p, Cˇ
2
p) (i.e., the intersection of curve E
∗
rA and line C = ep) with mˇ
2
p, depending on which
contract gives the poor entrepreneur a higher level of utility.
Now consider the situation where br is small and c is high such that φr < φp always holds
at any combination of R,C and m(R,C) where Ccp ≤ C ≤ ep, then there exists a corner
solution as shown in panel b. Eˇp is contract Eˇ1p (it is identical to E
c
p – the intersection of the
poor entrepreneur’s switch line SLp and curveE∗rA). This result follows since along curveE
∗
rA,
contract Eˇ1p(E
c
p) is the most attractive contract that encourages the choice of the good technique.
Finally, if, as discussed, br is large and c is low such that φr > φp always holds at any
combination of R,C and m(R,C) where Ccp ≤ C ≤ ep, then Eˇp is the intersection of curve
E∗rA and the poor entrepreneur’s collateral constraint curve C = ep or Eˇ
2
p (see panel c of
Figure 4.12), since now the poor entrepreneur would like to accept more intensive mentoring
requirement in return for a reduction in the repayment requirement.
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Figure 4.12: Derivation of Eˇp and mˇp
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Proposition 4.8 states that if the poor entrepreneur has moderate wealth – i.e., ep ≥ Ccp – the
mentoring requirement can play a role in inducing self-selection. The equilibrium is characterized
by perfect separation without rationing. The intuition is as follows. Due to the wealth impact,
mentoring affects the rich and the poor entrepreneurs differently. Although the loan terms of the
mentoring loan contract designed for the poor are more favourable to the rich type, the extra
costs caused by the use of mentoring services make the contract less attractive, and thus deter
the rich entrepreneur from choosing it. As a result, the rich entrepreneur chooses the commercial
loan contract. The poor entrepreneur has no choice of contracts due to her limited wealth, and
thus chooses the mentoring loan contract.
Corollary 4.3. Compared with the collateral requirement of contract Eˆp, if σrb > σpg (Case I),
Cˇp ≤ Cˆp and Rˇp ≥ Rˆp; if σrb < σpg (Case II), Cˇp > Cˆp.
As shown in Figure 4.12, the optimal mentoring contract for the poor entrepreneur must
be located on curve E∗rA and lie below the collateral constraint curve C = ep. Compared with
rationing contract E∗∗p (the best contract designed for the poor under imperfect information
where rationing is used to induce selection in Case I), the mentoring loan contract Eˇp has a lower
collateral requirement but a higher repayment requirement. However, compared with contract
Eˆp in the second case – i.e., contract E∗p – the mentoring loan contract involves more collateral.
Corollary 4.4. EUr(Eˇr, 0) = EUr(Eˆr, 1), but it is unclear whetherEUp(Eˇp, mˇp) ≥ EUp(Eˆp, γˆp)
or not.
It is difficult to determine whether or not an individual poor entrepreneur is better off at
the mentoring contract Eˇp, compared to at the rationing contract Eˆp. However, since each en-
trepreneur obtains a loan and invests with the good technique at the mentoring contract Eˇp, the
problem of underinvestment is solved. In this sense, a better outcome is achieved compared to
where the lender uses rationing to mitigate their information problems.
It is clear that the effectiveness of the mentoring requirement as a selection tool is limited
by the poor entrepreneur’s wealth. If she has very limited wealth (i.e., ep < Ccp), it is impossible
to design a mentoring contract for the poor. The poor entrepreneur is excluded from the credit
market.
However, with the use of mentoring services, credit rationing can be solved to some extent.
This is because the mentoring services can facilitate screening and monitoring. Through this
process, the lender can generate entrepreneur information and use it to screen entrepreneurs and
monitor their investment activities. This means that mentoring not only affects an entrepreneur’s
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costs of obtaining a loan, but also his/her choice of techniques. In the next section, the model
is extended by including the impact of mentoring services on the entrepreneur’s choice of tech-
niques.
4.4.2 An Extension
With mentoring activities, the lender is likely to know the entrepreneur’s choice of techniques.
Thus, the entrepreneur may find the bad technique to be less attractive, because, with the bad
technique, he/she would have to spend more effort to convince the lender that he/she is using the
good technique. As a result, for each entrepreneur the marginal cost of obtaining a mentoring loan
is higher if he/she uses the bad technique than that if he/she uses the good technique: big < bib.
For simplicity, it is assumed that 0 = bpg < bpb < brg < brb.
So under the mentoring contracts, given the same mentoring requirement, the switch lines
of both the rich entrepreneur and the poor entrepreneur shift down; and the switch line of the
rich shifts more than does the poor entrepreneur’s switch line. In Figure 4.13, the mentoring
requirement m′v forces the poor entrepreneur’s switch line to shift from SLp(0) to SLp(m
′
v).
The change in the poor entrepreneur’s switch line increases the choice set of the lender and thus
makes it possible to achieve a separating equilibrium without rationing in the situation where
the poor entrepreneur has very limited wealth, i.e., ep < C∗p (note that C
∗
p < C
c
p).
The marginal rate of substitution between R and C of the type i entrepreneur where the
lender’s profit equals zero can be rewritten as follows,
φi = −
pj(1 +
bijpg
c
)U ′(ei + Ij −R− bijm(R,C)) + (1− pj) bijpgc U ′(ei − C − bijm(R,C))
pj
bi(1−pg)
c
U ′(ei + Ij −R− bijm(R,C)) + (1− pj)(1 + bij(1−pg)c )U ′(ei − C − bijm(R,C))
,
(4.27)
for i = r, p and j = g, b. The derivation of φr and φp is illustrated in Figure 4.13. Along curve
E∗rA, the utilities of the rich and the lender remain constant. The slope ofE
∗
rA givesφr. Similarly,
along curve E∗rB, the utilities of the poor entrepreneur and the lender remain constant, and thus
the slope gives φp.
Assumption 4.5. Assume that bpb, brg and brb are sufficiently large and c is sufficiently small
such that the condition pgR′v+(1−pg)ep−cm′v ≥ 0 holds at contractE ′v(R′v, ep) with mentoring
requirementm′v, where contractE
′
v(R
′
v, ep) is the intersection of curvesE
∗
rA and C = ep above
the switch line SLp(m′v) (see Figure 4.13).
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This assumption implies that non-negative profits can be made at contract E ′v(R
′
v, ep) when
the mentoring requirement m′v is set at what is necessary to deter the rich entrepreneur from
choosing this contract. Note that the mentoring contract E ′v(R
′
v, ep) must encourage the poor
entrepreneur to choose the good technique. It means that entrepreneurs are sensitive to the
mentoring requirement and the lender’s mentoring costs are not very high, such that it is possible
to design a feasible mentoring contract that induces self-selection.
Proposition 4.9. Perfect separation without rationing can be attained by means of the mentoring
requirement even if ep < C∗p . The mentoring loan contract is given by
1. if φr < φp always holds at any combination of R,C and m(R,C), Eˇp and mˇp solve
EUpb(E) = EUpg(E)
pgR + (1− pg)C −Rf − cm = 0
EUr(E(R,C),m) = EUrg(E
∗
r , 0);
(4.28)
2. if φr > φp always holds at any combination of R,C and m(R,C), Eˇp and mˇp solve
C = ep
pgR + (1− pg)C −Rf − cm = 0
EUr(E(R,C),m) = EUrg(E
∗
r , 0);
(4.29)
3. if φr is greater or smaller than φp, depending on the values of R,C and m(R,C), Eˇp
and mˇp solve either (4.28), or (4.29) or the following expressions, depending on which
contract gives the poor entrepreneur the highest level of utility.
φr = φp
pgR + (1− pg)C −Rf − cm = 0
EUr(E(R,C),m) = EUrg(E
∗
r , 0).
(4.30)
Proposition 4.9 states that if the entrepreneurs are sensitive to the mentoring requirement
and the lender is not very sensitive, then the mentoring requirement can be used to facilitate
self-selection and to reduce rationing. In Figure 4.13, curveE∗rA represents the combinations of
contracts and mentoring requirements that enable the lender to make zero profit while allowing the
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rich entrepreneur to derive a utility of EUr(E∗r , 0), when br = brg < brb. Because the mentoring
requirement makes the choice of the bad technique less attractive, this curve is steeper than
E∗rA which is associated with brg = brb = br. Similarly, along curve E
∗
rB the utilities of the
poor entrepreneur and the lender remain constant. Notice that curve E∗rB becomes steeper as
brp increases. The optimal contract designed for the poor entrepreneur must lie on the segment
of curve E∗rA between the poor entrepreneur’s new switch line under the optimal mentoring
requirement, and below the collateral constraint line C = ep.
Corollary 4.5. As either brb or bpb increases, the poor entrepreneur’s access to credit can be
further improved. They can obtain loans even if ep < C∗p . A more efficient outcome than the one
with perfect information is achieved.
The intuition is as follows. As brb increases, the choice of the bad technique appears to
be less favourable under a mentoring contract to the rich entrepreneur. As a result, curve E∗rA
becomes steeper. Similarly, a higher bpb means the poor entrepreneur feels the choice of the bad
technique is less attractive under a mentoring contract. Consequently, her switch line, given the
same mentoring requirement, shifts down further. Thus, even though ep < C∗p , there may still
exist a contract that satisfies the conditions in Assumption 4.5. According to Proposition 4.9, the
equilibrium should be a separating one where all entrepreneurs obtain the loans they need.
pi(0)
SLr(0)
SLp(0)
E∗r
ep
C∗p
A
E′vE
∗
p
C R = C
R
SLp(m′v)
SLr(m′v)
RA
pi(mA)
B
R′vO 1
Figure 4.13: Derivation of φr and φp: brb > brg > bpb > bpg
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4.4.3 A Special Case: ep = 0
Now consider an extreme case. Suppose the poor entrepreneur has no wealth, i.e., ep = 0, and
she never chooses the bad technique under a mentoring contract since bpb is prohibitively high.
With the aid of Figure 4.13, the following proposition can be stated.
Proposition 4.10. When ep = 0, and if bpb is prohibitively high, there exists a unique separating
equilibrium: the contract designed for the rich is Eˇr (identical to E∗r ) with mˇr = 0; and the
contract designed for the poor Eˇmp = A (see Figure 4.13) with mˇp = mA. Credit rationing does
not arise in equilibrium, since each entrepreneur obtains a loan.
The loan terms and mentoring requirement can be determined by solving:
C = 0,
PgR + (1− pg)C − cm = 0,
EUr(E(R,C),m) = EUr(E
∗
r , 0).
(4.31)
This proposition states that if the incentive problem of the poor entrepreneur can be solved
through mentoring services, a more efficient outcome (compared with the one under perfect
information) is possible, even if the poor entrepreneur is unable to provide any collateral to
secure the loan.
The intuition is as follows. Since mentoring services make the bad technique unacceptable,
the poor entrepreneur never chooses this technique under a mentoring loan contract. Because
there is no incentive problem, it is not necessary to require positive collateral under the mentoring
loan contract. So even though she is unable to provide any collateral, the poor entrepreneur can
obtain the loan at the mentoring contract. Due to the increase in the costs of obtaining a loan,
the rich entrepreneur obtains a commercial loan and stays away from the mentoring contract.
The above analysis assumes that bpg = 0. Now consider a general case that bpg > 0 and
investigate its impact on the welfare.
Corollary 4.6. If bpg > 0, then as bpg increases, the welfare of individual poor entrepreneurs
decrease; the rich entrepreneur is not affected.
Since the poor entrepreneur finds it more expensive to obtain a mentoring loan even though
she uses the good technique, her utility from borrowing a mentoring loan will be lower, since:
EUp(Eˇp, mˇp) = pgU(ep + Ig − Rˇp − bpgmˇp)
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and dEUp(Eˇp, mˇp)/dbpg = −pgmˇpU(ep+ Ig− Rˇp− bpgmˇp) < 0. She may decide not to borrow
if EUp(Eˇp, mˇp) < U(0).
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, a model is developed that combines adverse selection and moral hazard con-
siderations to study the impacts of wealth on market equilibrium and entrepreneur’s access to
credit. In contrast to other models that treat wealth as the same across entrepreneurs (Besanko
and Thakor [1987]), the model in this chapter allows the entrepreneurs to have different levels
of wealth, and thus different attitudes toward risk. Moreover, the lenders use rationing directly
as a tool to facilitate entrepreneurs’ self-selection. This treatment enables the establishment of
a link between wealth and credit rationing. Specifically, the more wealth/collateral-constrained
individuals have more limited access to credit. This result explains the often cited outcome that
many low-income micro-entrepreneurs are unable to access the credit they need. However, the
link between wealth and rationing is not robust – under some conditions, rationing always arises
in equilibrium although all entrepreneurs can pledge sufficient collateral.
Non-financial services are an important component of microcredit programs. The empirical
work of Schreiner and Woller [2003] highlights the important role of mentoring and technical
assistance in ensuring the success of microcredit programs. Barry and Bruno [2008] argue that
mentoring increases the probability of success of an individual with a low level of entrepreneurial
skill.
This study provides a new explanation in the role of non-financial services: they can play a
role in mitigating information asymmetry by encouraging the entrepreneurs to select the type
of contract that they wish to obtain: only those who would otherwise be credit rationed find it
optimal to choose a micro-loan, while other entrepreneurs choose to obtain conventional loans.
In this way, the use of non-financial services enables microcredit programs to reach out to their
target individuals and to consequently improve their access to credit.
One of the challenges of microcredit programs is to understand the needs of their en-
trepreneurs and tailor the services to meet their requirements. In many cases, non-financial
services could be a costly substitute for collateral to micro-entrepreneurs. For example, in large
urban cities, a significant fraction of micro-entrepreneurs are new immigrants. Some may face
social and economic barriers to participate in and benefit from the activities organized by the
programs. So if non-financial services are not well designed to better fit their needs, they may
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be discouraged by the high costs of obtaining the loans and leave the program. Kon and Story
[2003] demonstrate that entrepreneurs whose cost of obtaining a loan is high are forced to exit
the credit market.
Another challenge is the high operation costs. Non-financial services increase the costs of
operating a microcredit program. If the costs are sufficiently high such that the lenders cannot
expect to break even, then the lenders may be deterred from microcredit lending. To address this
problem, some microcredit programs have reduced their auxiliary services to a minimum level,
and partner with community development organizations that are able to provide the complemen-
tary non-financial services. In this way, the lenders can specialize in the area – lending – where
they have advantages and let the organizations specializing in non-financial services provide the
complementary services. In this way, the programs can save operation costs.
In this chapter, the analysis is based on the assumption that the lenders are unable to dis-
tinguish entrepreneurs according to their initial endowments. This may be the case in many
situations – e.g., lending to new immigrants – where it is difficult for the lenders to understand
the social and economic status of the entrepreneurs due to the social and cultural barriers. In
the next chapter the analysis is extended to the case where the lenders are able to distinguish
entrepreneurs according to their wealth, and develop a new model to show how non-financial
services can facilitate self-selection.
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Chapter 5
Credit Rationing and Non-Financial Services
as a Selection Device, Model II
5.1 Introduction
A credit rationing model was presented in the previous chapter. That model investigates how
wealth affects individual entrepreneurs’ access to credit. It has been shown that with the pres-
ence of both adverse selection and moral hazard, collateral alone is not useful in inducing the
entrepreneurs to self-select into different groups. Furthermore, credit rationing may occur for
entrepreneurs with insufficient wealth/collateralizable assets. This result is based on a key as-
sumption – the lender cannot distinguish the entrepreneurs according to their wealth. In this
chapter, the situation considered is where the lenders can observe the wealth of entrepreneurs,
and thus categorize them into different groups and accordingly design a set of contracts for each
group. In this way, the effects of wealth can be reduced to a minimum.
However, there is another type of hidden information – entrepreneurial skill. This character-
istic is important since it affects an entrepreneur’s choice of projects as well as his/her probability
of succeeding. However, this characteristic is more difficult to observe than wealth. A number
of studies focus on this type of hidden information – see, for example, Bester [1987], Besanko
and Thakor [1987] and Chan and Kanatas [1985].
This chapter investigates how this information imperfection leads to credit rationing and how
mentoring and technical assistance facilitate the screening of the entrepreneurs. The arguments
center around the fact that linking non-financial services with loan provision results in extra
costs for the entrepreneurs to obtain loans.1 There is a cost differential between entrepreneurs
1The terms of non-financial services and mentoring are used interchangeably.
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of different qualities. The low quality entrepreneurs have higher costs since the use of non-
financial services makes it difficult for them to convince the lenders that they are high quality
and creditworthy. Thus, the mentoring loan contract is rejected by these entrepreneurs, and it
is accepted only by the high quality entrepreneurs who would otherwise be rationed. Perfect
separation without rationing of high quality entrepreneurs thus can be achieved in equilibrium
by means of non-financial services.
The entrepreneurs’ outside choices affect the loan contracts in the credit market (e.g., de Meza
and Webb [2000] and Ghatak, Morelli, and Sjostrom [2001]). For example, the entrepreneurs can
choose to be an entrepreneur or an employed worker. Their decisions are affected by the wage
rates in the labour market. These decisions determine the quality of the lender’s loan portfolio
which in turn determines the lender’s lending policies and the extent of credit rationing – in other
words, the level of investment implemented in the economy. The credit market is not treated in
isolation. There is a feedback from the labour market to the credit market. The impact of the
wage rates offered in the labour market on credit rationing is examined.2
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 presents the basic model. Section 5.3
analyzes the equilibrium in the credit market, as well as the impact of wage rates on the loan
contracts and the extent of credit rationing. Section 5.4 examines the potential role of mentoring
and technical assistance which forms an important component of micro-loans as a selection
device. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.2 The Basic Model
There are two types of agents in the model: entrepreneurs and lenders.
5.2.1 Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur has the opportunity to invest a fixed amount (normalized at unity) in one
project at most. The entrepreneur has some initial wealth ewhich is not liquid, and hence cannot
be directly used to finance the project. For simplicity, it is assumed that the initial wealth yields
a return of zero after one period. To make the investment, the entrepreneur has to borrow from
a lender. It is assumed that each entrepreneur borrows from one lender at most.
2The level of investment implemented may have an impact on the wage rates in the labour market. However, the
focus of this study is on the credit access of the micro-entrepreneurs underserved by financial institutions. They
account for a small share in the economy in developed countries. The impact of their investment decisions on the
labour market are thus ignored.
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There are two types of projects: good (g) and bad (b). The good project yields a return of Ig
if it is successful and 0 if it is unsuccessful. Moreover, the return from the good investment is
assumed to be verifiable. Thus, if an entrepreneur invests in such a project, he/she must repay
the loan if the investment is in the good state.
The bad project yields a private return Ib. The private benefits are not verifiable and therefore
cannot be appropriated by the lenders. The introduction of private benefits captures the idea that
an entrepreneur may direct some part of the loan for the purposes other than the investment,
and the lender cannot recover the diverted funds (Ghatak et al. [2001]). It is assumed that if an
entrepreneur invests in a bad project, he/she always defaults on the loan.
Entrepreneurs are of either high quality (H) or low quality (L). The high quality entrepreneur
has a higher level of entrepreneurial skill. Such an entrepreneur can invest in either a good project
or a bad project. If she invests in a good project, her probability of succeeding is p (to simplify
the illustration, the high quality entrepreneur is hereafter referred to as a female and the low
quality entrepreneur is referred to as a male). The low quality entrepreneur who has a lower level
of entrepreneurial skill invests only in a bad project. If an entrepreneur decides not to make an
investment, he/she can take an employment job. The wage rate in the labour market is w.
LetE(R, C) be the loan contract, whereR is the repayment requirement (R = 1 + r, where
r is the loan interest rate) and C is the collateral requirement. The entrepreneurs are assumed to
have the same utility function U and are risk-averse – i.e., U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0.
A type i (i = H,L) entrepreneur’s expected utility from obtaining a loan at contractE(R,C)
is defined as
EUH j =
{
pU(e+ Ig −R) + (1− p)U(e− C) if j = g,
U(e+ Ib − C) if j = b,
(5.1)
EULb = U(e+ Ib − C), (5.2)
where j ∈ [g, b] indicates the project type.
Assumption 5.1. (1− p)U ′(e− C) < U ′(e+ Ib − C).
This assumption implies that, when investing in a good project, the high quality entrepreneur’s
marginal benefit from a small reduction in C is smaller than that of an entrepreneur who invests
in a bad project.
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Consider the case where only partial collateral is required – i.e., R > C. The low quality
entrepreneur always chooses the bad project if he decides to invest, and thus his indifference
curve UL is a horizontal line in the R− C space (see panel a in Figure 5.1).
The high quality entrepreneur, with a good project, requires a reduction in the collateralC to
compensate for an increase in the repayment requirement R. Her indifference curve UHg, given
the good project, is downward sloping and concave in R−C space (see panel b in Figure 5.1).3
The slope of the indifference curve is given by
dC
dR
|UHg =
pU ′(e+ Ig −R)
(1− p)U ′(e− C) < 0. (5.3)
When she invests in a bad project, her expected utility depends only on the collateral requirement
a. Type L entrepreneurs b. Type H borrowers
UHb
UHg
UL
R R
R = C R = C
C C
A
B C
Figure 5.1: Entrepreneurs’ indifference curves: with no choice of projects
C. Thus, the indifference curve UHb is a horizontal line in the R−C space. In this situation, the
high quality entrepreneur is better off with a lower C, and is not affected by R. Curves UHb and
UHg are drawn on the assumption that the expected utility of the high quality entrepreneur is the
same along the two curves.
3With a good project, the high quality entrepreneur’s indifference curves are concave in R and C, since
d2C
dR2
|U¯Hg = −
pg
1− pg
U ′(e+ Ig −R)
U ′(e− C)
[
U ′′(e+ Ig −R)
U ′(e+ Ig −R) −
U ′′(e− C)
U ′(e− C)
dC
dR
]
< 0.
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With a choice of projects, the high quality entrepreneur’s indifference curve is the upper
envelope of the indifference curves associated with different projects (see curve ABC in panel
b of Figure 5.1).
The locus of the contracts at which the high quality entrepreneur is indifferent between the
two projects is called the switch line, shown by the upward sloped curve SL in Figure 5.2. The
slope of SL is given by:
dC
dR
|EUHg=EUHb = −
pU ′(e+ Ig −R)
(1− p)U ′(e− C)− U ′(e+ Ib − C) > 0. (5.4)
Since r ≥ 0, curveSL is truncated by lineR = 1. This curve is also truncated by the participation
constraint curve PAH . At any contract above the switch line, the high quality entrepreneur
I
II
III
IV
O 1 R
A
B D
PAL
PAH
Ib − w C
R = C
C
SL
Figure 5.2: Entrepreneurs’ participation constraints.
chooses the good project; at any contract below the switch line, she chooses the bad project.
Now consider the entrepreneurs’ participation constraints. A type i entrepreneur borrows
money if and only if EUi(E(R,C)) ≥ U(e + w). Curves PAH (curve ACD) and PAL (the
horizontal line BD) in Figure 5.2, respectively, depict the participation constraints of the high
quality and the low quality entrepreneurs. Above curve PAH/PAL, the high/low quality en-
trepreneur does not borrow. Underneath PAH , the high quality entrepreneur chooses the good
project if the loan contract is above her switch line SL, or she chooses the bad project if the
103
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
contract lies below SL. Underneath curve PAL, the low quality entrepreneur invests in the bad
project.
Four areas in Figure 5.2 can be identified: (1) for any contract that falls in area I , the high
quality entrepreneur invests in the good project and the low quality entrepreneur invests in the
bad project; (2) in area II , the high quality entrepreneur invests in the good project and the low
quality entrepreneur does not invest; (3) in area III both types invest in the bad projects; (4) in
area IV , no investment is undertaken.
5.2.2 Lenders
Lenders are homogenous. They finance loans out of deposit funds. Each lender faces a perfectly
elastic supply schedule of loan funds at an exogenous market-determined rate rf . Lenders are
assumed to be risk-neutral.4 Let piH and piL be the expected profits from lending to a high quality
and a low quality entrepreneur, respectively,
piHj =
{
pR + (1− p)C −Rf if j = g,
C −Rf if j = b,
(5.5)
piL = C −Rf , (5.6)
where Rf = 1 + rf .
The iso-profit curve p¯iH (linear linesAB andCD) is depicted in Figure 5.3. This curve is not
continuous. Above the switch lineSL, the iso-profit curve is the downward sloping lineAB since
the high quality entrepreneur invests in the good project; below SL, the iso-profit curve is the
horizontal lineCD because the bad project is carried out. This shape emerges because of the high
quality entrepreneur’s discrete change in projects that occurs at the switch line. Figure 5.3 also
depicts the relationship between p¯iH and the indifference curve of the high quality entrepreneur
U¯H . Above the switch line, the iso-profit curve p¯iH is steeper than curve U¯H :
−dC
dR
|piHg =
p
1− p >
pU ′(e+ Ig −R)
(1− p)U ′(e− C) = −
dC
dR
|UHg (5.7)
This result arises because entrepreneurs are risk-averse, while lenders are risk neutral.
4Unlike the entrepreneur, the lender holds large and diversified loan portfolios to achieve risk pooling. Thus the
lender is less risk-averse. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the lender is risk-neutral.
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C
R = C
SL
O
A
B
C
D
p¯iH
U¯H
O
Figure 5.3: Lender’s iso-profit curve p¯iH .
The iso-profit curve p¯iL is a horizontal line in theR−C space, since the lender’s profit is now
determined by the collateral requirement C, and is independent of R. Note that the low quality
entrepreneur never repays his loan since R > C.
Assumption 5.2. Ib < Rf + w.
This assumption has two implications. First, the lender can never make non-negative profits
from an entrepreneur who invests in a bad project. Recall that the entrepreneur with the bad
project never repays his/her loan. Thus it is clear that the lender tries to stay away from such
entrepreneurs, unless the lender is able to offer them a contract in which the collateral requirement
is at least as large as Rf . However, at contract E(R,Rf ) (R > 0), no entrepreneurs invest in the
bad projects, since U(e+ Ib −Rf ) < U(e+ w) if Ib < Rf + w.
Second, it is socially inefficient to finance the bad projects since at the contract where the
lender makes zero profit, the net gains from investing in a bad project are lower than the net gains
from taking an employment job. As a consequence, the first-best level of investment is that all
the high quality entrepreneurs invest in the good projects, while all the low quality entrepreneurs
take the employment jobs. Therefore, in this study the focus is exclusively on the high quality
entrepreneurs’ access to credit, because it is optimal to have the low quality entrepreneurs in the
labour market.
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Assumption 5.3. pU(e+ Ig −Rf ) + (1− p)U(e−Rf ) > U(e+ w).
Assumption 5.3 implies that contract E(Rf , Rf ) is desired by the high quality entrepreneur.
This assumption thus means that all the contracts on the lender’s zero profit curve above the
switch line are desirable to the high quality entrepreneur. Moreover, at contract E(Rf , Rf ), the
high quality entrepreneur must invest in the good project, since the bad project is unattractive
according to Assumption 5.2.
5.3 The Equilibrium
The credit market contains a large number of individually insignificant lenders and entrepreneurs,
and is assumed to be competitive. Lenders are Bertrand competitors. They do not want to finance
the bad projects (Assumption 5.2). To simplify the analysis, assume that the entrepreneur can
only apply to one lender during the period. The timing of the game is as follows.
1. At the beginning of the time period, the lenders announce their loan contracts. Given
the lenders’ offerings and the wage rates in the labour market, the entrepreneur decides
whether to invest in a project or to take an employment job. If the entrepreneur chooses to
take a job, the game ends; otherwise, the entrepreneur forgoes employment. That is, even
if the loan application is denied, the entrepreneur cannot work for someone else. If the
application is approved, the entrepreneur implements the investment.
2. At the end of the time period, the entrepreneur obtains the returns from the investment and
repays the loan if and only if he/she invests in a good project successfully. The game ends.
The analysis focuses exclusively on Nash equilibria. Because no lender can operate while
earning negative profits in the long run, Nash equilibria that produce non-negative profit is
examined. The analysis is first undertaken under the assumption of perfect information. This
assumption is then relaxed.
5.3.1 Perfect Information
With perfect information, the lender can distinguish the entrepreneurs according to their en-
trepreneurial skill, but have no control over their choice of projects. In equilibrium, no lender
lends to the low quality entrepreneur. These entrepreneurs have to enter the labour market and
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take an employment job. Only the high quality entrepreneur can obtain a loan. The optimal
contract must satisfy the high quality entrepreneur’s participation constraint
EUH g ≥ U(e+ w), (5.8)
and encourage the investment in the good project:
EUHg ≥ EUHb. (5.9)
In addition, because of competition among lenders, each lender must make zero profit from
the high quality entrepreneur (if positive profits could be earned, then lenders would have an
incentive to modify their contract terms to earn more profits):
piHg = 0. (5.10)
The equilibrium contract thus maximizes the high quality entrepreneur’s utility subject to
constraints (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10). The optimal contract must be on the lender’s zero profit curve
and above the switch line. According to Assumption 5.3, all such contracts are desirable to the
high quality entrepreneur. Therefore, constraint (5.8) is redundant and can be dropped.
R∗
E∗C
∗
PAH
PAL
UH
Rf
C
R
SL
R = C
piH = 0
Ib − w
O 1
Figure 5.4: Equilibrium with perfect information
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Proposition 5.1. With perfect information and a perfectly elastic supply of funds, each high qual-
ity entrepreneur obtains a loan at contractE∗ and invests in a good project, where contractE∗ is
where the lender’s zero profit curve above the switch line of the high quality entrepreneur crosses
the switch line of the high quality entrepreneur (see Figure 5.4). No low quality entrepreneur
can obtain a loan and make an investment.
Corollary 5.1. Contract E∗ is independent of the wage rate w.
Corollary 5.2. High quality entrepreneurs’ welfare is independent of w; however, low quality
entrepreneurs’ welfare increases as the wage rate w rises.
According to Proposition 5.1, with perfect information, the first-best investment level can be
achieved. Credit rationing of the high quality entrepreneur does not arise in equilibrium, unless
some of them are unable to provide sufficient collateral. Furthermore, with perfect information,
the optimal loan terms are not affected by the wage rate offered in the labour market.
5.3.2 Imperfect Information
Now consider the situation where the lenders have imperfect information. They are unable to
distinguish the entrepreneurs according to their entrepreneurial skill levels or to observe the
projects in which they invest. It is easy to verify that contract E∗ is not the equilibrium contract
with imperfect information. A new equilibrium should be determined.
Since lending to the low quality entrepreneur is unprofitable, the lender needs to design a
contract that is not attractive to these entrepreneurs. That is:
U(e+ Ib − C) ≤ U(e+ w) (5.11)
Expression (5.11) is the incentive compatibility constraint. With imperfect information, the
equilibrium contract must maximize the expected utility of the high quality entrepreneurs subject
to constraints (5.8), (5.9), (5.10) and (5.11).
Proposition 5.2. With imperfect information and a perfectly elastic supply of loan funds, the
optimal contract is Eˆ(Rˆ, Cˆ),
Rˆ =
Rf − (1− p)(Ib − w)
p
and Cˆ = Ib − w (5.12)
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PAL
UH(Eˆ)
Eˆ
E∗
R∗Rˆ R
pi = 0
C∗
Rf
C
R = C
SLPAH
Cˆ(Ib − w)
1O
Figure 5.5: The equilibrium with imperfect information
Each high quality entrepreneur obtains a loan and invests in a good project, while the low quality
entrepreneur exits the credit market.
This is a straightforward result. Due to the competition pressure, the equilibrium contract
must lie on the lender’s zero profit curve pi = 0 (constraint (5.10)) and above the switch line
(constraint (5.9)). When contract Eˆ is offered, no contract on curve pi = 0 above the switch line
SL can be added to the market for more profits. For example, any contract below Eˆ attracts the
low quality entrepreneurs and results in a reduction in the lender’s profit. Any contract above
Eˆ is unattractive to all entrepreneurs. Therefore, in equilibrium no lenders would deviate from
contract Eˆ unilaterally. Contract Eˆ is the Nash Equilibrium. Perfect separation is achieved in
equilibrium with the offering of a single contract Eˆ: only the high quality entrepreneur obtains
a loan and makes the investment.
Collateral is useful in inducing self-selection. The intuition is as follows. With imperfect
information, the lender is unable to distinguish the entrepreneurs. However, the lender can
indirectly control the high quality entrepreneur’s choice of the projects while discouraging the
low quality entrepreneur from borrowing. The lender thus raises the collateral requirement to
the level that is unacceptable to either a low quality entrepreneur or a high quality entrepreneur
who chooses the bad project (recall that the entrepreneur with a bad project is not affected by R
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since he/she never repays the loan). This collateral requirement equals Ib − w. In equilibrium,
perfect separation is achieved, since only the high quality entrepreneurs obtain the loans.
This result is different from that in the previous chapter. This is because here the assumption
is that the low quality entrepreneur always chooses the bad technique. As a result the lender’s
zero profit curves associated with different entrepreneurs coincide below the switch line SL,
rather than above it. Therefore, a single contract Eˆ can be offered, one which only the high
quality entrepreneur prefers.
Corollary 5.3. With imperfect information, high quality entrepreneurs have to pay information
rents to distinguish themselves from low quality entrepreneurs.
The first-best investment level is achieved, however, at a cost to the high quality entrepreneur’s
welfare. Compared with contract E∗, at contract Eˆ, the high quality entrepreneur has to pledge
more collateral:C∗ < Cˆ. Moreover, the reduction in the repayment requirementR is insufficient
to compensate the increase in the collateral requirement C: EUH(E∗) > EUH(Eˆ) since the
entrepreneur’s welfare increases as she moves down along the lender’s zero profit curve above the
switch line. As shown in Figure 5.5, contract Eˆ is less favourable to the high quality entrepreneur
than contract E∗.
Corollary 5.4. dCˆ/dw < 0 and dRˆ/dw > 0.
Corollary 5.5. Entrepreneur’s welfare increase in w.
Corollary 5.4 and 5.5 state how the loan terms and the welfare change with an increase in
wage rate w. As w increases, for example because of a higher demand in the labour market,
the collateral requirement can be reduced while still ensuring that the low quality entrepreneur
prefers to work rather than to borrow. Recognizing this, the lender has an incentive to alter the
loan terms for more profits by reducing the collateral requirement and increasing the repayment
requirement. As a result, the high quality entrepreneur benefits from the improvement in the
loan terms, and her welfare increases as the wage ratew rises. The low quality entrepreneur who
takes the employment job benefits from the higher wage rate in the labour market as well.
5.3.3 Credit Rationing
Now consider the case where the entrepreneurs have different collateralizable wealth. The en-
trepreneur’s initial wealth e can be divided into two categories, namely the collateralizable
wealth denoted by ce and the non-collateralizable wealth denoted by ne, with e = ne + ce.
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Some entrepreneurs have more collateralizable wealth, and some entrepreneurs have more non-
collateralizable assets. For simplicity, it is assumed that ceL = e > Cˆ.
The high quality entrepreneurs can be divided into two subcategories according to their
collateralizable wealth, namely rich entrepreneurs denoted by r and poor entrepreneurs denoted
by p. Their proportions are β and 1− β, respectively. It is assumed that ceHr = e and ceHp < e.
It is clear that if ceHp ≥ Cˆ – i.e., all the high quality entrepreneurs can provide sufficient
collateral – the equilibrium is contract Eˆ, and rationing of the high quality entrepreneur does not
occur. However, if the high quality poor entrepreneurs are unable to provide sufficient collateral
– i.e., ceHp < Cˆ – then rationing of the high quality entrepreneurs may arise in equilibrium. Let
γ be the probability of obtaining a loan at loan contract E(R,C).
Define σi as the marginal rate of substitution between γ and C of the type i entrepreneur,
while the lender’s profit equals zero5
σi =
dC
dγ
|U¯i,pi=0
=
{−pU(e+Ig−R(C))+(1−p)U(e−C)−U(e)
γ(1−p)[U ′(e+Ig−R(C))−U ′(e−C)] if i = H,
U(e+Ib−C)−U(e)
γU ′(e+Ib−C) if i = L,
where R(C) = Rf−(1−p)C
p
. The marginal rate of substitution σi is positive for i = H,L.
Lemma 5.1. σH > σL for C∗ ≤ C < Cˆ.
Proof.
γ(σH − σL) = −pU(e+ Ig −R) + (1− p)U(e− C)− U(e)
(1− p)[U ′(e+ Ig −R)− U ′(e− C)] −
U(e+ Ib − C)− U(e)
U ′(e+ Ib − C)
≥ [U(e+ Ib −R)− U(e)]
{ −1
(1− p)[U ′(e+ Ig −R)− U ′(e− C)] −
1
U ′(e+ Ib − C)
}
> 0
according to Assumption 5.3. (Q.E.D.)
This lemma indicates that the high quality entrepreneur’s marginal rate of substitution be-
tween γ and C is greater than that of the low quality entrepreneur, where R is adjusted to keep
the lender’s profit equals zero. It means that a high quality entrepreneur is willing to pledge
more collateral than does a low quality entrepreneur for an increase in γ, while R is adjusted
5The analysis focuses on σis at the contracts above the switch line.
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accordingly. As a result, the high quality entrepreneur has the incentive to increase the collateral
to signal her quality.
The intuition is as follows. The net benefit from an increase in the collateral captured by a
high quality entrepreneur is greater than that captured by a low quality entrepreneur. First, the
high quality entrepreneur benefits from both a higher γ and a lower R; while the low quality
entrepreneur benefits only from a higher γ. Second, the increase in the collateral imposes a lower
cost on the high quality entrepreneur with a good project than on the low quality entrepreneur with
a bad project, since the latter always loses the collateral. Therefore, the high quality entrepreneur
is less concerned about the collateral than the low quality entrepreneur, i.e.,σH > σL.
Proposition 5.3. With imperfect information and a perfectly elastic supply of loan funds,
1. if Cˆ > ceHp ≥ C∗, there exists a separating equilibrium: a non-rationing contract Eˆ
designed for high quality rich entrepreneurs and a rationing contract E˜ designed for high
quality poor entrepreneurs, at which the probability of obtaining a loan is γ˜:
Rˆ =
Rf − (1− p)(Ib − w)
p
, Cˆ = Ib − w; and γˆ = 1;
R˜ =
Rf − (1− p)ceHp
p
, C˜ = ceHp; and γ˜ =
U(e+ w)− U(e)
U(e+ Ib − ceHp)− U(e) < 1.
Rationing of high quality entrepreneurs arises in equilibrium. All low quality entrepreneurs
enter the labour market;
2. if ceHp < C∗, only high quality rich entrepreneurs obtain loans at non-rationing contract
Eˆ; high quality poor entrepreneurs and low quality entrepreneurs enter the labour market.
This proposition can be proved with the aid of Figure 5.6. In panel a, curves PAHr(.),
PAHp(.) and PAL(.), respectively, are the participation constraints of the high quality rich,
the high quality poor and the low quality entrepreneurs, while (.) indicates the respective γ.6
Notice that due to the collateral constraint (i.e., ceHp < Cˆ), the high quality poor entrepreneur’s
participation constraint curve is a horizontal line C = ceHp in R − C space and her switch
line is truncated by line C = ceHp. The downward sloping line pi = 0 is the lender’s zero
profit curve associated with the good project. Consider contracts A, B and E˜ on line pi = 0.
The probabilities of obtaining a loan at these contracts are γA, γB and γ˜, respectively. These
6Since the lender does not want to lend to the entrepreneurs with the bad projects, the equilibrium contract must
lie above the switch line. The contracts below the switch line are thus ignored.
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PAL|pi=0
R∗
A
RA
RA
E∗
pi = 0
Eˆ
Rˆ
SL
a. Entrepreneurs’ indifference curves in R− C space:
C
Eˆ
1γAR
Cˆ
CA
C = ceHp
C∗
A
Entrepreneurs are
better off
UH(γA)
UH |pi=0
UH |pi=0 = UH(γA)
γγB
B
BCB
b. Entrepreneurs’ indifference curves in
γ − C space: pi = 0
PAHr(1)
E˜
R˜
γ˜
E˜
PAL(1)
C˜ PAH |pi=0
D
PAL(γA)
PAL(γB)
C
R = C
PAHp(1)
O O1
UH(γB)
Figure 5.6: Derivation of equilibrium under imperfect information: ceHp < Cˆ
probabilities are set such that the low quality entrepreneur is indifferent between obtaining a loan
and not obtaining a loan, thus the following ranking is necessary: γA < γB < γ˜. Curve UH(.) is
the high quality entrepreneur’s indifference curve. Notice that the high quality entrepreneur is
indifferent between the rationing contracts on curves UH(.)s.
The entrepreneur’s indifference curves in γ − C space are depicted in panel b, where R
is adjusted to ensure that the lender makes zero profit. Curves PAH |pi=0 and PAL|pi=0 are the
participation constraints of the high quality and low quality entrepreneurs, respectively. Curve
UH |pi=0 is the indifference curve of the high quality entrepreneur. This curve is drawn based on
the assumption that the high quality entrepreneur’s utility at contracts on this curve equals her
expected utility at contract A with γA. These curves are upward sloping and concave in γ and
C.7 Notice that curves PAH |pi=0 and UH |pi=0 below line C = ceHp are the high quality poor
7This result occurs, since
dσH
dγ
= −2σH
γ
+ σ2H
U ′′(e− C) + (1− p)U ′′(e+ Ig −R)/p
U ′(e− C)− U ′(e+ Ig −R) < 0,
dσL
dγ
= −2σL
γ
+ σ2L
U ′′(e+ Ib − C)
U ′(e+ Ib − C) < 0.
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entrepreneur’s indifference curves. The entrepreneurs are better off with a higher γ and a lower
C. Since σH > σL, both curve PAH |pi=0 and curve UH |pi=0 are steeper than curve PAL|pi=0.
Suppose that initially the non-rationing contract Eˆ and the rationing contract A with γA
are offered. The low quality entrepreneur is indifferent between the two contracts, and decides
to enter the labour market by assumption. The high quality entrepreneur strictly prefers the
non-rationing contract Eˆ. However, due to the collateral constraint, only the high quality rich
entrepreneur can afford contract Eˆ. The high quality poor entrepreneur thus borrows at contract
A. In this situation, a new contract D with γB can be offered to the market profitably. This
contract is as rationing as contract B, As shown in the figure, contract D lies below curve
UH(γB). Therefore, for the high quality entrepreneur, contractD is more attractive than contract
B. It means that contract D with γB is more attractive to the high quality entrepreneur than
contract A with γA. Since contract D is above the zero profit curve, the lender who provides the
new contract attracts all high quality poor entrepreneurs and makes more profits from lending.
Thus, all lenders have an incentive to modify their contracts designed for the high quality poor
entrepreneur until contract E˜ with γ˜ is offered because further modification is unprofitable. This
contract is the intersection of the lender’s zero profit curve pi = 0 and the high quality poor
entrepreneur’s collateral constraint curve C = ceHp.
The intuition is that, compared with the low quality entrepreneur, the high quality en-
trepreneur is more concerned about the probability of obtaining a loan than with the collateral.
Given two rationing contracts at which both the low quality entrepreneur and the lender feel
indifferent, the high quality poor entrepreneur prefers the one that is less rationing, as long as
she can provide sufficient collateral. In equilibrium, the high quality poor entrepreneur pledges
all her wealth as collateral for a higher probability of obtaining a loan.
Corollary 5.6. dR˜/dw = dC˜/dw = 0 and dγ˜/dw > 0.
Corollary 5.6 describes the labour market’s impact on the credit market. First, the wage ratew
has no influence on the loan terms of the contract designed for the high quality poor entrepreneur.
Second, as the wage rate w increases, more high quality poor entrepreneurs can obtain the loans
and make their investments. This result occurs because γ˜ is determined by the utility differentials
of the low quality entrepreneur at contracts (R, Ib−w) and E˜(R˜, ceHp) (recall that his utility is
independent of R). The increase in w makes the implementation of an investment less attractive
to the low quality entrepreneur. As a consequence, a higher probability of obtaining a loan at
114
Chapter 5. Credit Rationing and Non-Financial Services, Model II
contract E˜ can be introduced while still deterring these entrepreneurs. Therefore, γ˜ increases in
w. Thus, a positive shock in w in the labour market results in a less rationing outcome in the
credit market, and in turn a higher investment level.
Corollary 5.7. The entrepreneurs’ welfare increase in w.
Corollary 5.7 indicates that all entrepreneurs benefit from the positive shock in the wage
rate w in the labour market: (1) the low quality entrepreneur gets a higher wage rate; (2) the
high quality poor entrepreneur is more likely to obtain the loan, so more investments are carried
out; and (3) the high quality rich entrepreneur borrows under more favourable contract terms.
Individually and in aggregate, the entrepreneurs are better off with a higher wage rate in the
labour market.
Corollary 5.8. dR˜/dceHp < 0, dC˜/dceHp > 0 and dγ˜/dceHp > 0.
Corollary 5.9. The high quality entrepreneur’s welfare increase as ceHp increases.
These results are immediate. They indicate how the amount of collateralizable wealth owned
by the high quality poor entrepreneur (ceHp) affects her access to credit and welfare. As shown
in Figure 5.6, as ceHp increases, the loan terms are less favourable; however the benefit from
the better access to credit (a higher γ) makes it worth posting more collateral. Thus, the high
quality poor entrepreneur is better off as ceHp increases. The other types of entrepreneurs are
not affected.
In this model, the collateral is a useful selection tool. The difference in the entrepreneurial
skill results in a difference in attitudes towards the collateral. The high quality entrepreneur who
invests in a good project is more concerned about the repaymentR and the access to credit γ than
the low quality entrepreneur. Therefore, the former has an incentive to provide the collateral up
to an amount that is unacceptable to the latter. In equilibrium, a contract that is attractive only
to the high quality entrepreneur with a good investment can be designed. Perfect separation is
achieved.
If, however, the collateral needed for self-selection exceeds ceHp, i.e., ceHp < Cˆ, a collateral
requirement of ceHp is insufficient to deter low quality entrepreneurs from borrowing money. The
lender responds to this incentive compatibility problem by reducing the probability of extending
credit to a high quality poor entrepreneur, thereby randomizing its credit policy. This rationing
contract is designed such that it is unattractive to low quality entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, only
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high quality entrepreneurs borrow money and make investments; low quality entrepreneurs take
employment jobs.
Rationing of the high quality entrepreneurs takes place in equilibrium if ceHp < Cˆ. Overall,
the proportion of the high quality entrepreneurs who cannot obtain the loans is (1− γ˜)(1− β).
Recall that those who do not receive loans cannot obtain employment jobs either. So credit
rationing leads to underinvestment and efficiency losses. Measures should be taken to reduce
credit rationing. One possible solution is to increase w. As non-participation becomes more
favourable to low quality entrepreneurs, a less rationing outcome in the credit market will be
attained. However, because the wage rate is determined by the demand for and the supply of
labour, arbitrary adjustment will cause an efficiency loss in the labour market. Another solution is
to use other selection devices to facilitate the screening of entrepreneurs. Non-financial services
(e.g., mentoring and technical assistance) can play such a role in addition to help the entrepreneurs
build entrepreneurial skills.
5.4 Non-Financial Services as a Selection Device
In this section, the potential role of non-financial services as a selection vehicle is investigated. As
in the previous chapter, the focus is on the impact of non-financial services on the entrepreneurs’
costs of obtaining a loan. Again, a loan contract with a component of non-financial services (i.e.,
mentoring services) is called a mentoring loan contract.
The link between mentoring and loan granting not only produces benefits to entrepreneurs but
also impose extra costs on entrepreneurs. Assume that the net benefit of mentoring requirement
is negative, or in other words, entrepreneurs have to incur a net cost as a result of mentoring
requirement.8
Moreover, the mentoring requirement affects different entrepreneurs differently. Let BHk
(k ∈ [r, p]) and BL be the net cost of obtaining a mentoring loan for the type Hk and the type
L entrepreneurs, respectively. The high quality entrepreneurs are more capable individuals and
benefit little from the mentoring activities (e.g., business counselling and after-care services).
Thus they tend to regard participating in mentoring activities of the lenders as extra costs.
However, the costs are different across high quality entrepreneurs.
The mentoring loan contract is the only way for a high quality poor entrepreneur to obtain a
loan; while a high quality rich entrepreneur has another option – the conventional loan contract.
8Alternatively, one can assume the net benefit of mentoring requirement is positive and carry out the analysis.
Such treatment will not change the result dramatically.
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Due to the presence of the conventional loan contract, the unconstrained high quality entrepreneur
feels that the mentoring requirement is more expensive, compared with the high quality poor
entrepreneur, thus BHr > BHp.
To simplify the analysis, assume that BHr is sufficiently high such that the high quality rich
entrepreneur would never choose a mentoring loan contract. This assumption means that the
lender can separate the high quality entrepreneurs by means of mentoring.
The low quality entrepreneurs are less capable, and benefit more from the mentoring activ-
ities.9 However, they are likely to spend more time and expenses on using these services. For
example, they may need to have more frequent meetings with their mentors than do high quality
entrepreneurs. Also, they are more likely to be behind on their payments and thus trigger an
intensive intervention. Therefore, they have to incur higher costs than do the high quality poor
entrepreneurs, thus BL > BHp.
The net costs of obtaining a mentoring loan – i.e., BHk and BL – are assumed to be a
function of the entrepreneurs’ marginal costs bHk and bL, respectively, and the intensiveness of
the mentoring services m. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that bHp = 0, so BHp = 0
for m ≥ 0; bL = b > 0; and bHr =∞.
The entrepreneurs’ expected utility from obtaining a loan at contract E(R,C) with a men-
toring requirement m are given by
EUHkj =
{
pU(e+ Ig −R− bHkm) + (1− p)U(e− C − bHkm) if j = g,
U(e+ Ib − C − bHkm) if j = b,
EULb = U(e+ Ib − C − bm),
for k = r, p.
Mentoring has no impact on the high quality poor entrepreneur, so her indifference curves
and switch line remain unchanged (see the participation constraint curve C = ceHp, the indif-
ference curve UHp and the switch line SL in Figure 5.7). The high quality rich entrepreneur
faces prohibitively high mentoring costs, thus never finds a mentoring loan contract profitable.
Mentoring forces the low quality entrepreneur’s participation constraint to shift downward, since
an improvement in loan terms (a reduction inC specifically) is necessary to cover the extra costs
9It is possible that the low quality entrepreneurs benefit little from the mentoring activities, especially if they
borrow loans for other purposes rather than for their businesses.
117
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
caused by mentoring (see the movement of the participation constraint fromPAL(0) toPAL(m)
in Figure 5.7). As m increases, the participation constraint shifts down further.
PAL(0)
pi(0)
Eˆ
cep
PAL(m)
pi(m)
E∗∗
SL
Rf + cm
R∗∗
E∗
PAHp
Rf
C
R = C
R1
UHp
O
Figure 5.7: Impact of mentoring requirement
Let c be the marginal cost of mentoring for the lender and assume c is the same across the
lenders. Assume that there is no fixed cost of mentoring, the lender’s profit function is given by
piHj =
{
pR + (1− p)C −Rf − cm if j = g,
C −Rf − cm if j = b,
(5.13)
piL = C −Rf − cm. (5.14)
The lender’s zero profit curve above the switch line SL shifts upward with an increase in the
intensiveness of mentoring services m, since the lender needs either a higher R or a higher C,
or both, to cover the cost of mentoring (see the movement of the zero profit curve from pi(0) to
pi(m) in Figure 5.7).
Assumption 5.4. c ≤ bpR∗∗+(1−p)ceHp−Rf
Ib−ceHp−w , where contract E
∗∗(R∗∗, ceHp) is the intersection of
the switch line SL and the collateral constraint curve C = ceHp.
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This assumption implies that the lender can make positive profit at contract E∗∗, at which
the mentoring requirement m∗∗ is designed such that the low quality entrepreneur is indifferent
between obtaining and not obtaining a loan, when the collateral requirement is ceHp.10
The mentoring requirement affects different entrepreneurs differently. This suggests that the
mentoring requirement can be used as a substitute for collateral to deal with imperfect information
in the environment where some entrepreneurs have difficulties in providing sufficient collateral
to secure a loan. However, the effectiveness of mentoring as a selection device is affected by
b, c and w. If Assumption 5.4 is violated because, for example, c is high – i.e., the lender
requires a large increase in R or C, or both to cover the mentoring costs, or b is low – i.e.,
the low quality entrepreneur is not sensitive to the mentoring requirement, or w is low – i.e.,
employment job is less attractive, then there exists no feasible mentoring loan contract. Recall
that the low quality entrepreneur is indifferent between contracts that have the same collateral
requirement and mentoring requirement. So R∗∗ is the highest possible repayment requirement
of the mentoring loan contract, when the collateral requirement equals ceHp and the mentoring
requirement equals m∗∗.11 Thus, the violation of Assumption 5.4 means that the lender cannot
make non-negative profit at contract E∗∗(R∗∗, ceHp) with mentoring requirement m∗∗, not to
mention to increase the mentoring requirement further for a further reduction in the collateral
so that the high quality poor entrepreneur can afford the mentoring loan contract. Therefore,
Assumption 5.4 ensures the existence of the equilibrium mentoring loan contract.
Lemma 5.2. All high quality rich entrepreneurs obtain the loans at conventional loan contract
Eˆ.
Since she never chooses a mentoring loan, the high quality rich entrepreneur can be easily
separated from the others. As discussed in a previous section, the conventional loan contract Eˆ
is offered to serve these entrepreneurs’ needs for credit.
10The low quality entrepreneur is indifferent between borrowing and not borrowing money, thus
U(e+ Ib − ceHp − bm∗∗) = U(e+ w) ==> m∗∗ = Ib − ceHp − w
b
.
Substitute m∗∗ into the lender’s profit function,
pi = pR∗∗ + (1− p)ceHp −Rf − cIb − ceHp − wL
b
≥ 0.
Rearranging this expression gives c ≤ bpR∗∗+(1−p)ceHp−RfIb−ceHp−wL .
11Notice that the mentoring loan contract must lie above the switch line to encourage the investment in the good
projects.
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Thus, the lender can focus on the submarket consisting of the high quality poor and the low
quality entrepreneurs. Due to the competition, the equilibrium contract should maximize the
welfare of the high quality poor entrepreneur, subject to the participation constraint (5.8), the
good project constraint (5.9), the lender’s new participation constraint:
pi = pR + (1− p)C −Rf − cm = 0, (5.15)
as well as the new incentive compatibility constraint:
U(e+ Ib − C − bm) ≤ U(e+ w). (5.16)
Define φ as the marginal rate of substitution between m and C, where R is adjusted such
that the lender’s profit equals zero:
φL|pi=0 = −b, (5.17)
φHp|pi=0 =
{− cU ′(e+Ig−R(C,m))
(1−p)[U ′(e−C)−U ′(e+Ig−R(C,m))] if EUHp > U(e+ w),
−b if EUHp ≤ U(e+ w),
(5.18)
where R(C,m) = [Rf + cm− (1− p)C]/p. The entrepreneurs require a reduction in C – note
that R is adjusted accordingly – to compensate for an increase in m. Notice that φL|pi=0 equals
a constant. To deter the low quality entrepreneur, the collateral requirement and the mentoring
requirement must satisfyU(e+Ib−C−bm) = U(e+w), which means that e+Ib−C−bm = e+w
must hold. It in turn means that σL|pi=0 = −b.
Proposition 5.4. With imperfect information, if C∗ ≤ ceHp < Cˆ, the optimal contract designed
for the high quality poor entrepreneur is a mentoring loan contract. It can be either contract Eˆ1
with mentoring requirement mˆ1 or contract Eˆ2 with mentoring requirement mˆ2. Contracts Eˆ1
and Eˆ2 and mentoring requirements mˆ1 and mˆ2 are defined as follows
Rˆ1 =
Rf−(1−p)ceHp
p
+
c(Ib−ceHp−w)
pb
, Cˆ1 = ceHp; and mˆ1 =
Ib−ceHp−w
b
= m∗∗.
Rˆ2, Cˆ2 and mˆ2 solve following expressions
EUHg = EUHb; pi = 0; and U(e+ Ib − C − bm) = U(e+ w).
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IfEUHp(Eˆ1) ≥ EUHp(Eˆ2), contract Eˆ1 with mentoring requirement mˆ1 will be offered; and
vice versa.
The above results are illustrated in Figures 5.8 and 5.9. The only difference between the two
figures is that Figure 5.8 is drawn based on the assumption that the high quality poor entrepreneur
prefers contract Eˆ1 with mˆ1 over Eˆ2 with mˆ2, and Figure 5.9 is based on the opposite assumption.
First examine Figure 5.8. In panel a, the horizontal line PAL(.) depicts the participation
constraints of the low quality entrepreneur, where (.) indicates the mentoring requirement. To
make these entrepreneurs indifferent among the contracts on curvePAL(.), the following ranking
is necessary: 0 < mˆ1 < mA < mˆ2. The downward sloped lines pi(0), pi(mˆ1), pi(mA) and pi(mˆ2)
are the lender’s zero-profit curves associated with the above mentoring requirements. The dashed
curves UH(mˆ1) and UH(mˆ2) are the high quality poor entrepreneur’s indifference curves. Note
that the high quality poor entrepreneur derives a higher level of utility along curve UH(mˆ1) than
along curve UH(mˆ2).
Now consider three contracts Eˆ1, A and Eˆ2. Contract Eˆ1 is the intersection of the lender’s
zero profit curve pi(mˆ1) and the collateral constraint lineC = ceHp; contractA is the intersection
of the lender’s zero profit curve pi(mA) and the low quality entrepreneur’s participation constraint
curve PAL(mA); and contract Eˆ2 is the intersection of the high quality entrepreneur’s switch
line and the low quality entrepreneur’s participation constraint curve PAL(mˆ2).
In panel b, the low quality entrepreneur is indifferent between obtaining a loan and not
obtaining a loan at contracts Eˆ, Eˆ1, A and Eˆ2, under which the mentoring requirements are
0, mˆ1,mA and mˆ2, respectively, since they all lie on curvePAL|pi=0 – the participation constraint
of the low quality entrepreneur in m− C space, where R is adjusted to keep the lender’s profit
equal to zero. The slope of the line equals −b. Curve UH(Eˆ1)|pi=0 is the indifference curve
of the high quality entrepreneur in the same space. This curve is convex in m and C.12 The
entrepreneurs are better off with either a lower m or a lower C, or both.
Since the entrepreneur’s indifference curves are convex in m and C on the lender’s zero
profit hyperplane in m− C space, the contract designed for the high quality poor entrepreneur
must be a corner solution. In equilibrium, either contract Eˆ1 with mˆ1 or Eˆ2 with mˆ2 will be
12Differentiating equation (5.18) with respect to m gives,
dφHp|pi=0
dm
=
U ′(e− C)U ′′(e+ Ig −R) (1−p)φHp−cp + U ′(e+ Ig −R)U ′′(e− C)φHp
(1− p)[U ′(e+ Ig −R)− U ′(e− C)]2 > 0,
where R = [Rf + cm− (1− p)C]/p. So the high quality entrepreneur’s indifference curves in m−C space (R is
adjusted accordingly) is convex in m and C.
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offered together with conventional loan contract Eˆ in equilibrium, depending on which contract
the high quality poor entrepreneur prefers.
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Figure 5.8: Equilibrium mentoring contract: Eˆ1 with mˆ1
For example, in Figure 5.8, the expected utility of the high quality poor entrepreneur is
at the highest possible level at contract Eˆ1 with mˆ1. This contract is thus designed for these
entrepreneurs. To see this, suppose instead initially contract Eˆ2 with mˆ2 is offered together with
conventional loan contract Eˆ. In this situation, a new contract B with mA can be added to the
market profitably. Contract B has the same collateral requirement as contract A, but with a bit
higher repayment requirement. ContractB lies between curves UH(mˆ1) and UH(mˆ2) in panel a,
thus it is more favourable than contract Eˆ2 but less favourable than contractA to the high quality
poor entrepreneur. This contract satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint as well since it
lies on curvePAL(mA) – the low quality entrepreneur’s participation constraint curve associated
with mentoring requirement mA. Therefore, no low quality entrepreneur borrows at contract B
with mA. Moreover, contract B lies above line pi(mA) – the zero profit curve associated with
mentoring requirement mA, so the lender who offers this new contract can make more profits.
Thus, all lenders have an incentive to modify their contract terms and mentoring requirement
designed for the high quality poor entrepreneur, until contract Eˆ1 with mˆ1 is offered, because
deviation from this contract is no longer profitable. So the Nash equilibrium is the conventional
loan contract Eˆ and the mentoring loan contract Eˆ1 with mˆ1.
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Figure 5.9: Equilibrium contract: Eˆ2 with mˆ2
Similarly, as shown in Figure 5.9, if the high quality poor entrepreneur strictly prefers contract
Eˆ2 over Eˆ1, then contract Eˆ2 with mˆ2 is offered together with the conventional loan contract Eˆ,
since deviating from it unilaterally is not profitable.
Corollary 5.10. When some high quality entrepreneurs lack collateralizable wealth – i.e.,C∗ ≤
ceHp < Cˆ, mentoring can be used to deal with information imperfections. In equilibrium,
rationing of high quality entrepreneurs does not occur: those who can provide sufficient collateral
obtain the conventional loans and those who are constrained obtain the mentoring loans. All
low quality entrepreneurs take employment jobs. The first-best investment level is achieved by
means of mentoring.
The intuition is as follows. With limited collateralizable wealth, collateral is not effective
in facilitating screening, since the collateral requirement of ceHp is insufficient to signal a high
quality entrepreneur with a good project. Because it affects different entrepreneurs differently,
mentoring has the potential to facilitate selection. By imposing a mentoring requirement of
sufficient magnitude that low quality entrepreneurs find it not worthwhile to obtain a loan, the
lender can achieve perfect separation; only high quality entrepreneurs stay in the market, and
low quality entrepreneurs move to the labour market. The self-selection of the entrepreneurs
occurs and the first-best level of investment is attained.
123
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Notice that in the environment of imperfect information, compared with the optimal rationing
contract, high quality poor entrepreneurs could be better off or worse off with the optimal
mentoring loan contract. For example, if mentoring loan contract Eˆ1 with mˆ1 is offered, these
entrepreneurs’ utility isEUHp(Eˆ1, mˆ1) = pU(e+Ig−Rˆ1)+(1−p)U(e−ceHp). In comparison,
their utility at the rationing contract isEUHp(E˜, γ˜) = γ˜[pU(e+Ig−R˜)+(1−p)U(e−ceHp)]+
(1 − γ˜)U(e). If c is small or b is large such that Rˆ1 is much higher than R˜, it is likely that the
condition EUHp(Eˆ1, mˆ1) > EUHp(E˜, γ˜) will hold, which means the entrepreneurs are better
off with the mentoring loan contract.
Corollary 5.11. The collateral-constrained high quality entrepreneur’s welfare EUHp increase
in b and wL, and decrease in c.
This result can be derived by investigating the comparative static properties. By differentiating
Rˆl, Cˆl and mˆl with respect to c, w and b, respectively, the following properties can be derived
dRˆl/db < 0 dCˆl/db ≤ 0 dmˆl/db ≤ 0
dRˆl/dw < 0 dCˆl/dw ≤ 0 dmˆl/dw < 0
dRˆl/dc > 0 dCˆl/dc ≤ 0 dmˆl/dc ≥ 0
for l = 1, 2.
As his marginal cost b increases, the low quality entrepreneur becomes more sensitive to
the mentoring requirement. Thus, a lower mentoring requirement is sufficient to deter him from
borrowing. This enables the lender to offer a more favourable loan contract to the high quality
poor entrepreneur by reducing either R or both R and C. Therefore, EUHp increases.
Similarly, as the wage rate w increases, making an investment becomes less attractive. A
lower level of mentoring requirement is sufficient to deter the low quality entrepreneur. SoEUHp
increases due to the improvement in the loan terms. Recall that the low quality entrepreneur takes
the employment job. The increase in w means that the welfare of these entrepreneurs increase as
well. The high quality rich entrepreneurs also benefit from the improvement in loan terms due
to the increase in w.
However, as c increases. the lender requires an increase in eitherR orC to cover the mentoring
costs. As a response, the lender reduces the mentoring requirement and increases either R or
both R and C. Since the loan terms are less attractive to the high quality poor entrepreneur, her
welfare decrease.
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5.5 Summary
In a model that combines adverse selection and moral hazard, collateral is shown to be a useful
selection tool in an environment where lenders can distinguish the entrepreneurs according to
their wealth, but cannot observe the quality of the entrepreneurs. High quality entrepreneurs
are willing to pledge more collateral to distinguish themselves from low quality entrepreneurs.
Perfect separation is attainable in equilibrium. All the high quality entrepreneurs obtain loans and
invest in good projects, while all the low quality entrepreneurs participate in the labour market.
Meanwhile, the first-best investment level is realized, although at a cost to the entrepreneurs,
since high quality entrepreneurs have to post more collateral than what is necessary to deal with
the moral hazard problem.
If some high quality entrepreneurs have insufficient collateralizable wealth, credit rationing
may occur since the repayment requirement and the collateral requirement are insufficient to
mitigate the information problem. The outcome is perfect separation with rationing.
The model in this chapter also demonstrates that non-financial services (e.g., business train-
ing, workshops, counselling, mentoring and after-care services) can be an effective selection
device, since it increases the low quality type entrepreneur’s costs of obtaining a loan, and thus
makes a mentoring loan contract unfavourable to this group.
The effectiveness of this strategy relies on the mentoring cost on both lenders and en-
trepreneurs. For example, if the lenders face prohibitively high mentoring costs, they are unable
to work out a mentoring loan contract that would not negatively affect their profits. Alterna-
tively, if the undesired entrepreneurs (the low quality entrepreneurs) have low mentoring costs,
it could be advantageous for them to participate in the mentoring activities to secure the loans.
In this situation, it would be difficult to discourage them from borrowing. The lesson is that the
lenders must design their non-financial services appropriately such that the participation in such
activities may cause a large discrete impact on the undesired entrepreneurs, and a relative small
impact on the desired entrepreneurs.
There is a positive feedback mechanism that affects the relationship between the credit
market and the labour market. The wage rate rises if there is a positive demand shock in the
labour market. The higher wage rate affects the entrepreneurs’ choices between employment and
investment, and leads to a better selection. As a result credit rationing becomes less serious. If
the lender offers the mentoring loan contract to solve the information problem, he can reduce the
intensiveness of these services in the case where there is a positive shock in the labour market.
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As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, a number of Canadian credit unions have operated micro-
credit programs. Unlike the NGOs who obtain capital from outside sources, credit unions finance
micro loans out of the deposits of their members. In the next chapter, a model is developed to
examine how the credit union prices micro-loans and deposit services.
126
Chapter 5. Credit Rationing and Non-Financial Services, Model II
127
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Chapter 6
A Framework for Analyzing Credit Union Decision-Making
6.1 Introduction
Co-operatives, including credit unions, have been identified as a way of introducing competition
to the imperfectly competitive markets. Enke [1945] first investigated co-operatives as a separate
form of business. Focusing on consumer co-operatives, he argues that an efficient outcome can be
achieved if the co-operative maximizes the sum of producer and consumer surplus. Helmberger
and Hoos [1962] analyzed how the presence of a co-operative may affect the market outcome in
different market structures. They demonstrated that the single processing co-operative with an
open membership policy can lead to an outcome that is closer to that under perfect competition
than to the monopoly structure.
A co-operative is a business that is owned and democratically controlled by its members who
are also the users of products and services provided by the co-operative. However, members
may have different preferences or different reasons for participating in the co-operative. As
a consequence, members have “a strong incentive to form coalitions to shift benefits in their
direction” (Hansmann [1988], p. 279). These subgroups often can achieve disproportionate
influence over the co-operative’s policy. This is particularly the case if the groups are in a better
position to participate in the decision-making process. Faced with member heterogeneity, pricing
policy becomes more difficult (Staatz [1987]).
In a credit union, member heterogeneity is a concern as outlined in Chapter 3. The credit
union consists of two broad groups of members: borrowers and savers. There is fundamental
potential conflict between the two groups. Borrowers prefer lower interest rates on loan services,
while savers prefer higher interest rates on saving services. The gap between the two is the
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profits to the credit union, which are either retained as reserve funds for the future development
or returned to the members based on patronage. It is impossible for the credit union to make
both groups better off at the same time: the benefits accruing to one group are at the cost to the
other group. Preferential treatment of one group would negatively affect the other group.
Traditional models of financial intermediaries and co-operatives cannot be applied directly
to model the behaviour of a credit union. Simple profit maximizing models are applicable only
if there is perfect competition in the financial market, which is typically not the case. In addition,
classic co-operative models are inappropriate because they are based on the assumption of
homogeneous members, and thus the maximization of a single objective for these members.
Taylor [1971] was the first who noticed the member orientation/preference of the credit union
and incorporated it into a simple theoretic model. His work has inspired a number of theoretical
efforts. Chapter 3 presented a brief review of these works, for instance, Smith et al. [1981], Smith
[1984], Emmons and Schmidt [2001], and Emmons and Mueller [1997].
In this chapter, a framework is developed for understanding how, in the provision of micro-
credit, the presence of a credit union leads to a better outcome compared with the structure that
would exist under an IOF (e.g., a chartered bank). The difference between this framework and
previous studies is that non-pecuniary motives of members are taken into account. The idea of
‘warm glow’ discussed in Andreoni [1989, 1990] is applied to the behaviour of savers in the
model. As will be shown, this non-pecuniary consideration has an influence on the interest rates,
and therefore affects the number of investments that can be carried out.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section models the behaviour of borrowers and
savers. Section 6.3 presents a comparison between two outcomes – one is with a monopolistic
IOF operating a micro-loan program and the other is with a credit union operating a micro-
loan program. Section 6.4 examines how saver commitment affects the outcome, including the
interest rates chosen and the resulting benefits to members. The last section concludes with the
key results.
6.2 The Framework
Consider a financial institution – either an IOF or a credit union – that operates a micro-loan
program to target the underserved micro-enterpreneurs. It also operates a community investment
saving program. The savings mobilized through this latter program are used to finance micro-
loans. The interest rate on the community investment saving deposits is below the market interest
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rate. This lower interest rate allows the financial institution to reduce the capital cost or financing
cost of micro-loans.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the clients of the financial institution can be classified into
two groups: borrowers and savers, and that each one belongs to one of any one of the two groups.
6.2.1 Borrowers
Borrowers can be further classified into two subgroups: conventional loan borrowers who are
not eligible for micro-loans and micro-loan borrowers.
Conventional Loan Borrowers
The financial institution has no incentive to alter its policy for conventional loans after micro-loan
and community investment saving programs are initiated, since doing so would result in either
its conventional credit services becoming less competitive compared with those provided by
other financial institutions (e.g., because of more stringent conditions) or a major loss of revenue
(e.g., the resulting credit is provided at a lower interest rate). Therefore, the conventional loan
borrowers’ access to credit is not affected. For simplicity, it is assumed that the net benefit of
the new programs to the conventional loan borrowers can be neglected, and that these borrowers
are neutral towards microcredit.1 As a result, the financial institution can ignore them when
introducing the micro-loan services. Hereafter, unless specified, borrowers refer to micro-loan
borrowers.
Micro-loan Borrowers
In each period there are nb potential borrowers who are eligible for micro-loans according to the
criteria set by the financial institution. Each has the opportunity to invest in one project at most.
The projects are identical. Borrowers have no initial wealth. To finance their projects, they have
to borrow funds from the financial institution (i.e., they have no other source of finance). This
amount is normalized at unity. The return from the project is 1 + i if it is successful, and 0 if it
is unsuccessful. The probability of having a successful project is denoted by p.
The micro-loan contract is specified by the interest rate rb, where rb < i. If the investments
are successful, borrowers reap the returns from the investments and pay off their loans (principal
1Conventional loan borrowers may derive either satisfaction or disatisfaction from the micro-loan program. For
example, if they believe that the provision of micro-loans is worthwhile, they may benefit even though they have
not made any contribution to it directly.
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plus interest) at the end of the period.2 However, in the case where the investment is unsuccessful,
borrowers would simply default on the loans since they cannot afford to repay the loans.
Borrowers are heterogeneous with respect to their entrepreneurial skill. Let x denote a bor-
rower’s entrepreneurial skill index. Borrowers are assumed to be uniformly distributed in their
entrepreneurial skill and x takes on values between zero and one. Moreover, an individual with
a higher x is less capable.
Let the type x borrower’s investment cost be γx, where γ > 0 is an exogenous parameter.
Thus, a less capable borrower incurs a higher investment cost than a more capable borrower.
Assuming that borrowers are risk-neutral, the net expected benefit captured by a borrower whose
entrepreneurial skill index is x is:
wb = p(i− rb)− γx. (6.1)
A borrower’s borrowing decision is determined by comparing the net benefit derived from
obtaining a micro-loan and not obtaining a micro-loan. Figure 6.1 illustrates the decisions and
welfare of borrowers. The horizontal line AB represents the expected benefit p(i − rb) from
obtaining a loan to individual borrowers. The upward sloping curve OC graphs the borrowers’
cost γx. The difference between AB and OC represents the net expected benefit to individual
borrowers from obtaining a loan. The intersection of AB and OC – point E – represents the
entrepreneurial skill index of the borrower who is indifferent between obtaining and not obtaining
a micro-loan. This borrower’s entrepreneurial skill index is given by
xˆ = p(i− rb)/γ. (6.2)
Borrowers located to the right of xˆ do not borrow micro-loans because it is unprofitable to
do so, while borrowers located to the left of xˆ borrow and undertake their investments. The
entrepreneurial skill index xˆ is also the proportion of borrowers who choose to borrow.
The aggregate benefit accruing to borrowers is given by the area below line AB and above
line OC times nb in Figure 6.1, and is given by:
Wb = nb
∫ xˆ
0
wbdx = nb
∫ xˆ
0
[p(i− rb)− γx]dx = nbp
2(i− rb)2
2γ
, (6.3)
2It is assumed that strategic default does not occur.
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Figure 6.1: The participation of potential borrowers.
for rb ≤ i.
6.2.2 Savers
Why Do Savers Participate?
The community investment saving deposits are lent out as micro-loans to the underserved micro-
entrepreneurs who otherwise have no access to the credit necessary to finance their small busi-
nesses (most of them are on a low income). The provision of microcredit not only directly benefits
individual borrowers but also creates positive externalities (social benefits) – e.g., empowering
women, reducing depopulation and improving nutrition and education. However, as discussed
in Chapter 2, in developed countries the social impact of a microcredit program is often very
limited.
Why would individuals contribute to the provision of microcredit? One reason is pure altru-
ism. With pure altruism, savers’ utility is a function of the returns from investing in the saving
plan and the benefits captured by borrowers. Another reason is the so-called “warm glow”. Warm
glow is a private benefit – a feeling of personal gratification arising from the contribution itself
(Andreoni [1989, 1990]). The discussion about warm glow of giving can be directly applied
to the case of investing in the community investment saving plan: savers are motivated by the
investment returns, the consumption of warm glow and the positive spillover generated.
Savers’ Decision-making
In each time period there are ns savers who make deposits at the financial institution. They
consider whether to make community investment saving deposits on top of their regular saving
deposits. It is assumed that the amount deposited in the community investment saving accounts
is the same across savers and is normalized at unity.
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Let rs be the interest rate on the community investment saving deposits and rms be the interest
rate on conventional saving deposits (i.e., the market interest rate on savings). The net benefit
associated with one unit of investment in the community investment saving plan is defined as
ws = U(rs − rms, G, g; y), (6.4)
where −(rs − rms) is the private consumption that the saver has to forgo if she invests in the
community investment saving plan, G is the social benefits of the micro-loan program captured
by the community; g is the consumption of warm glow; and y ∈ [0, 1] is the preference of that
particular saver for the provision of micro-loans.
Assuming the welfare function is separable and linear, Equation (6.4) can be simplified as
below:
ws =
{
rs − rms + βy if the saver participates,
Gy if the saver does not participate
, (6.5)
where β = G+ g.
The term rs− rms in equation (6.5) represents the net pecuniary benefits captured by a saver
from making community investment deposits (Walker and Chandler [1977]). Since rs ≤ rms (the
purpose of introducing the community investment savings plan is to allow the financial institution
to access cheaper loan funds), the net pecuniary gains from the community investment savings
must be non-positive.
The term βy is the non-pecuniary benefits from contributing to the provision of micro-loans.
The parameter β captures the social benefits and the consumption of warm glow (converted to
pecuniary terms). The variable y ∈ [0, 1] differentiates savers. Savers with a higher y obtain
greater satisfaction from their “participation” in the micro-loan program. As a result, they are
more likely to make contributions by participating in the community investment saving plan.
Those with a lower y derive a lower level of satisfaction from their “participation”, and conse-
quently they are unlikely to participate. For simplicity, it is assumed that savers are uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, 1].
In this simple framework, the social impactG does not affect a saver’s decision, since he/she
always captures the social benefit Gy. For simplicity, it is assumed that G = 0 and thus β = g.
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The savers’ decision to participate in the community investment savings plan is illustrated in
Figure 6.2. The upward sloping curve AB graphs the benefits from investing in the community
investment saving plan to savers of different types (y), while the horizontal curve CD graphs
the benefits from making conventional saving deposit. The distance between the two curves is
the net benefits captured by individual savers. The intersection of these curves determines the
marginal saver who is willing to participate in the community investment saving plan. This saver
is given by
yˆ =
rms − rs
β
. (6.6)
O
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Figure 6.2: Savers’ decision and welfare
Savers located to the left of yˆ do not invest in the community investment saving plan because
it is not worthwhile for them to do so. Only those who located to the right of yˆ would make such
investments. The proportion of savers who invest in the community investment saving plan is
1− yˆ =
{β+rs−rms
β
if rms > rs ≥ rms − β,
0 if rs < rms − β,
1 if rs = rms.
(6.7)
Notice that there is a lower limit on rs. If rs is sufficiently low such that rs < rms − β, then no
saver would participate.
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The aggregate net benefit captured by savers is ns times the area underneath AB and above
CD in Figure 6.2:
Ws = ns
∫ 1
yˆ
wsdy = ns
∫ 1
yˆ
(rs − rms + βy)dy = ns (β + rs − rms)
2
2β
(6.8)
for rs ≥ rms − β.
6.2.3 Financial Institution
The financial institution’s profit function is given by3
Π = xˆnbp(1 + rb)− xˆnb(1 + cb)− ns(1− yˆ)(rs + cs) + Trin, (6.9)
where cb and cs are the marginal costs of administrating micro-loans and community investment
saving deposits, respectively; T is the amount that the financial institution invests out of the
community investment saving deposits or the amount that the financial institution borrows from
other financial institutions to support the micro-loan program, depending on the sign ofT ; and rin
is the rate at which the financial institution borrows from or lends to other financial institutions.
In equation (6.9), the term xˆnbp(1 + rb) is the total expected revenue from micro-loans. In
each period, xˆnb borrowers obtain micro-loans. They repay the loans if and only if they have
a successful investment. The expected revenue from each micro-loan equals p(1 + rb). The
next term xˆnb(1 + cb) is the total principal and administrative cost of micro-loans. The term
ns(1 − yˆ)(rs + cs) is the sum of the total interest payment to savers who make community
investment saving deposits and the management cost of community investment savings.
The term Trin is the investment income/debt generated due to the micro-loan services. In
each period, the following balance sheet constraint must hold:
xˆnb + T = ns(1− yˆ) (6.10)
3Here it is implicitly assumed that the introduction of a community investment savings plan does not affect the
total amount of regular saving deposits that savers make at the financial institution, and thus has no impacts on the
regular loan services, as well as the profits accruing from providing conventional services. Therefore, the focus is
put on the profits generated from the micro-loan program and the community investment saving program.
There could be another scenario in which savers put a proportion of their savings in the community investment
saving account. The total amount of saving deposits they make remains unchanged, but the amount that goes
to the regular saving account is smaller with the community investment saving plan. To keep the regular loan
services unaffected, the financial institution must borrow from other financial institutions. Consequently, a new
term −(xˆnb − T )(rin − rms) needs to be added to the profit function. Under this assumption, the model becomes
more complicated, but the main results do not change dramatically.
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The left-hand side gives the sum of outstanding micro-loan accounts and the internal investment
account (T ). The right-hand side gives the liability, namely the deposits in the community in-
vestment savings accounts. The financial institution mobilizes the community investment saving
deposits and lends out the savings to micro-loan borrowers. In general, the amount of the savings
mobilized and the amount of loans lent out are not equal. In the case where there are excess loan
funds, the financial institution can make investments, the return rate of which is rin. In this way,
the financial institution squares up the balance sheet constraint.
Substituting equations (6.2), (6.6) and (6.10) into (6.9) gives
Π =
nbp(i− rb)[prb − (1− p)− rin − cb]
γ
+
ns(β + rs − rms)(rin − rs − cs)
β
. (6.11)
The slope of the financial institution’s iso-profit curve is given by
drb
drs
|Π¯ = −
γns[rin − cs − (β − rms)− 2rs]
βnb[pi+ (1− p) + rin + cb − 2prb] . (6.12)
Notice that the profit function Π is concave in rs and rb – its Hessian matrix is negative semi-
definite for rs ≤ rms and rb ≤ i.4
Assumption 6.1. pi− (1− p)− rin − cb > 0.
Assumption 6.2. rms − β < rin − cs < rms + β.
Assumption 6.3. 0 < rˆ1s , rˆ2s < rms, where
rˆ1s =
rin + rms − cs − β +
√
(rin − rms + β − cs)2 + βnb[pi−(1−p)−rin−cb]2γns
2
, (6.13)
rˆ2s =
rin + rms − cs − β −
√
(rin − rms + β − cs)2 + βnb[pi−(1−p)−rin−cb]2γns
2
. (6.14)
Assumption 6.1 implies that the financial institution’s profit-maximizing loan interest rate is
lower than i. Similarly, Assumption 6.2 implies the profit-maximizing deposit interest rate falls
in the range between zero and min(rms, rin − cs). As will be shown in the next section, these
4The Hessian matrix is given by ( −2nbp2/γ 0
0 −2ns/β
)
.
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two assumptions are made to ensure that there is an interior solution in the case where an IOF
operates the micro-loan program.
Assumption 6.3 implies that the financial institution always loses money if it sets the deposit
interest rate at rms. The rates rˆ1s and rˆ
2
s are the deposit interest rates at which the credit union just
breaks even if it sets the loan interest rate at the profit-maximizing level. Therefore, at any deposit
interest rate either greater than rˆ1s or lower than rˆ
2
s (for instance, rms), the financial institution
will lose money even if its loan interest rate is set at the profit-maxizing level.
Given these assumptions, the zero profit curve AV BHC is located and shaped as shown
in Figure 6.3. Recall that no savers would invest in the community investment saving plan if
rs < rms− β, and no borrowers would borrow if rb ≥ i. So the zero profit curve is truncated by
a vertical line rs = rms − β and a horizontal line rb = i.
H ′ H
V ′
V
riofs rin − csrms − β
A
B
riofb
rmsrˆ2s
rˆ1s
C
rb
rs
I
IIIII
IV
i
Figure 6.3: Financial Institution’s zero profit curve Π = 0
The horizontal line H ′H is the locus of the interest rates that satisfy ∂Π/∂rb = 0. It is
horizontal because the solution to ∂Π/∂rb = 0 is independent of rs; and it is below line rb = i
according to Assumption 6.1. Similarly, the vertical line V ′V is the combinations of the interest
rates that satisfy ∂Π/∂rs = 0. This line is on the left of line rs = rms according to Assumption
6.2.
137
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Lines H ′H and V ′V divide the area above the zero profit curve into four regions: (1) in
region I , the profit increases in rb and decreases in rs; (2) in region II, the profit decreases in
both rb and rs; (3) in region III, the profit decreases in rb and increases in rs; and (4) in region
IV , the profit increases in both rb and rs.
The analysis focuses on region I. This is because in regions II, III and IV Pareto improvement
is possible. That is, it is possible to make one group better off without negatively affecting the
other groups. For instance, suppose the financial institution offers point A in region IV. However,
by increasing the loan interest rate to riofb (see pointH
′), the financial institution can make more
profits and make borrowers better off without affecting savers. It means that the optimal offering
must be in region I, where Pareto improvement is impossible.
6.3 Choice of Interest Rates
Assume that the financial institution under consideration is the only service provider in the niche
market for micro-loans and community investment saving deposits. As a consequence, it is both
a monopoly and a monopsony. The IOF’s pricing policy is examined first. Then the credit union’s
pricing policy, as well as the impact of its member orientation, are analyzed.
6.3.1 IOF
The IOF is profit-driven and it sets rb and rs to maximize its profits
max
rb, rs
Π (6.15)
subject to Π ≥ 0 and rs ≤ rin − cs.
Constraint rs ≤ rin − cs requires that the IOF does not offer a deposit interest rate that
exceeds rin − cs, since it is cheaper to borrow from other financial institutions than to raise
deposits if rs ≥ rin − cs.5
The IOF’s optimal offering is point Eiof – the intersection of line HH ′ and V V ′ in Figure
6.3. The optimal interest rates are given by
riofb =
pi+ (1− p) + rin + cb
2p
and riofs =
rin + rms − β − cs
2
. (6.16)
5Due to this constraint, the IOF’s zero profit curve is curveAV B in Figure 6.3 – it is truncated by line rs = rin−cs.
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The IOF’s profit is given by
Πiof = nb
[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]2
4γ
+ ns
(rin − rms + β − cs)2
4β
. (6.17)
. According to assumptions 6.1 and 6.2, the IOF makes positive profits from each niche.
Let niofb and n
iof
s denote the number of the borrowers who borrow micro-loans and the
number of the savers who invest in the community investment savings plan, respectively,
niofb = nb
pi− (1− p)− rin − cb
2γ
and niofs = ns
rin − rms + β − cs
2β
. (6.18)
Due to the heterogeneity, at least some of the borrowers and savers receive positive net benefit
from the new services. The aggregate benefits captured by borrowers and savers are given by
W iofb = nb
[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]2
8γ
and W iofs = ns
(rin − rms + β − cs)2
8β
. (6.19)
The total net benefits to borrowers and savers equal the sum of W iofb and W
iof
s :
W iof = W iofb +W
iof
s = nb
[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]2
8γ
+ ns
(rin − rms + β − cs)2
8β
. (6.20)
Finally, the total surplus generated equals
TW iof = W iof + Πiof = 3nb
[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]2
8γ
+ 3ns
(rin − rms + β − cs)2
8β
. (6.21)
6.3.2 Credit Union
Now suppose a credit union operates the micro-loan program. The credit union is a financial
co-operative owned by its members who are also the users of the output (loans) and the suppliers
of the input (deposits). Therefore, the credit union would maximize its profits to some extent,
since the more profits, the more it can give back to members. The credit union knows that its
pricing policies for loan interest rate and deposit interest rate determine the net benefits of the
transactions captured by the members, as well as the profits. Therefore, in addition to profits, the
credit union takes into account the benefits captured by the members when it designs its pricing
policies.
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Unlike the IOF, the credit union needs to deal with the conflicts between borrower members
and saver members. Based on Smith [1984], the credit union’s objective function is defined as:
max
rb, rs
Wcu = αWb + (1− α)Ws (6.22)
subject to
Π = 0. (6.23)
Wcu is the total welfare of the members from the perspective of the credit union and is equal
to the weighted sum of the net benefits captured by borrowers and savers. On the right-hand
side of expression (6.22), the weight α is the behavioral preference parameter. It is scaled such
that it falls in between zero and one. The weight α reflects the conflicts between borrowers and
savers, as well as the credit union’s preference toward different member groups. For example, if
α > 1/2, micro-loan borrowers are the preferred group; if α = 1/2, the credit union is described
as being neutral; and if α < 1/2, savers are the preferred group. Wb and Ws are defined in (6.3)
and (6.8), respectively.
Equation (6.23) requires that the credit union set the interest rates such that it neither earns
a profit from the new programs nor uses the profits from conventional services to subsidize the
micro-loan program.
The first-order conditions to the problem in equation (6.22) are:
∂L
∂rb
= αnbp
2 (rb − i)
γ
+ λnbp
pi+ 1− p+ cb + rin − 2prb
γ
= 0,
∂L
∂rs
= (1− α)nsβ + rs − rms
β
+ λns
rin − cs − (β − rms)− srs
β
= 0,
Π = 0,
whereλ is the Langrange multiplier. It is easy to verify that max(α, 1−α) ≥ λ ≥ min(min(α, 1−
α),max(α, 1−α)/2). As a result, the bordered Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite, which
means that there exists a unique solution to the credit union’s maximization problem (see Ap-
pendix 6.6.1 for proof).
The credit union’s maximization problem can be solved with the aid of Figure 6.4. Curve
Wcu graphs the combination of rb and rs, at which the overall benefits to borrowers and savers
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remain constant from the point of the credit union. Recall that borrowers are better off with a
lower rb and savers are better off with a higher rs. The slope of curve Wcu is
drb
drs
|Wcu =
{ (1−α)nsγ(β+rs−rms)
αnbβp2(i−rb) ≥ 0 if α > 0,
∞ if α = 0,
(6.24)
for rb ≤ i and rs ≥ rms − β. Furthermore, Wcu is convex in rs and rb as the Hessian matrix is
positive semi-definite.
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Wcu
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Figure 6.4: The credit union’s interest rates: α ≥ 1/2.
Proposition 6.1. Compared with the IOF, the credit union offers more favorable interest rates,
specifically: rcub ≤ riof and rcus ≥ riof . Thus, more borrowers and savers participate in the
programs operated by the credit union; and the total benefits to members are greater with the
credit union than with the IOF.
The optimal offering must be the point where the credit union’s zero profit curve Π = 0 and
curveWcu are tangent to each other. In particular, this point must be on segment V H , depending
on α. In Figure 6.4, Eiof – the offering of the IOF – lies above segment V H . Recall that like
Wcu,W = Wb +Ws (the total benefits captured by members) is upward sloped and convex in rs
and rb. It means that any point on segment V H is more attractive to members than point Eiof ,
i.e., members are better off with the presence of the credit union, compared with the IOF.
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The intuition is as follows. The profit-driven IOF has the incentive to exercise its market
power in both markets to extract as much surplus as possible from borrowers and savers. So it
charges the highest possible loan interest rate and the lowest possible deposit interest rate. The
credit union has an objective of maximizing the benefits to members, while just breaking even.
Therefore, the credit union offers more attractive interest rates to make members benefit more
from the transactions. The favorable interest rates, in turn, attract more members to participate,
which in turn leads to a further increase in the benefits to members. The outcome is that more
benefits are generated and distributed between borrowers and savers.
Impact of Member Orientation
The credit union produces more benefits to members than the IOF. The increase in benefits
and the distribution of the benefits among members are affected by the credit union’s member
preference or member orientation.
The parameter α reflects the credit union’s preference toward borrowers relative to savers:
(1) if α < 1/2, the credit union is saver-oriented – one unit of benefits to borrowers is less
important than the same unit of benefits to savers. As α approaches zero, the credit union is
completely saver-oriented and is concerned only with the benefits to savers when determining
its interest rates; (2) if α > 1/2, the credit union is borrower-oriented. As a result, one unit of
benefits to borrowers is worth more than the same unit of benefits to savers. If α = 1, the credit
union is completely borrower-oriented and is concerned with the benefits to borrowers only; and
(3) if α = 1/2, the credit union is neutral.
Let rcub and r
cu
s be the optimal interest rates charged by the credit union.
Proposition 6.2. rcub and rcus decrease in α, i.e., drcub /dα < 0 and drcus /dα < 0.
This proposition indicates that as it becomes more borrower-oriented, the credit union reduces
both its loan and deposit interest rates, and vice versa (see Appendix 6.6.2 for proof).
The intuition is as follows. As it becomes more borrower-oriented (α increases) – for example,
because the number of borrowers increases – the benefits to borrowers are more important to the
credit union relative to the same benefits to savers. As a result, the credit union has the incentive
to reduce its loan interest rate to make borrowers better off. Since it cannot lose money (zero-
profit constraint), the credit union must lower its deposit interest rate to reduce the capital cost
of micro-loans. Therefore, both the loan interest rate and the deposit interest rate of the credit
union decrease in α.
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Corollary 6.1. dxˆcu/dα > 0 and dyˆcub /dα > 0.
Corollary 6.1 states that as the credit union displays stronger borrower-orientation, more
borrowers access micro-loans and fewer savers invest in its community investment saving plan.
To finance these additional micro-loans with less deposit funds, the credit union borrows more
from, or lends less to, other financial institutions to square up its balance-sheet constraint.
Corollary 6.2. The total benefit to members W cu = W cub + W cus decreases as the credit union
is more oriented toward the preferred member group, and vice versa: (1) dW cu/dα > 0 for
α < 1/2; (2) dW cu/dα < 0 for α > 1/2; and (3) dW cu/dα = 0 for α = 1/2.
Corollary 6.2 describes how member orientation affects the total benefits to members (see
Appendix 6.6.3 for proof). The total benefit W cu is at the highest level if the credit union is
neutral. As the credit union displays a preference toward a member group – either the borrower
group or the saver group – W cu falls. The stronger the preference, the larger is the drop in W cu.
However, W cu is always greater than the members’ welfare under the IOF.
This result is illustrated in Figure 6.5. Curve W cu depicts the combinations of interest rates
at which the total benefits to members remain constant. Curve Wcu(·) is the combination of
interest rates at which the total benefits to members remain constant in the view of the credit
union, where (·) indicates the size of α. CurvesW cu andWcu(·) coincide if and only if α = 1/2.
If α < 1/2, curve Wcu(·) is steeper than curve W cu, and vice versa (see curve Wcu(0) and curve
Wcu(1)). To a neutral credit union, point B – where curve W cu (or Wcu(1/2)) and the zero
profit curve Π = 0 are tangent – is the best offering. For a borrower-oriented credit union, since
curve Wcu(·) is flatter than W cu, the best offering must be on segment V B of the zero profit
curve (a borrower-oriented credit union offers a lower loan interest rate than does a neutral credit
union). Furthermore, as the credit union shows stronger borrower-orientation, its best offering
approaches point V . Similarly, for a saver-oriented credit union, the best offering must lie on
segment BH and it approaches point H as the credit union is more in favor of saver members.
Clearly, the more the credit union’s best offering deviates from point B, the lower the total
benefits to members. In other words, as the credit union becomes more in favor of its preferred
group, members receive less benefits in aggregate.
This result occurs because member orientation distorts the credit union’s pricing policy: the
interest rates are designed to maximize the benefits to members from the perspective of the credit
union, rather than the actual benefits received by members. The more α deviates from 1/2, or
the more the credit union prefers the preferred members group, the greater is the distortion. As a
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result, the total benefits to members decrease: even though the preferred members benefit from
the more favourable interest rate, the gains are insufficient to cover the losses experienced by
the less preferred group.
Corollary 6.3. dW cub /dα > 0 and dW cus /dα < 0.
It is obvious that the total benefits to borrower members W cub increase in α because (1)
individual borrowers benefit from a lower interest rate; and (2) more borrowers borrow loans.
Similarly, the benefits to saver members W cus decrease in α because (1) individual savers are
offered with a lower deposit interest rate; and (2) some savers withdraw. As stated in Corollary
6.3, W cub increases in α, while W
cu
s decreases in α.
Proposition 6.3. Compared with the IOF, the presence of the credit union may result in either
a more efficient outcome – i.e., TW cu > TW iof (TW cu = W cu), or a less efficient outcome –
i.e., TW cu < TW iof . Let Πiofb =
nb[pi−(1−p)−rin−cb]2
4γ
and Πiofs =
ns(rin−rms+β−cs)2
4β
. If
1. 3Πiofb < Π
iof
s , there exists an α1 ∈ (1/2, 1) such that if α < α1, TW cu > TW iof always
holds; if otherwise, α > α1, then TW cu < TW iof always holds;
2. 3Πiofs < Π
iof
b , there exists an α2 ∈ [0, 1/2) such that if α > α2, then TW cu > TW iof
always holds; and if otherwise, α < α2, then TW cu < TW iof always holds;
3. if neither 3Πiofb < Π
iof
s nor 3Π
iof
s < Π
iof
b hold true, then TW
cu > TW iof holds for any
α ∈ [0, 1].
Classical co-operative theories predict that the presence of the co-operative implies a more
efficient outcome compared to with a monopoly IOF. However, Proposition 6.3 indicates that
due to the conflicts between heterogeneous member groups and the member orientation of the
credit union, it is possible that the outcome under a co-operative (a credit union) is less efficient
than the one under an IOF.
For example, consider a completely borrower-oriented credit union. As will be shown in
the next section, such a credit union charges the same deposit interest rate as does a monopoly
IOF. To make borrowers better off, the credit union gives up all the profits that it can make so
that it can charge the lowest possible interest rate on micro-loans. From the point of the credit
union, this outcome is the best one that it can achieve. However, if 3Πiofb < Π
iof
s holds, then this
outcome is less efficient than the one under the IOF.6
6In this situation, it would be optimal if the credit union simply follows the IOF’s prices. However, as the credit
union returns the surplus to its members, this strategy is not sustainable (Fulton [1998]), unless the credit union
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Condition 3Πiofb < Π
iof
s is likely to hold if, for example, ns >> nb, or γ is very large, or p
is very low. In this situation, the difference between the benefits to borrowers under the credit
union and the benefits to them under the IOF is smaller than the total profit that can be earned
by the IOF (i.e., Πiofb + Π
iof
s ). It is clear that the benefits from charging the most favourable loan
interest rate are outstripped by the costs (the profits forgone). Therefore, a less efficient outcome
arises. As shown in Appendix 6.6.4, there exists a critical value α1, if α > α1, the distorting
effect of the member orientation leads to a less efficient outcome compared with the situation
where a monopoly IOF operates the micro-loan program.
Similarly, if the credit union demonstrates strong saver-orientation and condition Πiofb >
3Πiofs holds, then the outcome under the credit union is less efficient than that under the monopoly
IOF. Condition Πiofb > 3Π
iof
s is likely to hold if, for example, ns << nb, or γ is low, or p is high.
However, as indicated in part 3 in Proposition 6.3, if either 3Πiofb < Π
iof
s or Π
iof
b > 3Π
iof
s
is possible, then the credit union results in a more efficient outcome than the monopoly IOF,
regardless of the credit union’s member orientation.
The intuition is as follows. When the credit union is neutral between the interests of borrowers
and savers, the outcome is more efficient than that under the IOF. However, as the credit union
demonstrates preference towards a member group, a deadweight loss is created. The stronger the
credit union’s preference, the greater is the deadweight loss. So under some conditions, when
the credit union demonstrates a very strong preference, the deadweight loss is sufficiently high
such that the total surplus (profit+benefits to members) is lower than that under the IOF, thus
leads to a less efficient outcome.
This result arises because the credit union charges a single price for its services. With the
presence of heterogeneous members, this pricing strategy is generally not efficient. To achieve
a more efficient outcome, non-linear pricing schemes should be applied (for example, see Ver-
cammen, Fulton, and Hyde [1996]).
With these basic results, the impacts of the credit union’s member orientation on the interest
rates chosen are investigated. Three extreme cases are considered: (1) complete saver-orientation
α = 0; (2) neutrality α = 1/2 and (3) complete borrower-orientation α = 1.
• Case I. Complete saver-orientation: α = 0.
can make lump-sum payments. A recent study Canning et al. [2003] considered the possibility that the credit union
rations credit and returns the surplus in the form of interest rate subsidies. However, in practice, it may be difficult
to implement such a strategy .
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In this situation, the credit union cares only about savers: Wcu = Ws. In Figure 6.5, the
total benefit from the point of the credit union Wcu is represented by the vertical line
Wcu(0), since it is independent of rb. Obviously, point H – where curve Wcu(0) and the
zero profit curve are tangent – is the best offering of a completely saver-oriented credit
union. The interest rates are given below.
rcub (0) =
pi+ (1− p) + rin + cb
2p
= riofb and r
cu
s (0) = rˆ
1
s ,
where (·) indicates α.
Let ncub (·) and ncus (·) be the number of the borrowers who borrow micro-loans and the
number of the savers who invest in the community investment savings plan, respectively.
Thus,
ncub (0) = nb
pi− (1− p)− rin − cb
2γ
= niofb and n
cu
s (0) = ns
β + rˆ1s − rms
β
> niofs .
The benefits captured by borrowers and savers are
W cub (0) = nb
[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]2
8γ
= W iofb ,
W cus (0) = ns
(β + rˆ1s − rms)2
2β
> W iofs .
The total benefits equal
W cu(0) = nb
[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]2
8γ
+ ns
(β + rˆ1s − rms)2
2β
.
As it cares only about savers, the credit union charges the highest possible interest rate
on micro-loans which equals the interest rate charged by the IOF, and offers savers with
the highest possible interest rate on the community investment saving deposits. It uses
the profits from lending to cross-subsidize saver members. Notice that ∂Π/∂rb = 0 and
∂Π/∂rs < 0 at point H .
• Case II: A neutral credit union: α = 1/2.
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Figure 6.5: Credit union’s offerings and its member orientation.
In this scenario, the credit union treats borrowers and savers equally: one unit of benefits
to borrowers equals the same unit of benefits to savers. The optimal interest rates are
determined by point B in Figure 6.5.
rcub (1/2) =
1− p+ rin + cb
p
< riofb ; r
cu
s (1/2) = rin − cs > riofs .
More borrowers and savers participate in the respective programs, compared to under the
IOF, since
ncub (1/2) = nb
pi− (1− p)− rin − cb
γ
> niofb and n
cu
s (1/2) = ns
rin − cs + β − rms
β
> niofs .
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Furthermore, members are better off than under the IOF, and a more efficient outcome is
attained, since
W cub (1/2) = nb
[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]2
2γ
> W iofb ,
W cus (1/2) = ns
(rin − cs + β − rms)2
2β
> W iofs ,
W cu(1/2) = nb
[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]2
2γ
+ ns
(rin − cs + β − rms)2
2β
> TW iof .
• Case III: A completely borrower-oriented credit union: α = 1.
For a completely borrower-oriented credit union, Wcu = Wb. The curve Wcu(1) is hori-
zontal since Wcu is independent of rs. The best offering is determined by point V where
curve Wcu(1) and the zero profit curve are tangent. The interest rates are
rcub (1) =
pi+ (1− p) + rin + cb −
√
(pi− (1− p)− rin − cb)2 + nsγ(rin−rms+β−cs)2nbpβ
2p
< riofb ,
rcus (1) =
rin + rms − β − cs
2
= riofs .
A completely borrower-oriented credit union sets its interest rate on the saving deposits
at the lowest possible level, and offers borrowers with the lowest possible loan interest
rate. It uses the profits from savers to cross-subsidize borrowers. Notice that at the above
interest rates, ∂Π/∂rb > 0 and ∂Π/∂rs = 0.
The numbers of borrowers and savers who participate in the new programs are
ncub (1) = nb
pi− (1− p)− rin − cb +
√
(pi− (1− p)− rin − cb)2 + nsγ(rin−rms+β−cs)2nbpβ
2γ
> niofb ,
ncus (1) = ns
rin − rms + β − cs
2β
= niofs ,
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and the benefits are
W cub (1) = nb
[
pi− (1− p)− rin − cb +
√
(pi− (1− p)− rin − cb)2 + nsγ(rin−rms+β−cs)2nbpβ
]2
8γ
> W iofb ,
W cus (1) = ns
((rin − rms + β − cs)2
8β
> W iofs ,
W cu(1) = nb
[
pi− (1− p)− rin − cb +
√
(pi− (1− p)− rin − cb)2 + nsγ(rin−rms+β−cs)2nbpβ
]2
8γ
+ns
((rin − rms + β − cs)2
8β
.
6.4 Impact of Saver Member Commitment
In the previous section, a comparison was made between the outcome generated by a profit-
driven IOF and the outcome generated by a welfare-maximizing credit union. It was shown
that the credit union reduces credit rationing on micro-enterprises more than does the IOF. This
comparison is based on the assumption that the two service providers are identical except in their
objectives.
In this section, the impact of saver commitment on the interest rates is considered. Saver
commitment is captured by the parameter β (recall that β = g). A higher β means that the
micro-loan program is more important to savers, so savers are more committed to the program.
Its impacts on the profits of the IOF and the credit union are depicted in Figure 6.6.
First, consider the credit union’s zero profit curve. In Figure 6.6, curve Πβ = 0 (or curve
V BH) is the zero profit curve associated with saver commitment β.7 Notice that point B is
always on the credit union’s zero profit curve, if other factors except β are held constant. This
point is the best offering of a neutral credit union. A change in β leads to a change in loan funds
that are mobilized at rin − cs from savers. However, the change in loan funds does not translate
into a change in the credit union’s profits. Recall that the credit union incurs an administrative
cost cs and lends the excess amount to other financial institutions at rin. Despite the change in
saver commitment, the credit union always earns zero profits at point B.
Suppose saver commitment grows to β′ (β′ > β). This increase results in a counterclockwise
rotation of curve Πβ = 0 at point B to curve Πβ′ = 0 (or curve V1BH1), which is the zero profit
7The focus is on the segment of the zero profit curve that falls in the economic area.
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Figure 6.6: The zero profit curves and savers’ commitment: β < β′.
curve associated with commitment β′. At any point on curve Πβ = 0 below point B, the credit
union cross-subsidizes borrowers with the profits from savers. A stronger commitment leads to
more loan funds and thus improves the credit union’s profits. To keep the profits equal zero, the
credit union can either reduce rb or rs, or both. Similarly, at any point aboveB on curve Πβ = 0,
the credit union uses the profits from borrowers to subsidize savers. In this situation, a stronger
commitment leads to more loan funds that are more expensive compared with borrowing from
other financial institutions and more interest payments to savers. As a result, the credit union
needs to either increase rb or reduce rs or both to keep the profits unaffected. As shown in Figure
6.6, the zero profit curve thus rotates counterclockwise at point B as a result of a stronger saver
commitment.
Notice that the increase in β forces line V V ′ – the loci of the combinations of interest rates
at which ∂Π/∂rs = 0 – to shift inward (see the movement of line V V ′ to V1V ′1).
Now consider the IOF’s zero profit curve. Similarly, as saver commitment grows from β to
β′, the IOF’s zero profit curve rotates counterclockwise at point B, see the rotation from V B to
V1B in Figure 6.6.
150
Chapter 6. A Credit Union Decision-Making Model
6.4.1 IOF
First consider the situation where an IOF operates the micro-loan program and the community
investment saving program.
Proposition 6.4. As saver commitment to the micro-loan program grows, the IOF lowers its
deposit interest rate but does not adjust its loan interest rate:
driofb /dβ = 0 and dr
iof
s /dβ < 0.
Corollary 6.4. A stronger commitment of savers does not improve borrowers’ access to credit
since dniofb /dβ = 0, but it enables the IOF to earn more profits: ∂Π
iof/∂β > 0.
As shown in Figure 6.6, a higher β forces line V V ′ to shift inward to V1V ′1 , but does not
affect line HH ′. The IOF’s new interest rates are determined by point Eiof ′ – the intersection of
line HH ′ and V1V ′1 , and r
iof ′
b = r
iof
b and r
iof ′
s < r
iof
s .
The intuition is as follows. To maximize its profits, the IOF sets the loan interest rate such
that ∂Π/∂rb = 0. This interest rate r
iof
b is independent of saver commitment. Thus, the IOF
has no incentive to modify its loan interest rate in response to a change in saver commitment.
Therefore, despite more savers participating in the community investment saving plan, and more
deposits being mobilized to support the micro-loan program, borrowers’ access to credit has not
been improved.
On the other hand, a stronger commitment improves the IOF’s profits even if it does not adjust
its deposit interest rate due to the increased supply of loan funds at the low cost (riofs < rin−cs <
rin). However, it is profitable to reduce the deposit interest rate because ∂Π/∂rs < 0 at riofs after
saver commitment increases to β′. Reducing the deposit interest rate has two opposite effects
on the IOF’s profits: (1) the IOF’s profits increase since its interest payments to savers decrease;
and (2) the IOF’s profits decrease since a lower deposit interest rate discourages some savers
and thus leads to less investment income. The first effect outstrips the second effect. Therefore,
the IOF has the incentive to lower its deposit interest rate until ∂Π/∂rs = 0 is restored.
The result in Corollary 6.4 suggests that saver members tend to have a low level of commit-
ment if the micro-loan program is offered by an IOF. A higher commitment means that savers
would like to see an improvement in access to credit. However, the profit-driven IOF takes ad-
vantage of the increase in saver commitment to make more profits rather than improving the
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access to credit. Knowing this result would occur, savers tend to make a low commitment to the
IOF’s micro-loan program.
6.4.2 Credit Union
Proposition 6.5. As its saver members are more committed to its micro-loan program, the credit
union: (1) increases its loan interest rate if it prefers savers; (2) reduces its loan interest rate if
it prefers borrowers; and (3) does not change its loan interest rate if it is neutral.
Corollary 6.5. As saver member commitment grows, borrowers’ access to credit is: (1) improved
if and only if the credit union is borrower-oriented, i.e., dr
cu
b
dβ
< 0 if α > 1/2; (2) worsen if the
credit union is saver-oriented, i.e., dr
cu
b
dβ
≥ 0 if α < 1/2; and (3) not affected if the credit union
is neutral, i.e., dr
cu
b
dβ
= 0 if α = 1/2.
The intuition is as follows. A saver-oriented credit union values the benefits to savers more
than those to borrowers. It sets the interest rates such that the profits from borrowers are used
to cross-subsidize savers. With a stronger commitment, more savers participate in the saving
plan. It means that the credit union would lose more money on savers. To keep its profits equal
zero, the credit union increases the loan interest rate to earn more profits from borrowers. As
a result, fewer borrowers obtain micro-loans. Thus in a saver-oriented credit union, a stronger
saver commitment leads to a more rationing outcome.
A borrower-oriented credit union values the benefits to borrowers more than those to savers,
and it cross-subsidizes borrower members. As saver member commitment grows, the credit union
can attract more loan funds which is cheaper compared with borrowing from other institutions,
and as a consequence it earns more profits. The increase in profits enables the credit union to
lower its loan interest rate to make borrowers better off. The lower loan interest rate attracts more
borrowers, and thus improves borrowers’ access to credit.
Finally, a neutral credit union has no incentive to modify its interest rates in response to a
change in saver commitment. Although the savers’ participation is affected by the change in
their commitment, the credit union’s profits are not affected. It thus has no incentive to alter its
interest rates. Since the loan interest rate remains unchanged, borrowers’ access to credit is not
affected.
Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 depict three cases: (1) a completely saver-oriented credit union
(α = 0); (2) a completely borrower-oriented credit union (α = 1); and (3) a neutral credit union
(α = 1/2). Suppose that saver member commitment increases from β to β′. As discussed above,
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Figure 6.7: Impact of saver commitment on a completely saver-oriented credit union: β′ > β
the credit union’s zero profit curve rotates counterclockwise at pointB from Πβ = 0 to Πβ′ = 0.
Curves Wcu,β(α) and Wcu,β′(α) (α = 0, 1, 1/2), respectively, are the loci of the combinations of
the interest rates at which the benefits to members remain constant from the perspective of the
credit union, given different levels of saver commitment. The new interest rates are determined
by the point where the credit union’s zero profit curve Πβ′ = 0 and curve Wcu,β′(α) are tangent.
1. α = 0.
In Figures 6.7, points H and H1 are the best offerings of a completely saver-oriented
credit union with saver commitment β and β′, respectively. The loan interest rates at the
two points equal riofb , and the deposit interest rate at pointH1 is lower than that at pointH:
rˆ1′s < rˆ
1
s . At loan interest rate r
iof
b , despite being saver-oriented, the credit union is unable
to alter its loan interest rate for more profits from borrowers to subsidize savers. Recall
that ∂Π/∂rb = 0 if rb = r
iof
b . Therefore, although member commitment grows, the credit
union has no incentive to alter its loan interest rate.
However, the credit union has to drop the deposit interest rate from rˆ1s to rˆ
1′
s to absorb
the negative impacts on its profits caused by an increase of expensive loan funds due to a
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stronger saver commitment. Although some savers are discouraged by this lower interest
rate, overall, more savers participate in the saving plan.8
In this situation, the change in saver member commitment affects saver members only. It has
two impacts: one is positive and the other is negative. First, a stronger commitment implies
a higher level of satisfaction from making contributions and thus more participation of
savers. Second, a stronger commitment leads to a lower deposit interest rate and a reduction
in the benefits from deposit transactions. In aggregate, the first effect dominates, and the
total benefits to savers increase with a stronger commitment: dWs/dβ > 0. Therefore, the
total benefits to members Ws +Wb increase as saver member commitment grows.
2. α = 1.
This situation is illustrated in Figures 6.8. Points V and V1, respectively, are the com-
pletely borrower-oriented credit union’s best offerings given saver commitment β and β′,
respectively. Compared with at point V , the loan interest rate and the deposit interest rate
at V1 are lower: rcu′b (1) < r
cu
b (1) and r
iof ′
s < r
iof
s .
B
rsrmsrˆ1s
V ′1 V ′
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Figure 6.8: Impact of saver commitment on a borrower-oriented credit union: β′ > β
The completely borrower-oriented credit union sets its deposit interest rate at the lowest
level. Notice that ∂Π/∂rs = 0 at point V with commitment β. As saver commitment grows
8Differentiating Π = 0 with respect to β and rearranging gives drs/dβ = (rin−cs−rs)(rs−rms)/β[rin−cs−
rs−(β+rs−rms)] < 0, therefore, d(1−yˆ)/β]/dβ = (β+rs−rms)(rs−rms)/[rin−cs−rs−(β+rs−rms)] > 0
must hold, which means more savers would participate.
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stronger, the credit union’s profits from savers increase due to an increase in cheaper loan
funds. Moreover, it can make more profits on savers by lowering its deposit interest rate
since at the new commitment level, ∂Π/∂rs < 0 must hold at point V . With more profits
from savers, the credit union can lower the loan interest rate to make its favourite members
– borrowers – better off, while still breaking even.
Despite the lower deposit interest rate, more savers invest in the saving plan.9 As a result,
the benefits to savers increase.
3. α = 1/2.
As shown in Figures 6.9, a neutral credit union does not alter its pricing policy in face
of a change in saver member commitment. As saver commitment grows stronger, both
the credit union’s zero profit curve and the curve along which the credit union thinks the
benefits to members remain constant rotate counterclockwise, see the movement from
Πβ = 0(V BH) and Wcu,β(1/2)(ABC) to Πβ′ = 0(V1BH1) and Wcu,β′(1/2)(A1BC1),
respectively. Notice that curve Πβ′ = 0(V1BH1) and curve Wcu,β′(1/2)(A1BC1) are
tangent at point B. As a result, the benefits to borrowers remain unchanged, but the
benefits to savers increase since dWs/dβ > 0. The total benefits to member W cu, also
increase.
The impacts of member commitment on interest rates, member participation and the mem-
ber’s welfare are summarized in Table 6.1.
6.4.3 IOF vs. Credit Union
In this model, commitment is the preference for the micro-loan program offered by the financial
institution. It is likely that savers prefer to support the micro-loan program operated by a credit
union.
First, compared with the IOF, the credit union is a better choice for savers if they decide
to make contributions (Hansmann [1980]). Given the difficulty of monitoring the operation and
performance of a micro-loan program, savers may fear that the profit-driven IOF will convert
some contributions into the profits for its owners. The credit union is formed for a social purpose.
Its ultimate objective is to improve the welfare of membership through providing financial
9Differentiating ∂Π/∂rs = 0 with respect to β and rearranging give drs/dβ = −1/2, thus d(1 − yˆ)/dβ > 0
must hold.
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Figure 6.9: Impact of saver commitment on a neutral credit union: β′ > β
services to those in need. It has some commercial objectives, but these objectives are within the
context of its member welfare maximizing purpose. Operating a micro-loan program is consistent
with the credit union’s philosophy and can enhance its values. So misuse of funds is less likely
at the credit union. Moreover, the credit union has a history and reputation in serving people
with low incomes. Thus, the credit union’s micro-loan program appears to be more credible and
attractive to savers.
Second, as demonstrated in a previous section, the level of investment financed is higher with
the credit union than with the IOF, unless the credit union is completely saver-oriented. This
means that the micro-loan program operated by the credit union creates more private benefits
to borrowers and more social benefits (although they are assumed to equal zero in this model).
Thus, savers tend to have a higher value for the credit union’s micro-loan program and are more
willing to participate in its community investment saving plan.
Third, the IOF translates an increase in saver commitment into more profits without improving
borrowers’ access to credit as desired by savers. The credit union, however, would improve the
borrowers’ access to micro-loans if it is borrower-oriented. In a saver-oriented credit union,
the increase in saver member commitment may result in more restricted access to credit for
borrowers, because the credit union is more concerned about savers. However, the credit union
does not take advantage of saver commitment for profits.
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Table 6.1: Impacts of saver member commitment
Item IOF
Credit Union
α = 0 α = 1/2 α = 1
drb/dβ 0 0 0 -
drs/dβ - - 0 -
dnb/dβ 0 0 0 +
dns/dβ + + + +
dWb/dβ 0 0 0 +
dWs/dβ + + + +
dΠ/dβ + 0 0 0
d(Wb +Ws)/dβ + + + +
Assume savers have stronger commitment to the credit union’s micro-loan program: βcu >
βiof , where the superscripts indicate the organization form of the financial institution. An im-
mediate result is as follows.
Proposition 6.6. If βcu > βiof , members are better off with the presence of a credit union,
compared with the presence of an IOF.
Savers are more committed to the credit union’s micro-loan program. Therefore, the credit
union is able to collect more deposits to support the micro-loan program, compared with the
IOF. So the stronger commitment enhances the credit union’s ability to adjust its interest rates to
create more surplus for members. However, the credit union may distribute the surplus unequally
between saver and borrower members.
Of course, whether a particular member group benefits from the stronger saver commitment
depends on the credit union’s preferences. Unless the credit union is completely saver-oriented
(α = 0), borrowers have better access to credit if the micro-loan program is operated by the
credit union, and more investments are carried out.
6.5 Summary
Two outcomes were examined and compared: one is a monopolistic/monoposonistic IOF that
operates a micro-loan program; the other is a credit union that operates the micro-loan program.
The analysis suggests that credit unions have advantages over IOFs in successfully operating mi-
crocredit programs. Credit unions lead to a better outcome in terms of both member participation
and benefits to members.
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An important aspect of this study is that credit unions balance the interests of borrowers
and savers. The member orientation of credit union affects the interest rates charged by credit
unions. A saver-oriented credit union tends to offer a higher deposit interest rate and a lower
loan interest rate in comparison with a borrower-oriented credit union. This member orientation
has negative impact on efficiency: the stronger the preference a credit union exhibits, the less
efficient is the outcome.
This result occurs because deviating from neutrality creates a bias and causes a deadweight
loss. For example, a borrower-oriented credit union charges a deposit interest rate that is lower
than what a neutral credit union charges to make more profits from savers. The borrower-oriented
credit union then uses the profit from savers to subsidize borrowers by offering them a lower
loan interest rate than that offered by the neutral credit union. In each market, a deadweight loss
is created. As the credit union exhibits stronger preference, the deadweight loss increases. Under
some conditions, the total surplus under a credit union may be lower than that under an IOF.
This study is different from previous studies which focus solely on pecuniary benefits. In this
modelling work, the non-pecuniary benefits play an important role. Warm glow – the satisfaction
arising from giving – motivates savers to invest in a community investment saving plan that offers
a below-market interest rate. As the warm glow effect becomes more important to savers (or
savers are more committed to the micro-loan program), the credit union is able to produce more
surplus to members. However, saver commitment may have a negative influence on borrowers’
access to credit if the credit union prefers savers.
The lesson from this study is that in order to operate a community economic development
(CED) lending project successfully, such as a micro-loan program, the credit union needs a clear
commitment from the membership, the board of directors and the management. However, the
competitive nature of the financial sector is a barrier for the credit union to engaging in CED
lending. As CED lending is often costly and time-consuming, engaging in it may affect the
competitiveness and profitability of the credit union. Also members may have no real interest
in seeing their credit union engage in CED lending. As shown in the model, like an IOF, the
credit union cannot operate a micro-loan program without the commitment of the membership,
directors and management
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6.6 Appendix
6.6.1 Proof of the existence of a unique solution to the credit union’s optimization problem
Proof. Solving rs and rb as a function of λ, and substitute into Π = 0 gives
Π =
λ− α
(2λ− α)2A+
λ− (1− α)
[2λ− (1− α)]2B = 0
where A = [pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]2/p > 0 and B = [rin − cs + β − rms]2 > 0.
For λ > max(α, 1−α), Π > 0 must hold. For λ < max(min(α, 1−α),max(α, 1− α)/2),
Π < 0 always hold. Furthermore, Π > 0 if λ = max(α, 1 − α), and Π < 0 if λ =
max(min(α, 1−α),max(α, 1−α)/2). Furthermore, Π is continuous for λ ∈ [max(min(α, 1−
α),max(α, 1−α)/2),max(α, 1−α)], thus there must exist a unique solution to the optimization
problem. (Q. E. D.)
6.6.2 Proof of Proposition 6.2
Proof. Investigating the comparative static property gives
drs
dα
=
∂Π
∂rb
∂Π
∂rs
nbp
2 (i−rb)
γ
− ( ∂Π
∂rb
)2ns
(β+rs−rms)
β
|H| < 0, (6.25)
drb
dα
=
∂Π
∂rb
∂Π
∂rs
ns
β+rs−rms
β
− ( ∂Π
∂rs
)2nbp
2 i−rb
γ
|H| < 0, (6.26)
where |H| is the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix and |H| > 0.(Q.E.D.)
6.6.3 Proof of Corollary 6.2
Proof. Differentiating W cu with respect to α gives
dW cu
dα
= −nbp2 i− rb
γ
drb
dα
+ ns
β + rs − rms
β
drs
dα
. (6.27)
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Substituting equations (6.25) and (6.26) into (6.27) gives
the sign of (
dW cu
dα
) = the sign of (
drb
drs
|Π¯ −
drb
drs
|W cu)
=
{+ if α < 1/2,
0 if α = 1/2,
− if α > 1/2.
6.6.4 Proof of Proposition 6.3
Proof. First, consider a completely borrower-oriented credit union (β = 1), the total benefit is
given by
TW cu(1) = W cus (1) +W
cu
b (1)
= nb
[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb +
√
(pi− (1− p)− rin − cb)2 + nsγ (rin−rms+β−cs)2nbpβ ]2
8γ
+ns
((rin − rms + β − cs)2
8β
=
nb[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]2
4γ
+
1ns(rin − rms + β − cs)2
4β
+
nb[pi− (1− p)− rin − cb]
√
(pi− (1− p)− rin − cb)2 + nsγ (rin−rms+β−cs)2nbpβ
8γ
= Πiofb + Π
iof
s +
√
(Πiofb )
2 + Πiofb Π
iof
s .
Therefore,
TW cu(1)− TW iof =
√
(Πiofb )
2 + Πiofb Π
iof
s − Π
iof
b + Π
iof
s
2
=
{
+ if 3Πiofb ≥ Πiofs ,
− if 3Πiofb < Πiofs .
Similarly, under a completely saver-oriented credit union (α = 0), the total benefit
TW cu(0) = W cus (0) +W
cu
b (0)
= Πb + Πs +
√
(Πiofs )2 + Π
iof
b Π
iof
s .
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As a result,
TW cu(0)− TW iof =
√
(Πiofb )
2 + Πiofb Π
iof
s − Π
iof
b + Π
iof
s
2
=
{
+ if 3Πiofs ≥ Πiofb ,
− if 3Πiofs < Πiofb .
According to Corollary 6.2, dTW
cu
dα
> 0 if α < 1/2 and dTW
cu
dα
< 0 if α > 1/2. Therefore,
1. if 3Πiofb < Π
iof
s , there exists an α1 ∈ (1/2, 1] such that TW cu > TW iof always holds if
α < α1, and vice versa;
2. if 3Πiofs < Π
iof
b , there exists an α2 ∈ [0, 1/2) such that TW cu > TW iof always holds if
α > α2, and vice versa;
3. if neither 3Πiofs < Π
iof
b nor 3Π
iof
b < Π
iof
s holds, then TW
cu > TW iof holds true for any
α ∈ [0, 1].
(Q.E.D.)
6.6.5 Proof of Proposition 6.5
Proof. This proposition can be proved by investigating the comparative static property by means
of Cramer’s rule. Thus,
drcub /dβ =
∂Π/∂rb
|H|
[−(1− α)(β + rs − rms)(rs − rms)
β3
+λ
(rin − cs − rs)(rin − cs − rms)− (β + rs − rms)(rin + rms − cs − 2rs)
β3
]
,
where |H| > 0 is the determinant of bordered Hessian matrix, and ∂Π/∂rb ≥ 0. As a result,
The sign of drcub /dβ = the sign of λ
(rin − cs − rs)(rin − cs − rms)− (β + rs − rms)(rin − cs − rs)
β3
=
{
(+) if α ≤ 1/2,
(−) if α ≥ 1/2.
(Q. E. D.)
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions,
and Implications for Further Studies
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore a number of the issues around the provision of
microcredit by credit unions and the agencies with which they work, specifically: (1) to analyze
how information asymmetry in the provision of microcredit and the resulting rationing of credit
to low collateral entrepreneurs are addressed by the bundling of credit with the provision of
non-financial services (e.g., mentoring); and (2) to explain the advantages and disadvantages of
IOFs (i.e., commercial banks) versus credit unions in providing microcredit.
To achieve these objectives, three theoretical models were developed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6,
respectively. This chapter gives a summary of the research findings. Conclusions will be drawn,
followed by a discussion of the research limitations.
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
The results of the research carried out in this dissertation show that credit rationing arises in the
presence of information asymmetry (both adverse selection and moral hazard) and insufficient
collateral. Two different scenarios were considered: (1) entrepreneurs cannot be distinguished by
wealth; and (2) entrepreneurs cannot be distinguished by entrepreneurial skill. In each scenario,
entrepreneurs with insufficient collateral experience credit rationing. Rationing arises because,
in a perfectly competitive credit market, the collateral constraint limits lenders’ ability to design a
set of incentive-compatible contracts. Without rationing, all entrepreneurs prefer the contract that
is designed for the collateral-constrained entrepreneurs, and consequently lenders would incur
a loss from lending since they would end up lending to high risk and/or low return borrowers. In
response, lenders randomize the credit delivered under the contract designed for the collateral-
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constrained entrepreneurs to deter the other entrepreneurs from choosing this contract. Therefore,
the equilibrium is characterized by perfect separation with credit rationing of the collateral-
constrained entrepreneurs. The smaller is the collateralizable wealth of the collateral-constrained
entrepreneurs, the greater is the credit rationing that occurs.
An interesting result is found in the first scenario which suggests that, under some conditions,
credit rationing is persistent: low wealth entrepreneurs are always rationed. Rationing is not
related to the collateralizable wealth of low wealth entrepreneurs, instead, rationing is related to
the total wealth of low wealth entrepreneurs. The less wealth these entrepreneurs have, the larger
is credit rationing. This result arises when the difference in wealth between different entrepreneur
types is large and the difference between techniques is small.
Another result is that the more favourable are outside options (e.g., wage rate), the less credit
is rationed. Thus, lack of credit is a particular problem for collateral-constrained entrepreneurs
when the economy is in a downturn.
One of the implications of these models is that, with asymmetric information, a perfectly
competitive credit market will not produce the first-best efficient level of investment when col-
lateralizable wealth is unavailable. Micro-entrepreneurs with insufficient collateral are rationed
credit.
A number of Canadian credit unions have found ways to provide microcredit to micro-
entrepreneurs. In doing so, they appear to have at least partially solved the information asymmetry
problem. The approach used by credit unions to do so relies on bundling loan services with non-
financial services (e.g., mentoring). The classic explanation for the provision of non-financial
services is that financial capital and human capital are complements; thus the requirement to
receive non-financial services increases the entrepreneurs’ chances of surviving and succeeding.1
This study provides an additional reason: non-financial services can play a role in allowing
borrowers to self-select their loans so that the resources designated for collateral-constrained
micro-entrepreneurs are directed towards them and are not used by other entrepreneurs.
The bundling of micro-loans with the provision of non-financial services imposes extra
costs on entrepreneurs that obtain a micro-loan in comparison to a traditional loan. Assuming
heterogeneity in the entrepreneurs’ costs of obtaining a micro-loan, it is argued that entrepreneurs
who are the target clients of microcredit programs incur the lowest cost of obtaining a micro-
loan, while other entrepreneurs incur a relatively higher cost of obtaining a micro-loan. If this
1There are other explanations. For example, some training programs provide loan services in order to obtain
funds for their true mission because funders are more willing to pay for loans than training (Servon [2001]).
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outcome occurs, then the high cost discourages the latter from obtaining micro-loans. Thus, the
use of non-financial services, along with the interest rate and collateral, in the loan contact results
in a perfect separation and a more efficient level of investment.
The above modelling work was carried out under the assumption that the credit market is
perfectly competitive. With perfect competition, any and all firms would be prepared to offer
microcredit programs. Yet this is not the pattern that is observed. Instead, credit unions and
non-profit organizations are major players in the microcredit market, while the chartered banks
are typically not involved. As well, the credit market is oligopolistic in nature. To explain the
advantages and disadvantages of IOFs (e.g., chartered banks) versus credit unions in providing
microcredit, a model of a monopoly credit union was developed.
Two outcomes were examined and compared: one is a monopoly IOF that operates a micro-
credit program, and the other is a credit union that operates a microcredit program. Rather than
assuming there is a perfectly elastic supply of loan funds, the analysis considered the situation
where loan funds for microcredit are raised by offering a community investment saving deposit
program. With this saving product, the lender can access loan funds at below-market rates of
interest. The model assumes that savers make deposit decisions based on both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary motives.
The analysis suggests that credit unions, in comparison with IOFs, have advantages in provid-
ing microcredit to micro-entrepreneurs. The presence of a credit union leads to a better outcome
in terms of both the level of investment that is financed and the benefits to borrowers and savers.
The credit unions’ advantage stems from their focus on the welfare of their members rather than
on the profits earned.
An important aspect of the analysis is the orientation that the credit union has towards
borrowers and savers. The interest rates chosen by the credit union are affected by its member
orientation. As the credit union demonstrates a stronger preference towards borrowers, it reduces
both loan and deposit interest rates; consequently borrowers will be better off and savers are
worse off (the impacts are reversed if the credit union shows a stronger preference for savers).
Moreover, the stronger the credit union is in favour of one group (either borrowers or savers),
the less efficient is the outcome. Under some conditions, the outcome under the credit union is
less efficient than the outcome under the IOF.
This result arises because any deviation from neutrality results in a bias and creates a dead-
weight loss. For example, a completely borrower-oriented credit union offers the lowest possible
165
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
deposit interest rate in order to make the highest possible profit, as if it is an IOF. The credit union
then uses the profit from savers to cross-subsidize borrowers by offering them a loan interest
rate that is lower than what a neutral credit union would charge. A deadweight loss is created in
each market. As shown in the analysis, under some conditions, the total surplus under a credit
union may be lower than that under an IOF.
The impact of the non-pecuniary motives of savers on the pricing policies of the two financial
institutions was also examined. The results indicate that when an IOF operates the microcredit
program an increase in saver member commitment is translated into more profits for the IOF
rather than better access to credit. In comparison, when the credit union operates the microcredit
program, an increase in saver member commitment is translated into more benefits to borrowers
and savers in aggregate – whether borrowers or savers benefit and how the benefits are distributed
between borrowers and savers depends on the member orientation of the credit union. Conse-
quently, in a borrower-oriented credit union, an increase in saver member commitment results
in better access to credit for borrowers; this may not be the case in a saver-oriented credit union.
This result implies that credit unions are likely to be more capable of successfully operating a
microcredit program than are IOFs. All else equal, credit unions are able to obtain greater support
from their saver members, and thus have more loan funds available for delivering microcredit.
This study has some practical implications. First, it shows that the practice of bundling
microcredit and non-financial services used by credit unions can serve as a way of solving
the key information asymmetry problem that plagues microcredit schemes. The findings of the
study suggest that the administrators of microcredit programs should pay particular attention
to the nature of the non-financial services so that they properly fulfill their role and thus allow
low-collateral entrepreneurs to obtain loans.
A second implication is these monitoring services need not be provided by the credit union
itself; instead, this service could be provided by outside agencies working in concert with the
credit union. Indeed, a mixture of such practices is observed in the credit unions that were iden-
tified. A good example of an outside partnership is Assiniboine Credit Union (ACU) and SEED
Winnipeg. Since the establishment of SEED Winnipeg, the two organizations have been working
together on a number of community-based initiatives, including microcredit lending. ACU is
responsible for approving the loan applications and administrating the loans. SEED Winnipeg
provides the entrepreneurs with information and skills necessary to successfully operate a busi-
ness through training, workshops and after-care services for a specified period. SEED Winnipeg
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not only assists the entrepreneurs to walk through the loan application process, but also provides
ACU with assistance in screening and assessing the loan applications by having one staff sitting
on the review committee. This alliance with SEED Winnipeg allows ACU to concentrate on
it strength (i.e., lending) without committing extra resources and effort to the delivery of the
complementary non-financial services.
Finally, the model highlighted the importance of member commitment in the delivery of
micro-loans by a credit union. Member commitment enables the credit union to access cheap
capital to finance micro-loans. Therefore, for the successful delivery of micro-loans, the culti-
vation of member commitment is crucial. This may be more challenging for large urban credit
unions. Such credit unions serve diversified membership. As a result, members tend to have a
weak commitment to the broad community served by their credit union. This weak commitment,
in turn, may cause a difficulty in mobilizing deposits which are used to finance micro-loans.
Therefore, a credit union that wants to operate a community-oriented program should invest
in enhancing its image as a community-minded financial organization and raising members’
awareness to distinguish itself from other financial institutions.
7.2 Implications for Further Study
This study contributes to the credit rationing literature and the co-operative literature. However,
there are a number of areas that can be further pursued.
First, the lenders were limited in the use of selection instruments, i.e., they can only use the
interest rate and collateral to induce self-selection. The outcome is that an entrepreneur either
receives the amount of credit that he/she requested or is completely denied credit. However, in
practice lenders have more instruments at their discretion. One of such instruments is loan size.
Sometimes, lenders provide smaller loans than the amount for which entrepreneurs apply. One
area for future work is to allow lenders to make use of the interest rate, collateral and loan size
to screen the entrepreneurs. In this way, the analysis can be extended to another type of credit
rationing – loan size rationing.
Second, the credit union was assumed to offer a single price. However, such a strategy gen-
erally does not yield the most efficient outcome when members are heterogeneous. To overcome
this efficiency problem, non-linear pricing schemes could be applied to both borrower members
and saver members.
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Third, the behaviour of a monopoly credit union was examined and compared to that of a
monopoly IOF. In reality, of course, credit unions typically operate alongside IOFs in mixed
oligopolies. The operation of a microcredit program can be considered as a strategy that credit
unions use to differentiate themselves from their IOF competitors. A possible area for future
work is to examine the use of microcredit programs in this context.
Finally, credit unions have amalgamated rapidly in recent years. The result is the creation of
large credit unions that often serve quite diversified (e.g., geographic, ethnic, socio-economic)
communities. The formation of these new credit unions raises a number of questions. For instance,
are these larger credit unions able to use microcredit programs as differentiation strategies, or
does member commitment break down in these large organizations. How will the members from
one part of the credit union react to microcredit programs directed at members from another
part of the credit union? Are the managers of these larger credit unions likely to be more profit
focused, and thus less willing to participate in microcredit programs? These questions pose
interesting problems for future research.
168
Chapter 7. Summary and Conclusions
169
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Bibliography
ACU (2009). Assiniboine Credit Union Annual Report, 2009.
Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488–500.
Amess, K. and B. Howcroft (2001). Corporate Governance Structures and the Comparative
Advantage of Credit Unions. Empirical Research-Based and Theory-Building Papers 9, 59–
65.
Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equiv-
alence. The Economic Journal 97, 1447–58.
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-glow
Giving. The Economic Journal 100, 464–77.
Armendariz de Aghion, B. and C. Gollier (2000). Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection
Model. Economic Journal 110, 632–43.
Armendariz de Aghion, B. and J. Morduch (2005). The Economics of Microfinance. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. American
Economic Review 53, 931–73.
Arrow, K. J. (1968). The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment. American Economic
Review 58, 537–39.
Balkin, S. (1992). Entrpreneurial Activities of Homeless Men. Journal of Sociology ad Social
Welfare 19, 129–50.
170
Bibliography
Banerjee, A., T. Besley, and T. Guinnane (1994). Thy Neighbor’s Keeper: The Design of a Credit
Cooperative with Theory and A Test. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 491–515.
Barham, B. L., S. Boucher, and M. R. Carter (1996). Credit Constraints, Credit Unions, and
Small-Scale Producers in Guatemala. World Development 24, 793–806.
Barry, A. and O. Bruno (2008). Microcredit Supply in Developed Countries: The Role of
Mentoring. Preliminary Draft.
Bates, T. (1997). Race, Self-Employment and Upward Mobility: An Illusive American Dream.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bates, T. and L. J. Servon (1998). Microenterprise as an Exit Route from Poverty: Recommen-
dations for Programs and Policy Makers. Journal of Urban Affairs 20, 419–41.
Bennett, L., M. Goldberg, and P. Hunte (1996). Ownership and Sustainability: Lessons on
Group-Based Financial Services from South Asia. Journal of International Development 8,
271–288.
Berger, A. N. and G. F. Udell (1990). Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk. Journal of
Monetary Economics 25, 21–42.
Berger, A. N. and G. F. Udell (1992). Some Evidence on the Empirical Significance of Credit
Rationing. Journal of Political Economy 100, 1047–77.
Bernhardt, I. (1994). Competitive Advantage in Self-Employment and Paid Work. Canadian
Journal of Economics 27, 273–89.
Besanko, D. and A. V. Thakor (1987). Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopo-
listic and Competitive Credit Markets. International Economic Review 28, 671–89.
Besley, T. and S. Coate (1995). Group Lending, Repayment Incentives, andSocial Collateral.
Journal of Development Economics 46, 1–18.
Besley, T., S. Coate, and G. Loury (1993). The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit
Associations. American Economic Review 83, 792–810.
Bester, H. (1985). Screening versus Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information.
American Economic Review 75, 850–55.
171
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Bester, H. (1987). The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information. European
Economic Review 31, 887–99.
Bevilacqia, M. (1998, November). The Future Starts Now: A Study on the Financial Services
Sector in Canada. Technical report, The Standing Committee on Finance, Canada.
Bhatt, N., G. Plainter, and S.-Y. Tang (2002). The Challenges of Outreach and Sustainability for
U.S. Microcredit Programs. In J. H. Carr and Z.-Y. Tong (Eds.), Replicating Microfinance in
the United State, Washington, D.C., pp. 191– 222. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Bhatt, N. and S.-Y. Tang (1998). The Problem of Transaction Costs in Group-Based Microlend-
ing: An Institutional Perspective. World Development 26, 623–37.
Bhatt, N. and S.-Y. Tang (2002). Determinants of Repayment in Microcredit: Evidence from
Programs in the United States. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26,
360–76.
Bhatt, N., S.-Y. Tang, and G. Painter (2001). Making Microcredit Work in the United States:
Social, Financial, and Administrative Dimensions. Economic Development Quarterly 15, 229–
41.
Bhattacharya, S. and A. V. Thakor (1993). Contemporary Banking Theory. Journal of Financial
Intermediation 3, 2–50.
Blanchflower, D. G. and A. J. Oswald (1998). What Makes an Entrepreneur? Journal of Labour
Economics 16, 26–60.
Blanchflower, D. G., A. J. Oswald, and A. Stutzer (2001). Latent Entrepreneurship across
Nations. European Economic Review 45, 680–91.
Boot, A. W. and A. V. Thakor (1994). Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely
Repeated Credit Market Game. International Economic Review 35, 899–920.
Boot, A. W., A. V. Thakor, and G. F. Udell (1991). Secured lending and default risk: Equilibrium
analysis, policy implications and empirical results. The Economic Journal 101, 458–72.
Bouchard, M., C. Ferraton, and V. Michaud (2006). Database on Social Economy Organiza-
tions: the Qualification Criteria. Working Papers of the Canada Research Chair on the Social
Economy.
172
Bibliography
Bouchard, M., C. Ferraton, and V. Michaud (2008). First Steps of an Information System on
Social Economy Organizations: Qualifying the Organizations. Estudios de Economia Apli-
cada 26, 7–24.
Bundt, T., J. S. Chisea, and B. P. Keating (1989). Common Bond Type and Credit Union Behavior.
Review of Social Economy 47, 27–42.
Canning, D., C. W. Jefferson, and J. E. Spencer (2003). Optimal Credit Rationing in Not-for-
Profit Financial Institutions. International Economic Review 44, 243–61.
Carr, J. H. and Z.-Y. Tong (2002). Introduction: Replicating Microfinance in the United State
– An Overview. In J. H. Carr and Z.-Y. Tong (Eds.), Replicating Microfinance in the United
State, Washington, D.C., pp. 1–18. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Cater, M. R. (1986). Equilibrium Credit Rationing of Small Farm Agriculture. Journal of
Development Economics 28, 83–103.
CEDSEDI (1990). Interim Lessons Learned from Self-Employment Programs for the Disad-
vantaged: A Study of U.S. and Canadian Programs and Policy Perspectives.
CFIB (2003). Banking on Competition: Results of CFIB Banking Survey. http://www.
fin.gc.ca/consultresp/mergersRespns_24-eng.asp.
Chan, Y.-S. and G. Kanatas (1985). Asymmetric Valuation and the Role of Collateral in Loan
Agreements. Credit and Banking 17, 84–95.
Chan, Y.-S. and A. V. Thakor (1987). Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard
and Private Information. Journal of Finance 42, 345–63.
Chaput, K. (2003). A Community of Opportunity: Developing a Microcredit Program for Persons
with Developmental Disabilities in Alberta.
Che, Y.-K. (2002). Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring Under Group Lending. Working Paper.
CICA (1984). Financial Reporting for Credit Unions: A Research Study. The Canadian Institute
of Chartered Accountants.
Clemenz, G. (1986). Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information. Springler-Verlag, Berlin.
173
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Coco, G. (1999). Collateral, Heterogeneity in Risk Attitude and the Credit Market Equilibrium.
European Economic Review 43, 559–74.
Cowling, M. (1998). Regional Determinants of Small Firm Loans under the UK Loan Guarantee
Scheme. Small Business Economics 11, 155–67.
Coyle, M. and R. Wehrell (2006). Small is Beautiful, Big is Necessary; Canada’s Commercial
and Cooperative Answers to the Global Challenge of Microfinance Access. In Presentation to
the Global Microcredit Summit.
CUCC (2010). http://www.cucentral.ca.
Dakurah, H. A., E. Goddard, and N. Osuteye (2005). Attitudes Towards and Satisfaction with
Credit Unions in Alberta: A Regression and Scale Analysis. http://ageconsearch.
umn.edu/bitstream/34155/1/cp05da01.pdf. Paper prepared for presentation at
the Canadian Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, First
Draft.
Dallinger, B. (1989). Firmstart: A Study of the Viability of Self-Employment for Unemployed
and Low-income People. Technical report, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
de Meza, D. and D. Webb (1987). Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 282–92.
de Meza, D. and D. Webb (2000). Does Credit Rationing Imply Insufficient Lending? Journal
of Public Economics 78, 215–34.
Delbrouck, L. Y. A. (1994). Beyond Banking: The Potential for Credit Union Participation in
Community Economic Development. Master’s thesis, University of British Colmbia.
Denis, W. J. J. (1987). Business Regulations as an Impediment to the Transition from Welfare
to Self-employment. Journal of Labour Research 19, 263–76.
Diagne, E. (1998). Default Incentives, Peer Pressure, and Equilibrium Outcomes in Group-Based
Lending Programs. Technical report, IFPRI.
174
Bibliography
Dubreuil, G. and C. T. Mirada (2008). An Analysis of the Public Initiatives to Sup-
port Self-Employment Business Activities of the Less Favoured: Is There a Public Pol-
icy to Support the Micro-Credit Sector in Developed Countries? The Case of Catalo-
nia and Spain. http://www.orkestra.deusto.es/eunip2008/wp-content/
uploads/2008/10/estapemirada.pdf.
EMC (2002). Gaps in SME Financing: An Analytical Framework.
http://www.sme-fdi.gc.ca/eic/site/sme_fdi-prf_pme.nsf/
vwapj/FinancingGapAnalysisEquinoxFeb2002_e.pdf/\$FILE/
FinancingGapAnalysisEquinoxFeb2002_e.pdf. Prepared for Small Business
Policy Branch Industry Canada.
Emmons, W. R. and W. Mueller (1997). Conflict of Interest Between Borrowers and Lenders
in Credit Cooperatives: The Case of German Cooperative Banks. FRB of St. Louis, Working
Paper.
Emmons, W. R. and F. A. Schmidt (2000). Pricing and Dividend Policies In Open Credit
Cooperatives. FRB of St. Louis.
Emmons, W. R. and F. A. Schmidt (2001). Membership Structure, Competition, and Occupational
Credit Unions. http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/
01/0101we.pdf. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economics Working Papers.
Enke, S. (1945). Consumer Cooperatives and Economic Efficiency. American Economic Re-
view 35, ‘48–55.
Fairbairn, B., L. H. Ketilson, and P. Krebs (1997). Credit Unions and Community Economic
Development. Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, University of Saskatchewan.
Farmer, R. N. (1977). Would You Want Your Son to Marry a Marketing Lady? Journal of
Marketing 41, 15–18.
Ferguson, C. and D. McKillop (1997). The Strategic Development of Credit Unions. Wiley.
Ferrary, M. (2003). Trust and Social Capital in the Regulation of Lending Activities. Journal of
Socio-Economics 31, 673–99.
175
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Fischer, K. P. (1998). Financial Co-operatives: A “Market Solution” to SME and Rural Financing
Development of Credit Unions. Working Paper.
Fischer, K. P. and M. R. Mahfoudhi (2003). The Theory of the Mutual Financial Intermediary:
A Review. Online Publication, A.
Flannery, M. J. (1974). An Economic Evaluation of Credit Unions in the United States. Federal
REserve Bank of Boston Research Report No.54.
Frankiewicz, C. (2001). Calmeadow Metrofund: A Canadian Experiment in Sustainable Micro-
finance. http://www.calmeadow.com/metrofund.pdf.
Fulton, M. (1998, September). The Economics of Co-operatives. University of Saskatchewan.
Class Notes.
Fulton, M. (2005). Producer Associations: the International Experience. In B. H. Sonntag, J.-K.
Huang, S. Rozelle, and J. H. Skerritt (Eds.), China’s Agricultural and Rural Development in
the Early 21st Century, Canberra, pp. 174–96. Australian Centre for International Agricultural
Research.
Ghatak, M. (1999). Group Lending, Local Information and Peer Selection. Journal of Develop-
ment Economics 60, 27–50.
Ghatak, M., M. Morelli, and T. Sjostrom (2001). Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and
Allocation of Talent. http://www.sss.ias.edu/files/papers/econpaper26.
pdf. 2nd version.
Ghosh, P. and D. Ray (1997). Co-operation in Community Interaction without Information
Flows. The Review of Economic Studies 63, 491–519.
Goldenberg, M. (2006). Building Blocks for Strong Communities – A Profile of Small- and
Medium-Sized Enterprises in Canada. A research report prepared for Human Resource and
Social Development Canada.
Gonzalez-Vega, C., M. Schreiner, R. L. Meyer, J. Rodriguez-Meza, and S. Navajas (1997).
Microfinance for the Poor. Paris, OECD.
176
Bibliography
Government of Canada (2004). Co-operatives and the Social Economy. Prepared by the Co-
operatives Secretariat.
Guinnane, T. W. (2001). Cooperatives as Information Machines: German Rural Credit Cooper-
atives. Journal of Economic History 61, 366–89.
Hannafin, K. M. G. and D. G. McKillop (2006). A Thought on Altruism in the Economic
Evaluation of Credit Unions. Journal of Co-operative Studies 39(2), 5–14.
Hansmann, H. (1980). The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise. Yale Law Journal 89, 835–901.
Hansmann, H. (1988). Ownership of the Firm. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4,
267–304.
Hansmann, H. (1990). The Economic Role of Commercial Nonprofits: The Evolution of the
Saving Bank Industry. In H. Anheier and W. Seibel (Eds.), The Nonprofit Sector: Inernational
and Comparative Perspectives, Berlin. Walter de Gruyter and Co.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1996). The Governance of Exchanges: Members’ Cooperatives Versus
Outside Ownership. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 12, 53–69.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1998). Cooperatives Versus Outside Ownership. NBER Working Paper
6421.
Hart, S. L. and M. Touesnard (2008). Back to the Future: Integrating Sustainability into Credit
Union Strategy.
Hellwig, M. (1987). Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Competitive Markets with
Adverse Selection. European Economic Review 31, 319–25.
Helmberger, P. G. and S. Hoos (1962). Cooperative Enterprise and Organization Theory. Journal
of Farm Economics 44, 275–90.
Hillier, B. and M. V. Ibrahimo (1993). Asymmetric Information and Models of Credit Rationing.
Bulletin of Economic Research 45, 271–304.
Hossain, M. (1988). Credit for Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/rr65.
pdf. Institute Research Report 65.
177
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Hulme, D. and P. Mosley (1996). Finance against Poverty. London: Routledge.
Huppi, M. and G. Feder (1990). The Role of Groups and Credit Cooperatives in Rural Lending.
The World Bank Research Observer 5, 187–203.
Jaffee, D. and J. E. Stiglitz (1990). Credit Rationing. In B. M. Friedman and F. H. Hahn (Eds.),
The Handbook of Monetary Economics, Volume II, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 838–88.
Jain, S. and G. Mansuri (2003). A Little at a Time: The Use of Regularly Scheduled Repayments
in Microfinance Programs. Journal of Development Economics 72, 253–79.
Johnson, S. (1998). Microfinance North and South: Contrasting Current Debates. Journal of
International Development 10, 799–809.
Jones, P. A. (2001). The Growth of Credit Unions and Credit Co-operatives - Is the Past Still
Present? In E. Mayo and C. Guene (Eds.), Banking andSocial Cohesion. Alternative Responses
to a Global Market, Oxford. Jon Carpenter Publishing.
Ketilson, L. H. and K. Brown (2009). Financing Aboriginal Enterprise Development - The
Potential of Using Co-operative Models. Occasional Paper Series.
Knight, R. M. (1985). The Financing of Small High-technology Firms in Canada. Journal of
Small Business and Entrepreneurship 3, 5–17.
Kon, Y. and D. J. Story (2003). A Theory of Discouraged Borrowers. Small Business Eco-
nomics 21, 37–49.
Laffont, J. J. and P. Rey (2003). Collusion and Group Lending with Moral Hazard. Draft, IDEI.
Leeth, J. D. and J. A. Scott (1989). The Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence from the Small
Business Community. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24, 379–94.
Leland, H. E. and D. H. Pyle (1977). Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Finan-
cial Intermediaries. Journal of Finance 32, 371–87.
Levenson, A. R. and K. L. Willard (2000). Do Firms Get the Financing They Want? Measuring
Credit Rationing Experienced by Small Businesses in the US. Small Business Economics 14,
83–94.
178
Bibliography
Madajewicz, M. (2004). Joint Liability versus Individual Liability in Credit Contracts. http:
//www.econ.columbia.edu/RePEc/pdf/DP0304-18.pdf. Discussion Papers.
Mattesini, F. (1990). Screening in the Credit Market: The Role of Collateral. European Journal
of Political Economy 6, 1–22.
McMurtry, J. J. (2010). Introducing the Social Economy in Theory and Practice. In J. J. McMurtry
(Ed.), Living Economics – Canadian Perspectives on the Social Economy, Co-operatives, and
Community Economic Development, Toronto, Canada, pp. 1–34. Emond Montgomery Publi-
cations Ltd.
Milde, H. and J. G. Riley (1988). Signaling in Credit Markets. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 103, 109–29.
Morduch, J. (1998). Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship
Programs in Bangladesh. Working Papers 198, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School
of Public and International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies.
Morduch, J. (1999). The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from Grameen Bank.
Journal of Economics Development 60, 229–48.
Morrissey, M. and K. Mclvor (2008). The Belfast Social Economy: Emergence of a Model?
Queen’s University Belfast.
Moulaert, F. and O. Ailenei (2005). Social Economy, Third Sector and Solidarity Relations: A
Conceptual Synthesis from History to Present. Urban Studies 42, 2037–54.
Mount Auburn Associates (1994). An Evaluation of Working Capital Microenterprise Lend-
ing Program. Working Paper, The Institute for Cooperative Community Development, New
Hampshire College, Manchester.
Myers, S. C. and N. S. Majluf (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When
Firms Have Information That Investors Do not Have. Journal of Financial Economics 22,
187–221.
Navratil, F. (1981). An Aggregate Model of the Credit Union Industry. Journal of Finance XXXVI,
539–49.
179
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Ninacs, W. A. (2002). A Review of the Theory and Practice of Social Economy in Canada .
SRDC Working Paper Series 02-02.
Parker, S. C. (2001). Asymmetric Information, Occupational Choice and Government Policy.
Technical report, Department of Economics and Finance, University of Durham. Mimeo.
Parker, S. C. (2004). The Economics of Self-Employment and Entrepreneurship. Cambridge:
University Press.
Patin, R. P. and D. W. McNeil (1991a). Benefit Imbalances among Credit Union Members.
Applied Economics 23, 760–80.
Patin, R. P. and D. W. McNeil (1991b). Benefit Imbalances among Credit Union Members.
Applied Economics 23, 760–80.
Perez, S. J. (1998). Testing for Credit Rationing: An Application of Disequilibrium Economet-
rics. Journal of Macroeconomics 20, 721–39.
Peterson, S. (1980). Credit Unions: Theory, Empirical Evidence and Public Regualtion: Discus-
sion . Journal of Finance 36, 550–52.
Quarter, J., L. Mook, and A. Armstrong (2009). Understanding the Social Economy – A Canadian
Perspective. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Rahman, A. (1999). Microcredit Initiatives for Equitable and Sustainable Development. World
Development 26, 67–82.
Rai, A. and T. Sjostrom (2004). Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and
Insurance in Village Economies. Review of Economic Studies 71, 217–34.
Rispoli, L. (2009). Trends in Gross Domestic Product and Self-employment of Unincorporated
Enterprises in the Canadian Economy, 1987 to 2005. Economic Analysis Division, Statistics
Canada. Analytical Paper.
Russell, L. (2001). Access to Capital: Issues for Micro-Entrepreneurs in Halton. Halton Social
Planning Council & Volunteer Centre. Discussion Paper.
Schaefer-Kehnert, W. (1982). Success with Group Lending in Malawi. Development Digest 1,
10–15.
180
Bibliography
Schreft, S. L. and A. P. Villamil (1992). Credit Rationing by Loan Size in Commercial Loan
Markets. Economic Review 78, 3–8.
Schreiner, M. (1999a). Lessons for Microenterprise Programs from a Fresh Look at the Unem-
ployment Insurance Self-Employment Demonstration. Evaluation Review 23, 503–26.
Schreiner, M. (1999b). Self-employment, Microenterprise, and the Poorest Americans. Social
Service Review 73, 496–523.
Schreiner, M. (2003). Microenterprise Development Programs in the United States and in the
Developing World. World Development 31, 1567–80.
Schreiner, M. and J. Morduch (2002). Opportunities and Challenges for Microfinance in the
United States. In J. Carr and Z.-Y. Tong (Eds.), Replicating Microfinance in the United States,
Washington, D.C., pp. 19–61. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Schreiner, M. and G. Woller (2003). Microenterprise Development Programs in the United States
and in the Developing world. World Development 31, 1567–80.
Servon, L. J. (1999). From Public Assistance to Self-Sufficiency: the Role for the Microenterprise
Strategy. Working Papers.
Servon, L. J. (2001). Fulfilling the Potential of the US Microenterprise Strategy. In J. Carr and
Z.-Y. Tong (Eds.), Replicating Microfinance in the United States, Washington DC, pp. 169–90.
Fannie Mae Foundation.
Shaw, J. (2004). Microenterprise Occupation and Poverty Reduction in Microfinance Programs:
Evidence from Sri Lanka. World Development 32, 1247–64.
Sievers, M. and P. Vandenberg (2007). Synergies through Linkages: Who Benefits from Linking
Micro-Finance and Business Development Services. World Development 8, 1341–58.
Smith, D. J. (1984). A Theoretic Framework for the Analysis of Credit Union Decision Making.
The Journal of Finance XXXIX, 1155–1168.
Smith, D. J., T. Cargill, and R. Meyer (1981). An Economic Theory of a Credit Union. The
Journal of Finance 36, 519–528.
181
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
Soloman, L. D. (1992). Microenterprise: Human Reconstruction in America’s Inner Cities.
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 15, 191–221.
Staatz, J. M. (1987). Recent Developments in the Theory of Agricultural Cooperation. Journal
of Agricultural Cooperation 76, 74–95.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1990). Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets. World Bank Economic Review 4,
351–366.
Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss (1981). Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. The
American Economic Review 71, 393–410.
Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss (1992). Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets and Its Implica-
tions for Macro-economics. Oxford Economic Papers 44, 694–724.
Strandberg, C. (2004). The Emergence of Community Investment as a Strategy for Investing in
Your Community. In Saskatchewan “Investing in Your Community Conference”.
Tal, B. (2003). Canadian Small Business – A Growing Force. Technical report, CIBC World
Markets.
Tal, B. (2006). Small Business in Canada: Trends & Prospects. Technical report, CIBC World
Markets.
Taylor, R. (1971). The Credit Union as a Cooperative Institution. Review of Social Economy 29,
207–217.
Van Tassel, E. (1999). Group Lending under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Development
Studies 60, 3–25.
Vancity (2005). Vancity Microcredit Toolkit. http://www.
vancity.com/MyBusiness/BusinessFinancing/JustStarting/
MicrocreditToolkitDownloads/.
Vercammen, J., M. Fulton, and C. Hyde (1996). Non-Linear Pricing Schemes for Agricultural
Co-operatives. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78, 572–584.
182
Bibliography
Von Pischke, J. D. (2002). Current Foundations of Microfinance Best Practices in Developing
Countries. In J. H. Carr and Z.-Y. Tong (Eds.), Replicating Microfinance in the United State,
Washington, D.C., pp. 1–18. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Vroman, W. (1997). Self-Employment Assistance: Revised Report.
Walker, M. C. and G. G. Chandler (1977). On the Allocation of the Net Monetary Benefits of
the Credit Union Ownership. Review of Social Economy 35, 159–168.
Walter, J. (2006). Not Your Father’s Credit Union. Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond 92, 353–377.
Watson, H. (1984). Credit Markets and Borrower Effort. Sourthern Economic Journal 50,
802–13.
Wehrell, R., M. Campbell, G. Cunnigham, A. Mathie, and N. Lee (2002). The Atlantic Micro-
Credit Socio-Economic Impact Study. Final Report for the Atlantic Canada Opportunities
Agency and the Steering Committee to Coordinate Research on Micro-Credit in Atlantic
Canada.
Williams, T. (2004). Requiem for Microcredit? The Decline of a Romantic Ideal. Banking and
Finance Law Review 19, 145–98.
Wilson, R. and S. Bailey (2004). A Self Employment Policy Discussion Paper: Trends, Chal-
lenges, Barriers and Conclusions. SEDI.
Wydick, B. (2001). Can Social Cohesion Be Harnessed to Repair Market Failures? Evidence
from Group Lending in Guatemala. The Economic Journal 109, 463–75.
183
An Economic Analysis of Microcredit Lending
184
Appendix A. Interview Guide
Appendix A
Semi-Structured Interview Guide
The following three sets of draft questions identify the areas that the researcher intends to
explore through personal interviews with microcredit borrowers; credit union loan officers, staff,
and supervising committee members; and managers and staff of the community development
organizations, respectively. The questions are intended to guide the participants. It is expected
that in some cases, depending on the nature of the response, that the discussion might go outside
the expected scope of the interview. The respondents will be allowed and encouraged to tell the
stories they think most important.
Each set of questions consists of a few main questions, followed by a number of probing
questions. Depending on the participant’s response to the main questions, probing questions may
be asked in order to collect information of interest.
A.1 Draft Questions I - for microcredit borrowers:
1. Please describe how you became a microcredit borrower.
• What type of business did you invest in?
• What were the main barriers to getting credit?
• Please describe the financial infrastructure in your community. What were the alter-
native financing sources that you had access to?
• Why did you choose the credit union? How long have you been a member?
• How long have you obtained microcredit loans from the credit union?
• How did you use the microcredit loans?
• Do you use the other financial services provided by the credit union?
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2. Please describe your borrowing experience.
• How well does the program work?
• What are the main problems with the program (for example, small size, high trans-
action cost, high interest rate, document requirements, etc)?
3. Please describe your repayment performance.
• Have you ever experienced repayment difficulties? What were the causes (control-
lable or uncontrollable shocks, etc.) and what was your action?
• Have you ever had to delay your repayment or default on your loans? Why? What
happened as a consequence?
• Please describe the lending culture of your community or your ethic group.
• Do you have problems with book-keeping, cash flow management, etc.?
4. Please describe your relationship with loan officers/staff of credit union.
• How often does the loan officer/staff pay a visit to your house or workplace, or make
a phone call to you? What are the main topics of the conversation?
• Have you and the loan officer/staff established a personal relationship? How long did
it take to build this relationship?
• Do you think the loan officer understands you - i.e. your culture, religion, values? Is
he/she an outsider or insider in your community? Do you trust him/her?
• Do you come to credit union for consultations when you experience difficulties in
operating your business? Why or why not?
• Do you actively participate in events and activities organized by credit union? Why
or why not?
5. Please describe your relationship with community development organization(s) that are
involved in microcredit programs.
• What service do you receive?
• Is there any service that is prerequisite for microcredit? Is it useful to your business?
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• Will you continue to participate in the organizations’ activities if you no longer need
microcredit service?
• How often do you meet the managers/staff of the organizations?
• Do you think the managers/staff of the organizations understand you - i.e., your
culture, religion, values, and needs? Do you trust them?
• Do the managers/staff visit your house or workplace regularly?
• Do you go to them for advice or consultation?
6. Please describe your experience with the animators.
• How long has the animator worked in your community?
• What’s your personal relationship with the animator?
• Do you trust the animator?
• What service does the animator provide?
• Do you think you need to do something for the animator in return?
• Who do you prefer to work with – the loan officers/staff or the animators? Why?
7. Please describe your demographic characteristics.
• Are you a new immigrant? What is your ethic background? Your religion? Education
level? Language? Family size? Dependent children? Income level? Income sources?
• How long have you been living in this community? Do you plan to move in the near
future?
Additional questions for peer lending borrowers:
8. How and when was the lending group formed? What was your relationship with the peer
members before the formation of the group (kinship, friends, acquaintances, partners, etc.)
• Do you trust your peers? Do you monitor their investment activities?
9. What is your experience with the peers?
• Do you help each other if anyone faces financial difficulties, or impose social sanc-
tions instead?
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• Since the first loan was granted, has any member exited voluntarily or involuntarily?
• What are the key subjects of the regular group meetings? How often do you meet?
A.2 Draft Questions II - for loan officers and staff (including animators) /
supervising committee members in credit unions:
1. How and why did the credit union launch and develop the microcredit program?
• What are the goals and vision?
• What are the main activities?
• Who are the targeted population? How does the credit union reach them?
• What are the major events that have significant impacts on the development of mi-
crocredit program, if there are any?
• How many borrower members? What is the average loan size?
• What is the role of support from third parties?
2. What are the major barriers to delivering microcredit service?
3. Please describe in detail how a microcredit loan is processed.
• What are the security requirements?
• How does the credit union collect borrowers’ information?
• What are the challenges and difficulties Ð i.e. social, cultural, or ethic factors?
4. What is the governance structure of the microcredit program?
5. What are the main policies related to the microcredit program?
• Loan policies
• Incentive policies (reward/punishment)
• How are the policies implemented?
6. What innovations have the credit union made in delivering microcredit service?
• What innovations in screening, monitoring, enforcement and collection?
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• What innovations in educating borrowers and bridging cultural gaps?
• What are the impacts?
7. What is the relationship between borrowers and the loan officers/staff?
• What are the qualifications or requirements for the loan officers/staff?
• Is there any personal relationship established? Is it helpful to improve repayment
performance?
• How long does it take to build this relationship?
• What is the ratio of loan officers/staff to borrowers?
8. Please describe the functions / roles of the community development organizations that are
involved in the microcredit program.
• Why and how did they get involved?
• What are the qualifications or requirements for the organizations to get involved?
• What service do they provide?
• What knowledge or skills are necessary to provide the service? Does the credit union
provide them with necessary support (i.e. training)?
• How do you evaluate their service?
• What policies or mechanisms are in place to ensure that the organizations behave in
the credit union’s interest?
• How often do you meet the organizations’ personnel? What are the main topics of
the meetings?
• Will the credit union continue to co-operate with the community development orga-
nizations in delivering microcredit in the near future?
9. Please describe the functions / roles of the animators.
• Why did the credit union hire the animators?
• What are the qualifications or requirements? What training is provided?
• What are the animators’ functions?
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• How do the animators report their work?
• In your view, who do borrowers prefer to work with Ð the loan officers / staff or the
animators?
• What are the impacts of the introduction of the animators? How do you assess the
roles of the animators?
10. What are the challenges and difficulties in operating a microcredit program?
11. What are the repayment rate, loan loss provision, average loan disbursement, actual loan
loss, etc?
Questions for Animators
12. Why did you start to work as an animator?
13. What are the major barriers to credit in your community?
• In your community, are there any social, cultural, ethic or religious factors affecting
repayment performance?
14. What’s your experience with borrowers?
• How and how often do you reach borrowers?
• What service do you provide?
• Do you think there is reciprocity between you and borrowers?
• What are the problems or difficulties in working with borrowers?
• What are the benefits of being an animator (except the wage you have received) if
there’s any?
15. Please describe your social and economic status in the community
A.3 Draft Questions III - for Discussion with managers / staff of community
development organizations:
1. Please briefly describe the development history of the organization
• When was the organization established?
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• What are the goals, values and vision?
• What activities are undertaken to achieve the goals?
• Who is the targeted population? How does the organization reach them?
2. Why and how did the organization begin to get involved in the microcredit programs?
• What are the main barriers to credit?
• How long has the organization been involved?
• Will the organization continue to be involved in the future?
• What is the percentage of the clients requiring credit service? Please describe their
social and economic status.
3. Please describe in details the organization’s service related to microcredit program.
• What expertise and experience are required?
• Does the credit union provide necessary training?
• Does it form an important part of the organization’s activities?
• What are the organization’s main concerns?
• Good repayment performance is very important to the credit union. How this is
embedded in the organization’s practice?
4. Is there any other service tied to microcredit?
5. Please describe the relationship between the organization and microcredit borrowers.
• How does the organization collect information?
• Do you visit their houses or workplace, or make phone calls regularly?
• Do they come to you for advice or consultation?
6. Please describe the relationship between the organization and the credit union.
• How is the borrower information shared?
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